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The adoption of a new constitution following the removal of an autocrat is an 
important step towards the establishment of a democratic regime. While many factors 
can influence whether the new constitution is broadly accepted by political parties or 
not, international actors involved in democracy promotion and peace-building have 
consistently emphasized the importance of crafting inclusive constitution-making 
processes. However, so far, little systematic evidence has been gathered to prove that 
constitution-making design matters. The main question of this thesis, therefore, is: 
Does inclusive constitution-making design help to foster agreement on a constitution 
during democratization, and if so, how? This contains two sub-questions: (1) Does the 
difference in constitution-making design help to explain why political parties of the 
anti-authoritarian coalitions disagreed on the constitution in Egypt, while they reached 
agreement in Tunisia, after the 2010/11 uprisings?; (2) Why do some countries adopt 
a design that is inclusive and others do not? This thesis draws on democratization and 
constitution-making scholarship to inform an investigation into these questions. Its 
main theoretical contribution lies in bringing together perspectives from scholarly 
traditions that have rarely crossed paths. The empirical contribution of this thesis is 
that it presents original primary material, including close to 60 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in Cairo, Tunis, and Prague between 2014 and 2017. Combining 
a comparison of two similar cases of constitutional change in the midst of 
democratization, Egypt and Tunisia, with a within-case analysis, the thesis moderates 
the claim that constitution-making design matters. It argues that inclusive design can 
function as a safeguard against a situation where a constitution is fashioned by a 
temporary majority. Yet, inclusive procedures, of themselves, cannot guarantee that 
the constitution will be embraced across political divides, while the intrinsic problem 
of endogeneity further calls into question the weight attached to the design-based 
explanation. Finally, the thesis develops and applies conceptual tools which help to 
distinguish between two forms of inclusiveness which previously have been only 
broadly outlined in theoretical accounts of constitution-making, shedding light on 
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“Constitutions provide an overarching legal framework that set out the 
basis of a social contract between State and its people. They establish 
the institutions of government and their powers vis-à-vis each other 
and the people. UNDP supports participatory, inclusive, transparent 
constitution-making processes that help build consensus around a 
shared vision of society.” 
UNDP website, 20181 
 
“Many of us likely suspect that the conditions and rules under 
which founders write, deliberate, and ratify will be consequential. 
We just cannot say with any authority how they matter or to what 
extent.” 
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009, p. 202) 
 
After the historic vote on the Tunisian constitution in January 2014 in the National 
Constituent Assembly (NCA), Mustafa Ben Jaafar, the Assembly’s president, was 
quoted as saying: “This constitution, without being perfect, is one of consensus. We 
had today a new rendezvous with history to build a democracy founded on rights and 
equality”.2 This quote is emblematic of the debates about constitutional change that 
                                               
 
1 UNDP, “Democratic governance and peacebuilding”, available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/inclusive-
political-processes/constitutional-reform.html [accessed 12 August 2018].   
2 Associated Press, “Tunisia signs new constitution”, The Guardian, 27 January 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-new-constitution-progressive 
[accessed 12 August 2018].  
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took place in Tunisia and Egypt after the popular uprisings that swept away their 
longstanding dictators in 2011. Writing new constitutions, and ones that would be built 
on broad agreement between the political forces that emerged from the revolutions, 
was viewed as a critical task for the countries’ journeys to democracy. This thesis is 
concerned with the processes of producing constitutions in the wake of democratic 
change. Specifically, it investigates whether constitution-making design, that is rules 
and practices that frame how protagonists of constitutional change convene, debate 
and approve constitutions, has a bearing on constitutional agreement.  
It does so in the context of the Arab uprisings and the two countries where 
popular protests triggered the removal of dictators, Egypt and Tunisia. Scrapping old 
constitutions and writing new ones had its symbolic value, putting a stamp on the 
move away from authoritarianism. In practical terms, the reforms could have focused 
on the adjustment of the legal order to reflect the democratic aspirations of the 25 
January Revolution in Egypt and the Revolution of Dignity in Tunisia. Formally 
laying down provisions underpinning groups’ and individuals’ rights and freedoms, 
reforming the relationship between the executive, legislative, and judiciary, and 
placing restraints on governments constituted an important step towards 
institutionalizing democracy. It is, hence, not surprising that constitutional reforms 
emerged at the top of the political agenda immediately after the revolutionary tide 
unseated President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, 
in January and February 2011, respectively. 
In Egypt, this aspiration mirrored the opposition efforts to reform the 1971 
Constitution which, prior to Mubarak’s fall, was a key part of its strategy in 
challenging the regime. Mubarak’s opponents regularly questioned electoral laws that 
favoured the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) in court in order to press for 
3 
 
amendments. Later on, the opposition called for constitutional changes that would 
allow independent candidates to run for the presidency and give judges the power to 
supervise electoral processes in which fraud was not uncommon (Brown, 2011b).3 
Constitutional change was also a central issue in Tunisia. This manifested itself when 
Tunisians who, a few days before, had caused Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia, returned 
to the capital’s Kasbah square on 20 February 2011, demanding the election of a 
constituent assembly to write a new constitution. Protesters viewed producing a new 
constitution as “a concrete and audible way to put down the regime” (Hmed, 2016, pp. 
86-9). 
Changing the constitutions was, nevertheless, expected to be a challenging 
endeavour. Diverse groups in Egyptian and Tunisian society joined forces to 
pressurise their authoritarian presidents and governments to resign. Yet these initial 
anti-authoritarian coalitions, to use Przeworski’s (1988, pp. 63-4) term, were far from 
coherent entities. Political parties in Egypt and Tunisia were divided along an array of 
cleavages, including left-right, generational and, most importantly, religious (Shehata, 
2010; Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2011). While they might have agreed on overthrowing 
their dictators, as in other transitioning countries, these parties had different, and often 
competing, ideas about, and preferences for, the answers to the question of how 
politics should be organized after the presidents for life were gone (see Przeworski, 
1988, pp. 63-4). Tunisians appeared to have bridged these contentious issues when 
parties across the divides embraced the constitution in January 2014, while the charter 
                                               
 
3 BBC, “Mohammed ElBaradei Urges Egypt Election Boycott”, 7 September 2010, available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11212449 [accessed 12 August 2018]. 
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produced in Egypt in November 2012 seemed only to foster disagreement and led to 
deepening political polarization along the Islamist-secularist friction line.4  
My motivation for writing this thesis developed against the backdrop of two 
trends that overlapped at the time when constitution-making processes were underway 
in the Arab Spring countries. The first of these trends was the increasing attention that 
was being paid by the international community to constitution-making assistance. As 
part of this agenda, international organizations which focused on constitutional 
reforms began to promote so-called “best practices” for constitutional change globally. 
Perhaps influenced by this movement, the second trend manifested itself in terms of 
the weight that local actors, students of regional politics, and constitutional experts 
attached to the broad agreement on new constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia. These two 
trends sparked my interest because they intersected in the strong, and often uncritical, 
conviction that constitution-making processes are consequential and that inclusive 
processes are a key to constitutional agreement.  
The main question of this thesis, therefore, is: Does inclusive constitution-
making design help to foster agreement on a constitution during democratization and, 
if so, how? This contains two further sub-questions: (1) Does the difference in 
                                               
 
4 In line with Shehata (2010) and most of the mainstream literature, I distinguish between the broad 
categories of Islamists and secularists (which I use interchangeably with non-Islamist or secular-
leaning). I use these terms to distinguish between the two groups’ understanding of the role of 
religion in national politics. The term secularist, hence, does not imply its proponents were, on a 
personal level, less pious than Islamists. Furthermore, and as described in the coming chapters, these 
categories contain a wide range of political forces on the left and right in terms of their preferred 
economic policies, or in advocating for more or less conservative social projects. Given the anti-
religious connotation of the word secular in the Egyptian context, politicians within this stream 
preferred to label themselves as “civil forces”. Nevertheless, I stick to the term secularist, because the 




constitution-making design help to explain why political parties in the anti-
authoritarian coalitions disagreed on the constitution in Egypt while they agreed in 
Tunisia?; (2) Why do some countries adopt a design that is inclusive while others do 
not? In answering these questions, this thesis moderates the claim that constitution-
making design matters. It argues that inclusive constitution-making design can 
function as a safeguard against a situation where a constitution is fashioned by a 
temporary majority. My basic contention is that constitution-making design, on its 
own, cannot guarantee agreement between political opponents that find themselves 
very far apart on key issues and that, therefore, other factors have to be present to 
ensure that the differing views of those building the constitution are accommodated. 
In addition, by focusing attention on the question of how constitution-making designs 
emerge, the thesis indicates that only some contexts might be conducive to the 
facilitation of the coveted inclusive process. The problem of endogeneity then further 
reduces the validity of the weight attached to the design-based explanation of the 
different outcomes in the two cases studied in this thesis. 
To set the scene, I begin this chapter by introducing the two policy trends 
described above. I then move on to situate the thesis within two relevant scholarly 
debates: democratization and constitution-making. I close the chapter by outlining the 
way I explore the influence of inclusive constitution-making design on different 
outcomes of the two constitutional change processes under investigation: the broad 








1.1 Setting the Scene: Constitutional Agreement and International Assistance 
for Constitution-makers 
In 2011, Lakhdar Brahimi, an Algerian politician with a career in peace-making and, 
at the time, the United Nations (UN) and Arab League envoy for Syria, remarked: 
“Until a few years ago, the focus of international constitutional assistance was on 
providing guidance about the content of a constitution rather than on the process by 
which it is made” (Brandt et al., 2011, p. i). That he made his comment in a foreword 
to a handbook for constitution-makers signified an important shift that had developed 
over the previous two decades; the international community had become increasingly 
attentive to processes through which constitutions are produced.  
This development may have been triggered by the fact that constitutional 
change has become ever more common in the past thirty years, as argued by Hart 
(2003) and Ginsburg and Aziz (2014, p. 117). Unfortunately, there is, to my 
knowledge, no data set available that would confirm this claim. What can be traced is 
that during the 1990s and 2000s a number of international organizations in the field of 
democracy assistance, development, and peace-building launched programs and 
activities that, apart from the content of constitutions, focused also, and often 
exclusively, on the processes of making constitutions and their subsequent 
implementation. Not only that, but assistance to protagonists of constitutional change 
in designing suitable processes for making new and reforming old constitutions has 
since developed into a central element in these organizations’ toolbox in building 
peace and democracy. While the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
2008 – 2013 Strategic Plan did not mention the word constitution at all, the more 
recent version for 2014 – 2017 states that the UNDP will “assist countries to maintain 
or secure peaceful and democratic governance” when facing such challenges as 
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“reforming their constitutions”.5 The UNDP website underscores the importance of 
this statement when it specifies that “for the first time, the… [plan] explicitly 
recognizes constitution-making assistance as a key component of UNDP’s support for 
inclusive governance, peacebuilding and sustainable human development.”6  
An analogous development can be recognized with other organizations in the 
field of constitutional assistance. Interpeace, which started as project under the UN in 
1994 and was involved primarily in peacebuilding activities, now has a programme 
called Constitution-making for Peace.7 Similarly, the Swedish International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), whose domain originally was 
electoral assistance, has embarked on constitution-related work since 1996 through its 
regional programs. In the mid-2000s, IDEA launched its Constitution Building 
Processes Programme, which, as the name implies, deals specifically with processes 
of writing and implementing constitutions.8 In addition, Berlin-based Democracy 
                                               
 
5 UNDP, “UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-17”, 23 September 2013, p. 28, available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/Changing_with_the_World_UNDP
_Strategic_Plan_2014_17.html [accessed 12 August 2018]. Compare with the older Strategic Plan, 
UNDP (2008) “Strategic Plan: 2008-2011, Accelerating global progress on human development”, 
available at: http://web.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp07-43Rev1.pdf [accessed 12 August 2018].   
6 UNDP, “UNDP Guidance Note on Constitution-Making Support”, 5 February 2015, available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-
governance/parliamentary_development/GuidanceNote_ConstitutionMakingSupport.html [accessed 
12 August 2018]. 
7 See the Interpeace website. Interpeace, “History”, available at: https://www.interpeace.org/who-we-
are/history/ [accessed 12 August 2018]; and Interpeace, “Constitution-making”, available at: 
https://www.interpeace.org/what-we-do/constitution-making-for-peace/ [accessed 12 August 2018]. 
Unfortunately, their website does not provide information about when exactly was the project 
launched.  
8 See the website of International IDEA. IDEA, “History of International IDEA’s work on 




Reporting International (DRI) today includes “constitutions” among its main 
activities, and apart from the focus on their content and implementation, its website 
reveals the organization offers support in the processes of constructing them.9 
These programmes provide opportunities for sharing experience among fellow 
constitution-makers from diverse countries, as well as providing other types of 
support. For instance, those curious about learning more about how to proceed with 
constitution-making can browse through a wide range of resources on these 
organizations’ websites, including case studies and handbooks with practical tips on 
how to organize the process. Some of these organizations advertise training courses 
for constitution-makers and provide opportunities for networking.10 It is also not 
uncommon for constitutional experts to advise decision-makers on process-related 
aspects of constitutional change.11 In addition, international assistance involves 
financial support.12 
                                               
 
9 See the DRI website. DRI, “Constitutions”, available at: http://democracy-
reporting.org/?page_id=279 [accessed 24 August 2016]. 
10 This is based on the information provided on the websites of UNDP, DRI, IDEA, and Interpeace.    
11 An example is the work of Christina Murray, one of the leading specialists on constitution-making 
and Professor of Constitutional and Human Rights Law at the University of Cape Town. In the mid-
1990s, she sat as an expert on a constitutional panel in South Africa and has since then either directly 
participated in constitutional processes or served as an advisor in such diverse places as Fiji, Kenya, 
Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, and Nepal. This information is based on informal conversations with 
some of these experts and published material about them. See e.g. University of Cape Town, “Staff. 
Christina Murray”, available at: http://www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za/pbl/staff/cmurray [accessed 12 
August 2018].  
12 Writing about the recent Tunisian experience, a report produced by the Carter Center (2014, p. 76) 
described how key international donors – national governments and the European Union – channelled 
funds in support of the Tunisian NCA through the UNDP. The report claimed that the UNDP’s total 
budget increased to $18.6 million (Carter Center, 2014, p. 76). 
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Crucially, this assistance comes with a particular conception of how 
constitution-making should proceed. Practitioners have stressed that it is how 
protagonists of constitutional change debate, draft, and approve their constitutions that 
matters (Miller, 2010; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; 2017; Samuels, 2006b; Schmitter, 2001; 
Ghai and Galli, 2006; Brandt et al., 2011). In their handbook, Brandt et al. (2011, p. 
iv) assert that how a constitution is constructed is equally as, or even more, important 
than its content. Emerging “best practice” in constitution-making that policy-makers 
encourage revolve around the idea that these processes should be, above all, 
democratic. Specifically, policy documents have underlined four core principles to 
which constitution-makers should aspire globally. These involve inclusiveness, 
representation, public participation, and transparency. An exemplar is the Guidance 
Note of the UN Secretary-General from 2009, which emphasized that the UN 
assistance to constitution-making “should be designed to contribute toward inclusive, 
participatory and transparent processes”.13  
Some authors and policy documents acknowledge the limitations of these 
prescriptions. They stress that constitution-making does not depend solely on finding 
a suitable method, because sorting out differences and negotiating a coherent 
constitutional text is not always a function of the rules that frame the process. This 
issue is further complicated by the nature of constitution-making, which entails the 
distribution of power and resources and is, consequently, deeply political and 
                                               
 
13 UN, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making 
Processes”, April 2009, pp. 2-4, available at: 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitution-
making_Processes_FINAL.pdf [accessed 19 August 2018]. See also handbooks published by the 
International IDEA (Böckenförde et al., 2011) and by the Interpeace (Brandt et al., 2011: 3).   
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contentious (Brandt et al., 2011).14 Practitioners maintain reservations about the 
universal application of “best practice” across diverse contexts (see e.g. Brandt et al., 
2011; Miller, 2010, p. 601). Individual recommendations also contradict one another. 
For example, if too many players are involved in constitution-making, the process may 
be protracted, and the final negotiated text incoherent (Brown, 2011a, pp. 10-11). 
Finally, while stressing that a poorly designed process can have undesirable 
consequences, most notably in post-conflict countries, they are sceptical about the 
positive effect even of processes that are well-designed (Miller, 2010, p. 649). Despite 
considerable limitations, promotion of these ideals continues throughout the world, 
and the region of the Middle East and North Africa is no exception (see DRI, 2011; 
Gluck and Brandt, 2015).  
Meanwhile, as politicians struggled to draw up constitutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia, observers understood that producing documents that all political forces could 
agree on, respect, and view as legitimate was essential if democracy was ever to 
replace authoritarian rule. Analysts Revkin and Auf (2012, p. 9) argued that if the 
constitution-making process in Egypt was to generate a constitution “that is respected 
by all social and political forces,” disagreements regarding the process of writing it 
had to be resolved. The constitution could only become legitimate, the authors 
claimed, if it reflected consensus and compromise between the major political groups: 
Islamists, liberals, socialists, revolutionaries, and secularists. Coincidentally, less than 
two weeks before the Tunisian NCA passed the final draft, an expert on Tunisian 
                                               
 
14 UNDP, “UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-17”, 23 September 2013, p. 5, available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/Changing_with_the_World_UNDP
_Strategic_Plan_2014_17.html [accessed 12 August 2018]. 
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politics, Pickard (2014), cautioned that “broadening and solidifying elite agreement 
on Tunisia’s political order is the most daunting challenge in the coming year”. 
Lack of agreement, observers speculated, could have hindered democratization 
(Hamad, 2012, p. 52; El-Shobaki, 2014, p. 95). A noted scholar of constitutionalism, 
Brown (2012b), warned that a constitution imposed against the “protestations of a 
vocal minority” in Egypt would result in a political atmosphere of “bitter divisions” 
and “extreme suspicion.” Amr El-Shobaki (2014, p. 95), an Egyptian politician and 
political science professor, lamented, with hindsight, that Egypt’s Constituent 
Assembly (CA) did not produce a “text of consensus” but instead “one of sharp 
disagreement” which, in turn, contributed to a deepening of the existing political 
polarization. “When a community fails to find consensus on its constitution,” El-
Shobaki concluded, “this represents the beginning of the failure of its democratic 
experience” (2014, p. 95).  
Inclusive constitution-making was viewed as key to securing the coveted 
constitutional agreement (Moustafa, 2012, p. 6; DRI, 2011, pp. 1-2; Carey and 
Reynolds, 2011, p. 47; Revkin and Auf, 2012, p. 9). Two publications are especially 
relevant in articulating this position. In line with the emerging international guidelines 
for constitution-making, a briefing paper by the DRI from November 2011 
complained that little attention had been given to “establishing inclusive procedures 
that foster political consensus in the making of new, democratic constitutions” in 
Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. The paper recommended adopting supermajority 
requirements for appointing constituent assemblies, their internal work, and a final 
vote on any constitution. The paper argued that such an approach would create 
“incentives for compromise and moderation” by preventing a single political group 
from dominating constitution-making. Such a consensual process, they suggested, 
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would make broad public acceptance of new constitutions more likely and benefit 
long-term political stability (DRI, 2011, pp. 1-2).  
A similar argument was put forward by Carey and Reynolds (2011). In their 
article for the Journal of Democracy, they evaluated emerging plans for electoral 
reforms across some of the Arab Spring countries, including Egypt and Tunisia. They 
recommended that above all other criteria, electoral systems should put a premium on 
inclusivity, precisely because elections are held to generate constituent assemblies. 
The authors concluded that: “Without electoral systems leading to fully inclusive 
constitutional-design processes and parliaments, many of the hopes for democracy in 
the Arab world may falter at the first hurdle.” (2011, p. 47)15  
A cursory examination of the empirical data suggests that these views might 
be correct. Three years after the 2010/11 revolution, the Tunisian NCA, representing 
a wide range of societal interests, approved the new constitution almost unanimously. 
Between 2014 and 2015, Tunisia’s rating by Freedom House – an organization that 
produces a ranking of freedom in the world often employed by political scientists as 
an indicator of democracy – improved in the major category of political rights from 3 
to 1 (i.e. from partially free to free). One of the reasons behind the upgrade was the 
“adoption of a progressive constitution”.16 Egypt’s rating on political rights improved 
in the year following the passage of a new constitution, that is, between 2012 and 
                                               
 
15 In a similar vein, previously cited authors, Revkin and Auf (2012, p. 9) suggested that for the new 
Egyptian constitution to be seen as legitimate, the process involved in its production should 
encompass “inclusive and participatory dialogue engaging every interest group.” 
16 Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2015: Tunisia”, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/tunisia [accessed 22 July 2016].  
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2013, from 6 to 5 (i.e. from not free to partially free).17 However, the reason behind 
the upgrade was not the constitution. 
After most non-Islamist representatives left the CA for good in November 
2012, following months of tensions, Islamist parties carried on drafting and voted 
through the final version while their opponents were absent from the Assembly. The 
response was a campaign launched by numerous non-Islamist parties and civil society 
groups calling for a “no” vote in the upcoming constitutional referendum and large 
demonstrations, during which Islamists and their opponents clashed violently.18 
Freedom House remarked that the constitution its critics saw as “written by an 
unrepresentative and overwhelmingly Islamist constituent assembly” failed “to quell 
deep mistrust and tensions between liberal and Islamist political factions”.19 The 
lifespan of the constitution was short. Only eight months later, on 3 July 2013, the 
military intervened directly in politics following a new popular upsurge, ousting 
Islamist president Mohamed Morsi and suspending the recently approved charter.20 
                                               
 
17 Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2013: Egypt”, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/egypt [accessed 22 July 2016]. 
18 Saleh, Y. and S. Fayed, “Egypt’s opposition protests against constitution”, Reuters, 18 December 
2012, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-idUSBRE8BH0LY20121218 
[accessed 26 July 2016]; Samak, D., “Egypt’s National Salvation Front to vote against constitution”, 
Ahram Online, 12 December 2012, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/60359/Egypt/Egypt’s-National-Salvation-Front-to-vote-
against-c.aspx [accessed 25 July 2016].    
19 Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2013: Egypt”, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/egypt [accessed 22 July 2016]. 
20 General Abdul Fatah Khalid al-Sisi, Head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, announced 
the suspension of the constitution in a statement on 3 July 2013, which also deposed the President. 
See Al Jazeera, “Transcript: Egypt’s Army Statement”, 3 July 2013, available at:  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373203740167797.html [accessed 25 July 
2016].   
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Consequently, Freedom House’s rating for Egypt in 2014 went down from partially 
free to not free.21  
This section has demonstrated that assistance to constitution-makers today 
forms a significant part of the international community’s activities aimed at building 
peace and democracy. It also highlighted the fact that one of the standards to which it 
aspires is that the constitution-making processes should be inclusive of all the political 
forces, and that standard has found significant support among analysts of 
constitutional change in Egypt and Tunisia.   Inclusive processes were shown to be 
key to securing constitutional agreements in complex and difficult contexts. Questions 
remain as to whether the difference in constitution-making designs really does help to 
explain the differences in outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia, and why the two countries 
ended up with different designs in the first place. There is a clear need for a more 
considered analysis to identify causal links between constitution-making design and 
constitutional agreement. This thesis provides that analysis.   
 
1.2 Constitution-making and Democratization 
This thesis builds on two current academic debates: the extensive literature on 
democratization, and the burgeoning research on constitution-making. These debates 
are reviewed briefly below. Analysis reveals that each of them is useful in exploring 
the relationship between inclusive constitution-making design and constitutional 
agreement, although neither contains comprehensive answers. The review also reveals 
that despite sharing individual elements of the research agenda, there has been little 
overlap between the two fields. While scholars of democratization have showed little 
                                               
 
21 Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2014: Egypt”, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt [accessed 25 July 2016]. 
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interest in the constitution-making processes, the context of democratization has been 
under evaluated by students of constitution-making.  
 
1.2.1 Democratization Scholarship  
Constitutional and democratic changes seem to go hand in hand. In many countries 
transitioning from authoritarian rule, pro-democracy players seek to scrap 
authoritarian constitutions altogether or at least alter them significantly enough to 
secure democratic change. Examples include Spain, South Africa, Indonesia, and 
more recently Tunisia and Egypt (Bonime-Blanc, 2013; Horowitz, 2013; Ebrahim and 
Miller, 2010). Despite this symbiosis, it is rare for students of democracy to ponder 
constitution-making to any great extent. To understand why this is so, it is helpful to 
recall briefly the academic development of, and the analytical distinction between, 
agency and structure-oriented approaches to the study of democratization. In doing so, 
I highlight two themes that are not explicitly related to constitution–making but 
provide valuable parallels: the understanding that democratic transition and 
subsequent consolidation are periods when the rules of the political game are being 
changed, and the advancement of the idea that if democracy is to endure, rival political 
factions must agree on its rules.  
Researchers immersed in the older, structural approach that came to dominate 
the discipline from the 1960s onwards generally focused on macro-level, structural 
factors that preceded moments of democratic change. When Moore wrote his Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy in 1966, based on experiences from countries 
such as the United States, France, Russia and Japan, he understood democratization to 
be a long and incremental process involving a struggle between social classes. This 
structural stream has since focused on factors such as the level of socio-economic 
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development (Lipset, 1959; Inglehart, 1997), the structure of social classes (Moore, 
1966), distance from democratic epicentres, culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), and 
type of preceding non-democratic regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996).  
In contrast, beginning with the sudden breakdown of authoritarian regimes in 
Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s, scholars in the second tradition 
chose to utilise a more detailed inquiry into the actual events of transitions from 
authoritarianism (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Higley and 
Gunther, 1992; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Shain and Linz, 1995). In their 
seminal work, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) proposed that democratic change is 
quick and revolves around interaction between the elites of the old regime and their 
opponents. By doing so, they brought scholarly attention to the processes involved in 
authoritarian breakdown, transitions, and democratic consolidation. This usually 
meant focusing the level of analysis on the actors, and political leaders in particular, 
actively involved in these processes, and considering their strategies, motivations, and 
interactions. By highlighting more immediate explanations of democratization, this 
approach comes closer to the periods of constitution-making. However, while this 
scholarship focused on the negotiations between political elites, it generally ignored 
the structures that framed those interactions.  
 Later, these actor-centered theories were challenged as academics argued that 
political leaders do not act in a vacuum but in a world that already exists, and this 
constrains their behaviour and the range of possible actions (Møller and Skaaning, 
2013, pp. 155-6; Mahoney and Snyder, 1999; Karl, 1990; Bratton and Van de Walle, 
1997). Despite the fact that more nuanced approaches emerged that combined the 
focus on agency with attention to structures, few studies considered constitution-
making processes. Students of institutional design in nascent democracies usually 
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cared about the end-product of constitution-making, a constitution which defined the 
outlook of the political regime. If they looked closer at the processes at all, it was to 
understand why decision-makers made the particular choices they did about the 
configuration of macro-political institutions (Lijphart, 1992; Frye, 1997; Negretto, 
2009; Jung and Deering, 2015; Shugart, 2005; Benoit and Schiemann, 2001; Colomer, 
2004; Birch, 2003; Renwick, 2010; 2011). Although Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 81) 
complained that the context in which the writing of constitutions develops is a 
“neglected aspect” in democratization research, not much has changed. More recently, 
Schmitter (2001, p. 5) invited students of democratization to pay more attention to 
constitution-making and its design when he hypothesized that the process of writing a 
new constitution can have a more predictable impact on the democratic trajectory of a 
country than the institutions defined by the resulting constitution. Still, there has been 
a continued lack of attention paid to constitution-making processes in general.22  
 The early transition and consolidation literature, nevertheless, does offer 
valuable insights into the importance and the difficulty of reaching agreement on the 
institutional framework of a democracy following the ending of an autocracy. The way 
authors from this tradition understand transitions between regimes is through the prism 
of institutional change. Transitions consist of a struggle between political forces over 
old rules of the political game and the invention of new ones (O’Donnell and 
                                               
 
22 A remarkable exception is Linz and Stepan’s (1996) distinction between different contexts of 
constitution-making during democratization. Elster et al. (1998), who analysed the constitutional 
designs adopted in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe, also took constitution-making 
processes into consideration. More recently, Horowitz’s (2013) account of democratization in 
Indonesia following the fall of the Suharto regime showed how democratic change was entangled 
with the elite-driven and incremental process of constitutional change. I will discuss these books in 
more detail in the next chapter. Nevertheless, constitution-making has remained on the side-lines in 
the study of democratization.    
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Schmitter, 1986, p. 78; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 10; Przeworski, 1988, p. 
63; 1991, p. 14). According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 5), relevant actors 
seek to restrict the uncertain political space where old political institutions are 
disputed, by (re)defining the rules and procedures of the new regime that would 
determine “likely winners and losers in the future”. Through these lenses, transitions 
become rare windows of opportunity when political institutions are up for grabs. 
Political elites can make choices about electoral systems and executive-legislative 
relationships that might then “lock in”, providing them with a limited opportunity to 
choose a new course (Møller and Skaaning 2013, p. 129). This is also why conflicts 
between self-interested actors over their preferences for the institutional configuration 
of the new regime may burst out as soon as the old regime begins to crack. These 
conflicts, in turn, can endanger democratic consolidation.  
The essential condition for democratization emphasized by this literature is, 
therefore, that rival parties need to come to an agreement on political institutions that 
are to frame political interactions in the new democratic regime (Higley and Gunther, 
1992; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1988, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 
1996; Munck and Leff, 1997). In its minimalist form, institutional agreements consist 
of four elements that define a political regime: (1) the questions which participants are 
allowed in political competition, by what threshold, and whether the representation of 
minorities is guaranteed; (2) the type of electoral system; (3) the form of government; 
and, (4) whether the state is to be organized on a unitary or federal basis (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 69-70; Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 4). It is easy to see a parallel 
between institutional agreements cited in this scholarly tradition and agreements on 
new constitutions, documents that serve primarily to enable and constrain government 
(Galligan and Versteeg, 2013, p. 6; Elkins et al., 2009, pp. 38-40). In fact, while 
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institutional agreements may be semi-formal or informal, such as the outcomes of 
roundtable talks in post-communist Europe, at some point they may be “packaged 
together into a single handbook – a constitution” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p. 
78; see also Higley and Gunther, 1992, p. 24).  
This approach to explaining democratization is, however, less helpful if we 
want to understand how to move from a situation of divided political elites to an 
agreement on the institutional framework of a democracy. The success of these 
negotiations hinges on the choices made by political leaders and their ability to come 
up with a set of political institutions with which both the stronger and the weaker 
among them can live (Przeworski, 1988, p. 64; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 
69-73; Higley and Gunther, 1992, pp. 3-4, 32). If democracy is to take root, the set of 
political institutions agreed upon has to provide a “reasonable” guarantee for both 
“winners” and “losers” in the founding elections that “their interests would not be 
affected in a highly adverse manner” under democratic competition (Przeworski, 
1988, p. 64). As Møller and Skaaning (2013, p. 136) correctly observed, these theories 
leave unanswered the question as to what conditions make conflict-prone elites willing 
to seek compromise on democratic institutions, and why it is so often the case that “no 
negotiated solution” is possible (Przeworski 1988, p. 76).  
In Egypt and Tunisia, as in so many other places around the world today, 
constitutional talks developed through channels that were created for the very purpose 
of producing constitutions. Scholars of constitutional change, whose work the next 
section reviews, bring these channels to the fore, anticipating that their design might 
have implications for the diverse outcomes observed. However, I will argue, despite 
numerous scholarly and practitioners’ assertions that constitution-making design 
matters, there is, so far, little consistent empirical evidence for such a claim.  
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1.2.2 Constitution-making Scholarship 
Echoing the developments in the policy arena where constitution-making processes 
were taken increasingly seriously, students in the interdisciplinary field of 
constitution-making began to assess whether the way constitutions are produced leads 
to different outcomes (e.g. Horowitz, 2013; Ginsburg et al., 2009; Carey, 2009; Elster 
et al., 1998; Elster, 1995; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; 2017; Winder, 2005; 2008; Moehler, 
2006; 2008; Lerner, 2011; Elkins and Ginsburg, 2013; Saati, 2015). Much of this 
research departs from the debates about the impact of macro-political institutions that 
are prevalent in political science. Scholars asked whether different constitution-
making designs had a bearing on a constitution’s content, durability, and legitimacy 
(Ginsburg et al., 2009; Elkins et al., 2009; Carey, 2009). They further tested the 
designs’ impact on resolution of, or a return to, violent conflict (Widner, 2005; 2008), 
and explored their effect on the levels of post-promulgation democracy, rights’ 
protection provided by the constitution, and constraints the document places on 
government (Widner, 2008; Carey, 2009; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; 2017). In doing so, 
authors scrutinized some of the guidelines advocated by the international community, 
including recommendations for the processes’ inclusive, representative and 
participatory nature (Carey, 2009; Winder, 2005; 2008; Eisenstadt et al., 2015).  
 However, despite much progress, there is so far little systematic evidence to 
support the link between different constitution-making designs and these outcomes, 
and causal mechanisms are still to be detected. Drawing systematic patterns has been 
complicated, in particular, by the heterogeneous research agenda that scholars in the 
field have adopted and the related conceptual and methodological challenges. More 
specifically, constitution-making processes have been perceived as composed of a 
broad set of institutional elements, actors, and stages which, in addition, can unravel 
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across specific contexts. Scholars often consider different combinations of these 
elements and link them to diverse outcomes, which in turn results in conceptual 
ambiguity. Next, investigation of approximate outcomes, such as democracy and 
reduction in violence, further complicates efforts at discerning the impact of 
constitution-making design, as many other factors or country-specific events can come 
into play (Widner, 2005, pp. 2-3). Much of the research also suffers from endogeneity 
problems. It remains unclear how constitution-making designs evolve under 
distinctive circumstances, and whether it is indeed the design or these circumstances 
that then affect the outcomes being analysed (Brandt et al., 2011, p. 18; 2008; Brown, 
2011a, p. 12; 2013; Pepinsky, 2014; Przeworski, 2004; Widner, 2008, p. 1536). For 
all these reasons, researchers have maintained a degree of caution about their findings 
(Widner, 2005, pp. 2-3, 15; 2008, pp. 1529-38; Carey, 2009, p. 162; Ginsburg et al., 
2009, p. 219). I will return to these issues in more depth in Chapter 2, which will 
present the theoretical framework for this thesis. To summarize, it appears that despite 
the scholarly upsurge of interest in constitution-making, the evidence for the impact 
of “best practices” as outlined by the international community remains weak.  
 In addition, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the context of 
democratization has been overlooked, with much of the scholarship focusing on post-
conflict situations.  While a reasonable number of studies have examined the role of 
citizen participation, the horizontal aspect of inclusion – that of political elites – is 
surprisingly understudied.23 This is an important shortcoming. As democratization 
                                               
 
23 Perhaps the closest to this focus comes in a book chapter by Carey (2009), where he explored the 
link between inclusive constitution-making design and democracy. In particular, Carey looked at its 
effect on the levels of post-promulgation democracy, resulting constraints on government, and 
constitutional stability. Yet Carey’s measure of inclusiveness was not based exclusively on the 
involvement of political parties. Instead, he relied on the number and type of collective and individual 
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literature warns us, political forces emerging from a transition might have conflicting 
preferences for a new constitution. However, their agreement on the final version is 
critical for democratic consolidation. Further, both policy documents and analyses of 
constitutional change in Egypt and Tunisia after 2011, which I have presented above, 
stressed that constitutional agreement might depend on involvement of a broad range 
of political parties in a constitution-making process. However, neither scholars of 
democratization, nor of constitution-making, seem to have given much consideration 
to the question of whether, and how, the inclusive constitution-making design impacts 
on a constitutional agreement following an autocrat’s removal. This thesis addresses 
this gap.  
 
1.3 Contributions 
This research aims to contribute to both constitution-making and democratization 
scholarship and, in addition, bridge the artificial distance between the two fields 
which, despite their shared agenda, have seldom merged. Drawing on insights from 
each of the traditions, the thesis proposes, and empirically tests, a novel theoretical 
framework that helps to identify the link between inclusive constitution-making 
design and constitutional agreement during democratization.  
                                               
 
veto players who had a formal role in drafting the constitution. More veto players implied a more 
inclusive process, but it was not the only indicator. He gave a higher value to inclusion of actors who 
were democratically elected, as well as to situations where the electoral environment was open and 
participatory. Political parties were thus considered to be one type of democratic veto player, 
providing their representatives were democratically elected. However, they were only one element in 
Carey’s measurement of inclusivity. Citizens, as a group, became a collective veto player where 
referenda were organized. Looking at adoption of new constitutions between 1990 and 2005, Carey 
found preliminary evidence for the correlation between inclusive design and the levels of post-
promulgation democracy, constraints of government, and constitutional stability, but remained 
cautious about the strength of the findings. 
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The thesis adds to the constitution-making scholarship in several ways. First, 
it breaks down the long and often abstract causal chains assumed by large-N studies 
and assesses, on a smaller scale, the impact constitution-making design can have. This 
is achieved by limiting the scope of the research to the context of democratization, and 
by exploring constitutional agreement, which is a more proximate outcome than those 
typically studied in this scholarly tradition. Second, building on existing theoretical 
literature and accounts by practitioners, this thesis develops conceptual tools to 
measure inclusiveness. Utilizing these tools in the analysis of the two case studies, it 
assesses both formal and informal constitution-making channels and the rules and 
practices that frame them. This approach sheds light on how a neglected aspect of 
inclusion, that of competing political parties, works not only in theory, but also in a 
real world situation, and clarifies what an inclusive process means to the participants 
themselves. Finally, the thesis puts forward the argument that scholars should not use 
constitution-making design as an explanation but rather seek to explain it. Part of this 
thesis develops and tests theoretical expectations about factors conducive to inclusive 
design. In short, instead of fashioning an overly ambitious causal story, this thesis is 
based on careful empirical inquiry and analysis of original material and is aimed at 
establishing a solid ground on which future theoretical and comparative research can 
build to provide a more robust understanding of constitution-making processes during 
democratization. I argue that this approach is necessary given that our knowledge 
about the causal relationship between inclusive constitution-making and constitutional 
agreement has considerable limitations.  
 The thesis is also relevant to democratization literature. In particular, it 
highlights that in countries where political forces are divided along religious lines, as 
in Egypt and Tunisia, divisions over identity-related and symbolic aspects of the 
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constitution might be as salient, and perhaps even more so, than divisions over the 
institutional framework of democracy. Resolving these conflicts is critical for 
democratic consolidation.  
 The final contribution of this research is empirical. The analysis is based on 
original primary data. Apart from documents and newspaper articles, the material 
includes qualitative interviews with leading members of political parties involved in 
the constitutional change processes, representatives of civil society, and experts. This 
allows me to bring new insights as to the causes behind the different outcomes of the 
democratization processes in Egypt and Tunisia.  
 
1.4 Research Design 
To recapitulate, this thesis investigates the following questions: Does inclusive 
constitution-making design help to foster agreement on a constitution during 
democratization and, if so, how? Does the difference in constitution-making design 
help to explain why political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions disagreed on 
the constitution in Egypt while they agreed in Tunisia? Finally, why do some countries 
implement a design that is inclusive while others do not?  
 This thesis adopts a qualitative approach to answering these questions, which 
is well-suited to a situation where our prior knowledge about the causal links under 
investigation is imperfect. In particular, it relies on a combination of a small-N 
comparison and within-case analyses, which according to George and Bennett (2005, 
p. 18) is “the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies”. Using the 
Most Similar System Design (MSSD), I compare the experience of two countries, 
Tunisia and Egypt, who underwent constitutional change following the wave of 
popular revolutions that in 2010 and 2011 swept through the Middle East and North 
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Africa. While in both countries the anti-authoritarian coalitions were divided along 
religious friction lines, the constitution-making process yielded different outcomes. In 
Tunisia, the constitutional change resulted in broad constitutional agreement, while in 
Egypt non-Islamist parties rejected the new constitution.  
The tentative conclusions about the causal relationship that I draw from the 
comparisons are strengthened by evidence from within-case analysis. The Tunisian 
case is especially well-suited for a more detailed inquiry as it can be viewed as a 
typical case where both the cause and outcome are present (Beach and Pedersen, 2016, 
p. 281). The constitution-making design was highly inclusive and the parties across 
the political spectrum embraced the new constitution. This allows me to inquire deeper 
into the role of inclusion, and to assess the impact of constitution-making design 
against other potential explanations of constitutional agreement. The disadvantage of 
this approach is its limited generalizability to other cases. Nevertheless, I believe that 
it is a necessary trade-off at this stage of exploration. 
The analysis builds on several types of data. The main bulk of evidence 
consists of 56 original qualitative interviews with the protagonists of constitutional 
change in Egypt and Tunisia, informants and experts that I conducted in several rounds 
between 2014 and 2017 in Cairo, Tunis, and Prague. These are accompanied by 
additional informal consultations with experts, journalists, and civil society activists. 
The majority of the interview material relates to the Tunisian case. This is both 
because the case plays an important role in the research design of this thesis, as well 
as the problematic nature of conducting fieldwork of this type in Egypt since the 
military takeover in 2013. I explain these difficulties and how I dealt with them in 
more detail in Chapter 3. To research the Egyptian case, I relied primarily on 
systematic media analysis of over 150 newspaper articles from local online English-
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language dailies, Ahram Online and Egypt Independent, the information from which I 
supplemented with a more deliberate and detailed search through both local and 
foreign newspapers. In addition, I drew on primary data (e.g. election results and polls, 
and documents, including successive constitutional drafts), and secondary data, such 
as existing academic research and reports produced by local and international 
organizations. Most of the material that I analysed was in French and English but in 
several cases I worked also with documents and journal articles translated from 
Arabic.  
 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
constitution-making scholarship more thoroughly. Drawing on insights into the 
constitution-making design that it provides, as well as on democratization and 
institutionalist literature and practitioners’ accounts, I then outline my own theoretical 
framework which I developed to assess the impact of constitution-making design and 
its inclusivity on constitutional agreement among parties of the anti-authoritarian 
coalition. Asking how inclusion has been perceived by scholars and practitioners, I 
distinguish between inclusion simply as being at the table (formal inclusion) and, 
alternatively, as having the capacity to shape the constitution (substantive inclusion). 
This chapter also provides alternative explanations of constitutional agreement 
relevant to the Tunisian case. Finally, the chapter identifies expectations about three 
factors that may influence whether an inclusive constitution-making design is adopted 
or not: availability, balance of power among parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition, 
and values. In Chapter 3, I define and operationalize the key concepts of this thesis 
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and present the research method, type of data that I use, and explain how I collected 
and analysed this data.  
 Chapter 4 serves as an introduction to the empirical cases. It outlines the 
context of the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, evaluates whether the democratic 
transitions were completed, and identifies the major parties of the anti-authoritarian 
coalitions and the political divisions that set them apart. The chapter will show that 
both Tunisia and Egypt did complete the democratic transition, but that Egyptians 
faced more impediments on their way to passing the minimum democratic threshold 
set by this thesis. The chapter argues that in both the cases, parties of the anti-
authoritarian coalition were considerably divided, and what pitted them against each 
other most intensely were their competing visions for the role of religion in politics 
and the state. Even though members of the Tunisian opposition had more experience 
with building cross-ideological coalitions before 2011, this did not seem to 
significantly mark their relationships after the revolution. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 form the core of the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 gauges 
the constitutional (dis)agreements in Tunisia and Egypt. It assesses the overall 
(dis)agreement, as well as considers negotiations about the most contentious and 
important aspects of the constitutions. It demonstrates that in both Tunisia and Egypt, 
articles in the constitutions relating to the role of religion and rights and freedoms were 
at least as contentious and important to the parties as paragraphs about executive-
legislative relations. However, while in Tunisia secularists were able to turn the 
constitution increasingly in the direction that they preferred, which ultimately secured 
their endorsement of the text, their counterparts in Egypt were less successful in so 
doing. Overall, Chapter 5 argues that constitutional negotiations during 
democratization cannot be seen as isolated islands. A more accurate picture is that the 
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talks unravel due to a backdrop of conflicts over political power that involve, but are 
not limited to, the constitutional text. Constitutional agreements are inextricably 
bound up with the resolution of these broader struggles.  
 Chapter 6 examines how inclusive the constitution-making designs were in 
Egypt and Tunisia. I show that the design adopted in Tunisia was significantly 
inclusive to begin with. Its inclusiveness then increased further in the final months of 
the process, as weaker secularists were granted almost an equal position in 
negotiations with the stronger Islamists. This development, however, was only 
partially an effect of the changes in constitution-making design. Meanwhile, in Egypt, 
the involvement of non-Islamist parties in constitution-making, as well as their 
capacity to shape the constitution’s content, was decreasing as the process developed. 
This was, on the one hand, because of the constitution-making design. Most notably, 
the small majority necessary for the constitution’s approval left weaker non-Islamists 
with little possibility of preventing the adoption of unfavourable elements. On the 
other hand, their influence over the text was further curtailed as they withdrew from 
the Constituent Assembly following a disagreement over the constitution-making 
process on which political opponents held diverging views as well as other political 
conflicts. The chapter also illustrates the perceptions about constitution-making design 
and its inclusiveness held by key actors. Building on the available evidence, I argue 
that although formal inclusion can have tangible benefits for constitutional 
negotiations, what political adversaries seek, and what matters to secure constitutional 
agreement, is their ability to shape the constitution, in other words the degree of 
substantive inclusion.  
Chapter 7 explores the origins of constitution-making designs, and asks why it 
was more inclusive in Tunisia than in Egypt. Contrary to emerging conventional 
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wisdom that portrays Tunisian political elites as inclined to consensus and inclusion, 
the chapter provides evidence to suggest that neither of the major Islamist parties in 
Egypt or in Tunisia sought to limit their influence over the constitution. In Tunisia, 
however, Islamist Ennahda’s (Party of the Renaissance Movement) ability to adjust 
the design was constrained by the forum where key decisions were made early in the 
transition and which gave more weight to smaller, non-Islamist parties. In comparison, 
the high ranking military officers who took political power in Egypt after Mubarak 
was ousted vested the authority to decide about procedures to guide constitutional 
change and its inclusiveness to the parties that won majority in the parliamentary 
elections. This step decisively decreased the chances of an inclusive process emerging. 
It can be argued that these early decisions, and the factors that framed them, set the 
processes in Egypt and Tunisia on very different paths. In addition, the chapter 
exposes the problem of the endogenous nature of the rules and practices that guided 
constitution-making, showing that constitution-making designs tend to reflect the 
existing power configurations, rather than create it. The chapter concludes that this 
situation undermines the concept that designs, of themselves, can serve as an 
independent factor that could explain constitutional agreement or the lack of one.  
Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 8 evaluates my theoretical model against the 
empirical findings from Egypt and Tunisia and proposes an alternative explanation for 
the constitutional agreement reached in Tunisia. The research shows that while there 
is some empirical support for the causal relationship between inclusive constitution-
making design and constitutional agreement during democratization, it is less 
straightforward than the policy and scholarly literature on constitution-making would 
suggest. I, therefore, propose an alternative explanation for the strong endorsement of 
the 2014 Tunisian Constitution. I argue that support developed from a situation in 
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which neither Islamists nor secularists could best their rivals, due to the shifts in the 







Literature Review and Theoretical Framework: Constitution-
making Processes, their Design, and Democratization 
 
In Chapter 1, I presented the central focus of this thesis, namely the processes whereby 
constitutions are produced following the overthrow of an autocrat. I underlined the 
international community’s preoccupation with constitution-making during post-
conflict transformation and in international democracy assistance, and outlined the 
“best practices” that have been broadly recommended. I also explained that this thesis 
sets out to investigate the role of one of these guiding principles: that constitution-
making processes should be inclusive of parties across the political spectrum. This 
chapter will now situate this research agenda within the literature on constitution-
making and lay out its diverse landscape that has brought together scholars across 
disciplines. In doing so, I will highlight the elements that I build on in my exploration 
of the impact of inclusive constitution-making design on a broad constitutional 
agreement, as well as expose shortcomings in this body of literature. Much of this 
research departs from, and has been informed by, the institutionalist approach to 
political science. I, therefore, open this chapter by situating the nascent constitution-
making literature in, and distinguishing it from, established debates about institutional 
design and choice that are closest to its object of analysis. The former is further 
indicative of some of the challenges that efforts at establishing causality between 
constitution-making processes and diverse outcomes face.   
In 1995, a pioneer of the research in constitution-making processes, Elster 
(1995, p. 364) complained that while “much has been written on the consequences of 
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constitutional design”, such as the presidential versus parliamentary systems and 
unicameralism and bicameralism, there was no book or even an article that considered 
the constitution-making process “in its full generality, as a distinctive object of 
positive analysis”. The past two decades have seen scholars departing from the 
prevalent debates about the content of constitutions and constitutional design and 
become increasingly attentive to the role of constitution-making processes. This 
chapter will show that the field has recently witnessed significant progress, as 
normative and theoretical claims have become complemented by systematic empirical 
inquiry.  
Nevertheless, despite this expansion, I argue that our knowledge of whether, 
and how, constitution-making marks various outcomes remains slim, partially due to 
conceptual and methodological challenges related, but not limited, to the 
heterogeneous research agenda that scholars have undertaken. Situations in which 
constitution-making is intertwined with democratic change and the involvement of 
political parties all remain surprisingly understudied. I therefore close the chapter by 
presenting an original theoretical framework to inquire into the impact of inclusive 
constitution-making design on constitutional agreement, building on insights from 
constitution-making, institutional design, and democratization scholarship, as well as 
from practitioners’ accounts and the literature on the Arab Spring.    
 
2.1 Constitutions as Explanatory Variables and Outcomes 
Before political scientists began to explore the processes whereby constitutions are 
made, constitutions attracted their attention as explanatory variables. Scholars of 
institutional, often referred to as constitutional, design considered the effects that 
various configurations of macro-political institutions have on outcomes, such as 
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conflict resolution, as well as the quality and endurance of democracy (e.g. Lijphart, 
2012; Linz, 1990; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Reynolds, 1999; 2011; Reilly, 2001; 
Cheibub, 2007; Sartori, 1994). This agenda involved, above all, the study of electoral 
systems, forms of government, and executive-legislative relationships. More recently, 
scholars have begun to approach these different institutional configurations as 
outcomes, asking why they were aspired to in the first place (Lijphart, 1992; Frye, 
1997; Negretto, 2009; Jung and Deering, 2015; Shugart, 2005; Benoit and Schiemann, 
2001; Sisk, 1995; Colomer, 2004; Birch, 2003; Renwick, 2010; 2011; Adeney, 2007).  
An exemplary debate in the older field, that of institutional design, began with 
the publication of Linz’s article linking presidentialism to authoritarian regression in 
nascent democracies (Linz, 1990). Linz criticised presidential regimes for producing 
zero-sum outcomes and encouraging a style of politics in which presidents are 
intolerant of the opposition. Since then numerous books and articles have contributed 
to the debate about the benefits of presidentialism, parliamentary systems of 
government, and various models of democracy in between (e.g. Cheibub, 2007; 
Mainwarring and Shugart, 1997; Elgie, 1999). In a similar vein, in places where 
societies were emerging from violent conflicts or were seriously divided across ethnic 
and religious friction lines, such as in South Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, 
scholars have investigated the impact of majoritarian and consensus models of 
democracy, power-sharing mechanisms, and federal design, looking for institutional 
cures that would help to sustain peace in these contexts (Adeney, 2007; Reynolds, 
1999; 2011; Horowitz, 1991; Reilly, 2001; Lijphart, 1985).  
The aim of much of this literature has been to enable an understanding of how 
institutions can be designed to provide the most fitting solutions for problems faced 
by countries. A good example of this tradition is Reynolds’ book, Designing 
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Democracy in a Dangerous World (2011), where he employs a metaphor of “patient” 
and “cure”. The word patient refers to a society that copes with a particular problem 
such as salient divisions across political and social cleavages. It is possible to cure the 
patient by creating institutions that are appropriately designed to tackle these 
problems. Reynolds, with colleagues (Reynolds et al., 2002), elaborated the entry 
point of this reasoning elsewhere. Unlike structural endowments such as historical 
legacies, cultural norms, or a structure of societal cleavages that are difficult to change 
in a short run, political institutions can be altered (Reynolds et al., 2002, p. 3). 
Reynolds and others coming from this tradition understood institutional design as one 
of the “key tools” that democrats may use to “improve the prospects for democracy” 
(Reynolds et al., 2002, p. 3). 
The literature on institutional design has been criticized for discounting the 
processes through which political institutions emerge, and this criticism has developed 
from two different theoretical positions. The first criticism relates to the idea that 
major political institutions can be consciously designed to produce predetermined 
outcomes. Horowitz (2002; 2008) pointed out that even if there ever was a consensus 
among political scientists as to what the best designs for particular problems were, 
they were unlikely to be implemented. One of the main reasons is that constitutions 
are usually born out of complicated processes that involve bargaining between parties 
with different interests in, and preferences for, political institutions. If, at least, some 
of these parties were to achieve what they desired, the resulting constitution would 
hardly be a coherent document consisting of a single design where each part fits into 
a larger whole (Horowitz, 2002; 2008). Not surprisingly, in his research, Horowitz 
(2008; 2013) has focused not only on the question of how constitutional designs 
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influence different outcomes, but also on constitution-making processes through 
which these designs come about. 
The second position raises the issue of the endogenous origins of institutions. 
It is tied to the fact that political institutions do not appear in a vacuum but “are the 
products of political action and the outcomes of political struggles” (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013, p. 3). Critics have pointed out that this circumstance might limit the 
independent effect of formal political institutions on the outcomes under study 
because, as Elgie (2012, p. 772) described it, those who change institutions are usually 
the same individuals and forces who then operate under them. More specifically, “if 
individuals choose institutions that reflect their pre-existing preferences, when they 
operate under the same institutions their behaviour is not being shaped by them. 
Instead, institutions are inducing behavior that is consistent with their pre-existing 
preferences” (2012, p. 772).   
This challenge is especially acute when new political institutions, such as those 
chosen during democratization, are studied. These institutions would become 
exogenous to power relations and, thus, capable of independently shaping the political 
process under two conditions (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 11). First, political actors can 
unintentionally set up   institutions that undermine their interests when they are 
misinformed about the institutions’ potential effects or there is a degree of uncertainty 
about their characteristics and their own standing compared to that of their opponents 
(Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 11; Shvetsova, 2003). The second condition relates to the 
duration of the institution. Political institutions often endure, even as the initial power 
map changes, because they are difficult to alter and, so, become exogenous to political 
configurations as time passes (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 11). However, if these 
conditions are not met, Kitschelt and his colleagues (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 12) 
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warned that “new democratic institutions cannot be the primary or exclusive forces 
that shape the political practice”. In the same vein, Przeworski (2004, p. 527) 
cautioned that at its extreme when endogeneity is strong, “institutions cannot have a 
causal effect on their own”. While responses differ in how to deal with this problem, 
one conclusion that most authors agree on is that institutional designs cannot be 
studied without taking into consideration their origins (Pepinsky, 2014; Lowndes and 
Roberts, 2013; Elgie, 2012). I will come back to this issue when I review the 
constitution-making body of literature.   
In contrast to institutional design scholarship that focuses primarily on the 
effects of different configurations of political institutions, another research agenda 
developed especially following the 1990s democratic wave in post-communist 
Europe. Authors treated political institutions as dependent variables, and explored 
why decision-makers choose the electoral systems and legislative-executive 
relationships they do. Their work has been influenced by rational choice theory, with 
scholars often concentrating on modelling the behaviour of strategically calculating 
and self-interested actors (e.g. Colomer, 2004; Benoit and Schiemann, 2001). Others 
have stressed that actors’ preferences for the design of political institutions are equally 
shaped by other factors, including historical legacies, normative beliefs, foreign 
influence or inspiration (Birch and Millard, 2002; Birch, 2003; Renwick, 2010; 2011). 
Since the choices of, and bargaining around, institutional design often happen 
in situations of constitutional change, the body of literature on institutional choice 
moves closer, temporally, to the periods that concern constitution-making scholars. 
While these two approaches appear similar at first glance, they vary in both the factors 
that they consider as important and the outcomes they seek to explain. Authors 
interested in constitution-making, too, study the periods before constitutions are made. 
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Yet this is primarily to understand how the process of making it, in terms of procedural 
choices and its modalities, affects various outcomes, rather than to inquire exclusively 
into the motivation behind constitutional choices. The next section explains the 
rationale behind scholarly and practitioner interest in constitution-making processes 
in more detail and reviews how, and with what results, the literature has approached 
the central themes of this thesis: inclusiveness, democracy and democratization.   
 
2.2 Constitution-making Processes at the Centre of Scholarly Inquiry  
Traditionally, constitutional politics were perceived as nobler than “normal” politics. 
In other words, protagonists of constitutional negotiations were expected to care first 
and foremost about producing a quality text. A prime example was the making of the 
1787 American Constitution. Yet constitutionalists later understood that this image of 
constitutional change was not the rule, but rather the exception. In reality, constitution-
making is not that different from other kinds of politics. Even though the idea of the 
public good may, indeed, guide constitution-makers’ steps, more often than not they 
represent their own interests, and those of their parties and constituencies, make short-
sighted decisions, and act on their passions (Brown, 2008; Ginsburg et al., 2009: 210; 
Schmitter, 2001, p. 7; Elster, 1995).  
What makes constitutional politics special is its end-product. Constitutions are 
so critical and discussions about them so different from other negotiations because 
they establish a system of government, define the powers and functions of institutions, 
add limits to their operation, and regulate “relations between institutions and the 
people” (Galligan and Versteeg, 2013, p. 6). On a more symbolic note, they define 
“the nation and its goals” (Elkins et al., 2009, pp. 38-40). They are also expected to 
last relatively long, as changing them in democratic systems is often made difficult by 
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the text itself. Once political actors adopt a constitution, they are, in effect, making a 
decision to bind themselves by rules that will structure and limit their routes to power, 
and this decision usually becomes hard to alter later. In theory, involved actors, of 
course, receive something in return; more stable and less uncertain terrain, where the 
political institutions set up by the constitution not only limit but also protect their 
interests. This is, at least, the idea behind a metaphor that projects constitutions as elite 
or wider social contracts, and which has been the backdrop for much of the academic 
study and policy writing about constitutional change.24 These specific characteristics 
of constitutions and constitutional politics are key to understanding the high stakes 
involved in constitution-making, as well as why actors in the policy arena, along with 
scholars, are concerned with the design of constitution-making processes.  
Given how fundamentally constitutions impact on politics, and because they 
are so often written by stakeholders who, in the most idealistic cases, may care about 
the public good as much as about their own interests, producing a constitution that can 
be widely accepted and followed by both politicians and citizens is inevitably a 
complex task. What complicates the matter further is that that constitutional change 
tends to occur at times of crisis, following violent conflicts or the breakdown of 
authoritarian rule. These contexts may generate more passion than reason, making the 
prospects for good constitution-making still slimmer (Elster, 1995). It is against this 
backdrop that scholars and practitioners began to consider about how constitution-
making proceeds. They came to believe that well-designed processes helped to 
                                               
 
24 This metaphor has, however, been criticized for inaccurately depicting the role of the constitution. 
For example, Galligan and Versteeg (2013, p. 42) pointed out that unlike corporate contracts, 
constitutions also enshrine values and proclaim national identity. They maintained that there might be 
“something sacred or irrational” about a constitution that cannot be found in private contracting and 
what makes any efficient breach unlikely.   
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minimize some of the problems observed, while badly designed ones only exacerbated 
them (Miller, 2010; Elster, 2012). 
This approach to constitution-making shares the starting point that 
characterized the institutional design scholarship introduced in the previous section. 
Specifically, that it is worth trying to design constitution-making processes in order to 
minimize undesirable outcomes. The following lines from Elster (2012, p. 149) are 
indicative of this point:  
 
I take a purely procedural approach to the issue of the optimal 
design of the constituent assembly, in the sense that I remain 
agnostic as to the nature of the optimal constitution. (…) The 
relevant question, however, is whether it is possible to eliminate or 
minimize the features that, from the ex ante point of view, are likely 
to lead to bias of one kind of another.   
 
He also urged caution in assessing how far a good design might take us, conceding 
that in case constitutional change involved “strong but misguided delegates, against 
whom no procedural safeguards can be erected”, even “the best procedures may lead 
to a suboptimal outcome” (Ester, 2012, p. 149; see also Miller, 2010, p. 649). While 
we should strive to design constitution-making processes carefully, procedures alone 
are unlikely to solve all the issues.       
 Despite this precaution, the notion that constitution-making processes and their 
designs matter has been widespread among both academics and experts (Samuels, 
2006a; 2016b; Ginsburg et al., 2009; Schmitter, 2001; Wallis, 2014; Miller, 2010, pp. 
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628-29; Böckenförde et al., 2013).25 For example, Schmitter (2001, p. 5) asserted that 
during democratization, a constitution’s “substance is less important than the 
overriding fact that agreement on them has been reached at a particular moment, by a 
particular sequence and by a particular process”. More specifically, he argued that 
“what counts is when and how these collective decisions” about macro-political 
institutions are “made, debated, ratified and implemented – more than what is in them” 
(2001, p. 5).  
Authors have since then proposed a variety of causal relationships. It has been 
argued that processes that are participatory and representative can “provide a forum 
for the negotiation of solutions to the divisive or contested issues that led to violence, 
or for a negotiated transition from an authoritarian regime” (Samuels, 2006b, p. 4). 
Representative and inclusive processes can also affect the legitimacy of the processes 
themselves, as well as the emergence of a “consensus around a constitutional 
framework” that is “agreeable to all”,26 “a true social contract among all relevant 
groups” (Miller, 2010, pp. 628-29), and the “buy–in from across society”.27 Further, 
constitution-making processes may foster trust-building among involved political 
elites (Miller, 2010, p. 629), and public participation in them can play “a positive role 
in state building by fostering a sense of political community” (Wallis, 2014, p. 5). In 
                                               
 
25 See also UNDP, “UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-17”, available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/Changing_with_the_World_UNDP
_Strategic_Plan_2014_17.html [accessed 12 August 2018]; and UN, “Guidance Note of the 
Secretary-General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes”, April 2009, 
available at: 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitution-
making_Processes_FINAL.pdf [accessed 19 August 2018].  
26 UN, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making 
Processes”, April 2009, p. 4. 
27 UNDP, “UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-17”.  
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contrast, processes that “exclude key players” may not reduce violence and lead to 
“short-lived” constitutions (Widner, 2008, p. 1520). They can also “create a need for 
measures” to be taken by part of the political elite if it feels the need to avoid the 
“disproportionate influence of one political force” (Miller, 2010, p. 638). 
 Comparative research has sought to establish wider patterns using empirical 
data about constitutional change. Authors coming from different fields, including 
constitutional law, post-conflict and peace studies, and comparative politics have 
investigated whether different types of processes impact on various outcomes, ranging 
from the levels of violence and democracy, durability of constitutions, their support 
from citizens, rights’ protection and constraints on the government provided by the 
resulting constitution, and institutional self-dealing by involved actors such as 
legislatures (Widner, 2005; 2008; Carey, 2009; Elkins et al., 2009; Elkins and 
Ginsburg, 2013; Ginsburg et al., 2009; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; 2017; Moehler, 2006; 
2008; Samuels, 2006a; Wallis, 2014; Saati, 2015). Despite the numerous claims as to 
the importance of well-designed constitution-making processes that I indicated above, 
systematic patterns regarding the relationship between processes and various 
outcomes, as well as any causal mechanisms involved, are still to be drawn.  
I delve into the reasons why this is so in the next sections, where I pinpoint 
some of the challenges this literature has faced. Before that, I discuss how scholars in 
this tradition approached democracy and democratization, showing that it has rarely 
been studied separately, as both a context in which constitution-making unravels and 
as an outcome. In doing so, I also review how this body of research has dealt with the 
question of inclusive constitution-making. I argue that while most studies have 
focused on the role of public participation in constitutional change processes, the link 
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between constitution-making design that ensures the inclusion of a wide range of 
political parties and democracy has been less explored. 
 
2.2.1 Constitution-making Design, Inclusiveness, and Democracy 
This thesis explores the link between the design of constitution-making processes and 
constitutional agreement. Building on the early transition and consolidation literature, 
in Chapter 1 I identified constitutional agreements as a necessary, although not of itself 
sufficient, condition if democracy is to take roots following the downfall of an 
authoritarian regime. These agreements often create an implicit part of the theorization 
of the role of constitution-making processes. For example, Elkins et al. (2009, p. 66) 
who focused on constitutional endurance, understood constitutions as “bargains that 
embody agreement among the relevant parties”, and others mentioned consensus-
based constitutions as ideal outcomes if democracy was to emerge and political 
reconciliation achieved (e.g. Miller, 2010, p. 652; Samuels, 2006b, p. 4; Carey, 2009, 
p. 156). Yet broad constitutional agreements have not, to my knowledge, been 
explicitly studied as a dependent variable by scholars of constitution-making. Nor has 
the outcome that comes closest to this research, democracy, been the most commonly 
studied one. This is perhaps because scholars coming from post-conflict and peace-
building studies, who dominate the field, preferred to look at peace and reduction of 
violence.28  
                                               
 
28 This attention to post-conflict situations is, perhaps, tied to the agenda of international 
organizations in the field of constitution-making. Two major organizations involved in constitution-
making, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Interpeace, work in the field of conflict 
resolution. In the volume edited by Miller (2010) for the USIP, more than half of the case studies 
were countries emerging from conflict. Similarly, authors of the handbook for constitution-makers 
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At the same time, authors who do focus on democracy have, above all, been 
interested in the role of public participation in constitution-making, not in 
inclusiveness in terms of involvement of political parties or their leaders (e.g. Saati, 
2015; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; 2017; Moehler, 2006). Despite the fact that pacting and 
bargaining between political elites about the institutional framework of democracy has 
been highlighted by transition and consolidation theories, some of these authors have 
viewed it as normatively inferior to citizen participation (Eisenstadt et al., 2017, p. xv, 
p. 16). Public participation indeed seems beneficial to democracy. One of the most 
systematic investigations to date which relied on data on 138 new constitutions in 118 
countries across the world between 1974 and 2011 found that it had positive influence 
on the levels of democracy post-promulgation (Eisenstadt et al., 2015). This was most 
notable where citizens were involved during the stage of the drafting of the 
constitution, compared to the later debate and ratification phases. The authors found 
further support for the participation hypothesis in their more recent book, which 
extended their dataset to include cases until 2014, and confirmed that popular 
participation, understood as “transparent and meaningful input” by citizens throughout 
the constitution-making process, had a positive impact on subsequent levels of 
democracy (Eisenstadt et al. 2017, p. 144). 
Case study research and small-N comparisons where more emphasis is given 
to within-case analysis and causal mechanisms tend to moderate enthusiasm about 
public participation. Moreover, they suggest that, after all, the involvement of political 
elites might still be worth looking at. Moehler’s (2006) careful inquiry into 
constitution-making in Uganda, where the public was involved to a significant extent, 
                                               
 
published by Interpeace stated that they were primarily concerned with ending violent conflict and 
building peace in deeply divided societies (Brandt et al., 2011). 
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found little support for the hypothesis that the involvement of citizens boosted their 
support for the constitution. Shifting her attention towards the communication by 
elites with citizens during constitution-making, she instead argued that what mattered 
was the type of messages that politicians were forwarding to citizens during 
constitution-making, as it was this that strengthened or weakened the support citizens 
had for the resulting document. Neither did Saati (2015) find support for the 
participation hypothesis. Her book combined small-N comparative analysis of over 20 
instances of constitutional change with within-case analysis into the cases of Kenya 
and Zimbabwe where similar participatory processes resulted in different outcomes in 
terms of the levels of democracy achieved. She argued that it was not the participatory 
nature of constitution-making but the level of elite cooperation that explained 
democratic improvement in Kenya and its decline in Zimbabwe. Instead of 
highlighting citizens, both the studies featured the role of political elites.  
As Eisenstadt et al. (2017) coupled their statistical findings on citizen 
participation with within-case analyses of cases that both contradicted and confirmed 
their statistical results, they arrived at similar conclusions. According to them, 
processes most favourable to democracy were those in which elites were unable to 
dominate and where public participation in the earliest stages of constitution-making 
provided “the best check against elite control” (2017, p. 146). At this point, however, 
the authors adopted a broader definition of public participation which involved 
“interest groups”, such as social movements, civil society actors, and even parties and 
other domestic opponents acting as intermediaries between incumbent elites and 
individual citizens (2017, p. 115, p. 122, p. 146). Along with their already quite 
restricted definition of political elites, by which they meant executives only, this 
became more of an argument for the inclusion of a wide range of social and political 
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groups in constitution-making processes than simply for individual citizen 
participation. As the authors put it, constitution-making “process matters and it is 
largely a function of the degree and breadth of involvement by a wide range of societal 
interests” (2017, p. 23).  
Another piece of research indicates that the distinguishing feature of actors 
involved in constitutional change might not necessarily be whether they come from 
the executive or not, but whether they are democratically elected. Focusing on 
inclusive constitution-making processes, Carey (2009) differentiated between them 
based on the type and number of both collective and individual veto players with a 
formal role in drafting and approving the constitution. While a larger number of veto 
players generally suggested a more inclusive process, it was also important what kind 
of actors they were. Carey took citizens into account in cases where referenda were 
organized, and gave higher value to those actors who were democratically elected, as 
well as to constitutional moments where the electoral environment was open and 
participatory (2009, pp. 162-4). Considering cases where new constitutions were 
adopted between 1990 and 2005, the study found that inclusive constitutional 
moments correlated with the levels of post-promulgation democracy, constraints on 
government, and constitutional stability, although Carey stressed that these findings 
were preliminary (2009, p. 162). The number of democratically elected veto players 
appeared to be the most influential factor.  
This distinction between elite bargaining and citizen involvement might 
perhaps be best perceived as two types of inclusion, horizontal and vertical, as it has 
been by authors who research peace settlements. Horizontal inclusion is that between 
the main political actors, vertical inclusion is between “those who hold power and 
those broader societal groups and forces who seek capacity to influence decisions that 
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affect them”.29 While the claim that elite bargaining is normatively inferior to public 
participation is one that is difficult to disagree with, nonetheless, actors, such as 
political parties, are still critical to the adoption of constitutions that are both widely 
approved and later successfully implemented. The recent experience of Iceland, where 
citizens, and not parties, deliberated about constitutional change but where the 
resulting constitution was not later implemented, indicates the importance of having 
political parties on board (see e.g. Eisenstadt et al., 2017, pp. 147-9). Egypt provides 
an example of the opposite. The first constitution following the 2011 revolution was 
approved by the majority of voters in a public referendum in December 2012. 
However, non-Islamist political parties opposed it and oversaw its suspension after 
the military intervention in July 2013. In short, the reality is such that the “buy-in” of 
these political forces and their leaders remains essential and policy-oriented 
documents and studies of constitution-making often make this point (Miller, 2010, pp. 
628-29).  
Despite their importance, how political parties, often representing opposing 
interests, are involved in constitution-making, and how this involvement affects their 
agreement on the constitution has not been thoroughly tackled in the existing research 
on constitution-making. There is, nonetheless, an important lesson to be learned from 
this body of literature. Public participation and negotiations between political leaders 
may not inhibit but complement one another in producing a democracy. What seems 
to matter most is the engagement of a range of political forces, and that the involved 
parties emerge from free, fair and democratic elections. I now turn to review the 
                                               
 
29 This distinction has been developed by Christine Bell and colleagues as part of their research 
project on peace settlements and presented as part of a peer-reviewed report written for the British 
Academy (2017, p. 7). 
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literature on one particular context during which constitutional change can occur, that 
of democratization, which is central to this research. 
 
2.2.2 Constitution-making and Democratization 
Constitutional change can occur across diverse contexts. Historically, new 
constitutions were written and old ones extensively redrafted following revolutions, 
social and economic crises, wars, the creation of new states or regime collapses, and 
the end of colonial rule (Elster, 1995, pp. 350-1). Although these diverse contexts 
posed different challenges to constitution-making with, perhaps, the exception of post-
conflict situations,30 these contexts have rarely been studied separately. As the focus 
here is on democratization, it is especially relevant to note that only a few authors have 
combined an emphasis on constitution-making processes with attention to situations 
when countries face the transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes.  
This is surprising as in many countries transitioning from authoritarian rule, 
scrapping authoritarian constitutions altogether, or at least changing them 
significantly, can be an absolute necessity in order to allow for both more democratic 
political competition and governance. Although the findings of Elkins et al. (2009, p. 
59), which are based on an extensive dataset, suggest exercising caution against 
reaching sweeping generalizations since their evidence showed that constitutional 
replacement happened within a year from a democratic transition in approximately 19 
% of cases, this still represents a considerable trend.31 Constitutional and democratic 
                                               
 
30 See e.g. Widner (2005; 2008), Lerner (2011), Hart (2001), Ludsin (2011), and Samuels (2006b). 
31 Their data includes cases of constitutional replacement (i.e. not just amendment) between 1789 and 
2005, making for “935 different constitutional systems for more than 200 nation states, both past and 
present” (Elkins et al., 2009, p. 6).   
48 
 
change were intertwined in Spain, South Africa, Indonesia (Bonime-Blanc, 2013; 
Horowitz, 2013; Ebrahim and Miller, 2010), and in post-communist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Elster et al., 1998), to name just some of the most 
prominent cases. More recently, democratic and constitutional aspirations could be 
seen in Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Tunisia.  
 Nevertheless, exceptions in the form of edited volumes and single country case 
studies dedicated to constitution-making during democratization can be found (Hyden 
and Venter, 2001; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009; Elster et al., 1998; Horowitz, 2013). 
The book Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies by Elster et al. (1998) 
stands out for its comparative approach. The authors touched on a wide range of issues 
pertaining to economic and constitutional transitions in Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, apart from briefly describing the procedures the countries used 
for constitutional change. Although they did not identify systematic patterns, their 
account is useful as it focuses attention on the role of the institutional framework in 
place in shaping the procedures available for changing the constitution (1998, pp. 79-
80). A similar argument was put forward by Horowitz (2013) in his in-depth inquiry 
into the constitutional and democratic changes in Indonesia. He claimed that the 
particular process which helped to produce democracy, and which mitigated conflict 
between protagonists of the constitutional change, depended on the country’s 
historical and structural legacy (2013, p. 292).   
 Indonesian constitution-making deserves further attention for its relation to the 
public- versus elite-driven processes dealt with in the preceding section. Horowitz’s 
(2013, p. 18, p. 30) account emphasized the role of Suharto’s opponents, in the 
Indonesian constitution-making process, who as political leaders found themselves 
divided and lacking in trust in each other. In contrast to the generally accepted wisdom, 
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he saw the benefit of constitution-making in its representative and inclusive aspects 
and not necessarily public participation per se, as the Indonesian constitutional change 
involved little consultations with civil society or the public. Specifically, Horowitz 
(2013, p. 293) argued that “the slow, consensual, and insider-driven process allowed 
the careful creation of new institutions and creation of understanding among 
legislators themselves”, which “undoubtedly helped to mitigate conflicts not only in 
the legislature but in the polity that was represented there”. Through this process, 
political actors were able to find a consensus on institutions they “believed they could 
live with” (2013, p. 293). While he maintained that not all processes have to be this 
consensual, in societies where “divisions about group identity are linked to conflicting 
visions of the constitution”, as in Indonesia, the criteria of “participation of contestants 
on all sides” and “maximum consensus” he concluded are essential if the process is to 
avoid a conflict over the resulting constitution (2013, p. 294). Similar 
recommendations can be found in the older transition and consolidation literature. 
Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 81), rare examples of scholars in this tradition who pondered 
constitution-making, cautioned against a “partisan constitution approved by 
‘temporary majority’”. Instead, divisive issues were to be dealt with in consensual, 
rather than in a majoritarian manner (1996, p. 83). 
 The literature that combines the focus on constitution-making processes with 
democratization is scarce but instructive. In the final part of this chapter, I incorporate 
the question of the origins of constitution-making processes in the theoretical 
framework of this thesis and expand on the issue of the involvement of political parties 
divided over the new constitutions in constitution-making bodies. One last step has to 
be taken before I develop the theoretical framework. The next section assesses the 
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limits of scholarly exploration of constitution-making processes, and indicates how 
this thesis tackles them.    
 
2.2.3 Limits of the Scholarly Literature on Constitution-making  
Returning to Elster’s evaluation of the scholarly exploration of processes of 
constitution-making, dealt with at the beginning of this chapter, in the mid-1990s, he 
complained that there were no studies dedicated to constitution-making as the main 
object of analysis. This chapter has shown that more and more exciting research has 
been produced about constitution-making processes and their design since that time. 
Academics have scrutinized some of the initial theoretical assumptions and “best 
practices” fashioned by the international community, including the role of public 
participation, inclusivity, and the representativeness of constitution-making. In doing 
so, they linked the role of procedures that frame who, how, and when, constitutions 
are produced, to a variety of distinct outcomes.32 Despite this progress, we still know 
relatively little about whether, and how, constitution-making marks democracy. 
Perhaps with the exception of a popular participation agenda where academic research 
has yielded more robust findings, systematic knowledge about the effects of different 
constitution-making designs on democracy is yet to be accumulated and causal 
relationships singled-out. This “modest harvest”, to exploit the metaphor used by 
Brownlee et al. (2015), has its roots in the heterogeneous research agenda and some 
of the conceptual and methodological challenges that I summarize below. 
The conceptual challenge is related to a broad research agenda. The object of 
analysis in this literature, vaguely delineated as a constitution-making process, is far 
                                               
 
32 I owe this conceptualization of a constitution-making process to Ginsburg and colleagues (Ginsburg 
et al. 2009: 214). 
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from straightforward. This is because these processes are composed of a complex set 
of diverse elements, stages, and actors, which can be found across diverse contexts. 
The responsibility for producing a constitution can be vested in different types of 
bodies, ranging from processes directed by executives, legislatures, popularly elected 
or appointed constituent assemblies, and expert or citizen conventions. Even similar 
constituent bodies can diverge in the procedures through which they were selected. 
Their internal working mechanisms and decision-making procedures vary, as do the 
mechanisms that frame the adoption of a constitution. Timing can vary too, with some 
processes dragging on over years, as happened in Indonesia, and other ones being 
much quicker.33 In Egypt, it took only six months to produce the 2012 Constitution. 
Under the uniting banner of constitution-making processes, authors have examined 
issues as diverse as the character of main constituent bodies, the method of their 
selection, the methods used for the adoption of the constitution, the type of actors 
involved, ranging from citizens to political elites, executives, legislatures, institutional 
veto players, and to foreign actors, and their engagement in different stages of 
constitution-making, from convening and deliberation to ratification (see Ginsburg et 
al. 2009; Saati 2015; Eisenstadt et al. 2015; Carey 2009; Widner 2008; Maboudi and 
Nadi 2016). As a result, even where cases appeared broadly similar, as Widner (2005, 
p. 1536) cautioned, they may have differed in many details.  
To complicate the matter further, constitution-making can develop across 
different contexts, and scholars have too rarely considered these separately to 
understand the causal stories in play. To give an example, a study looking at the role 
of representative constitution-making processes revealed that the type of selection 
                                               
 
33 Some of these elements were sketched out by, for example, Ginsburg et al. (2009, p. 210). For 
comparison, see also Brandt et al. (2011, p. 19).    
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procedures of constituent bodies made a difference to post-ratification levels of 
violence in Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific Islands. Yet the article showed they 
had no major effect in other parts of the world (Widner 2005). In short, context can be 
of “paramount importance”, a conclusion that emerged “most clearly” from a volume 
of 19 case studies in constitution-making published by the USIP (Miller 2010, p. 
604).34 These distinct aspects of constitution-making processes have then been linked 
to outcomes as different as the quality of constitutional texts, improvements in the 
levels of democracy and the reduction of violence. This overall heterogeneity of 
research agenda, together with the fact that this scholarly tradition is a relatively new 
one, has complicated the identification of systematic trends and efforts at 
generalization. To deal with this problem, I restrict this thesis to the specific context 
of democratization, and in the next chapter (Chapter 3) I clarify the conceptual choices 
that I made.  
Making sense of the causal links has been further hampered by the approximate 
dependent variables to which processes have often been related. Given the complex 
nature of processes with regard to the methods, actors, stages, timing, and context, and 
all the possible interplay between these elements, linking processes to outcomes such 
as democracy or violence might be, at this stage of development in this field, perceived 
as overly ambitious. As Widner (2005, pp. 2-3) noticed in her exploration of the 
influence of constitution-making on violence, while she was able to account for “the 
most obvious of these influences, as the period under consideration lengthens there is 
a greater chance that idiosyncratic events specific to a given country or features of 
                                               
 
34 Authors of  possibly the most elaborate handbook for constitution-makers available, written for 
Interpeace, shared the same knowledge, arguing that context might matter more for outcomes than the 
design of the process (Brandt et al. 2011). 
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substantive terms of a particular constitution” will occur. An alternative approach to 
solidifying our knowledge about constitution-making might, at least at this point, 
focus on understanding the impact the design of constitution-making has on more 
proximate variables. This is the tactic that I take in this thesis, where I identified 
constitutional agreement as an intermediate step between a constitution-making 
process, its design, and democracy. 
Finally, as with institutional design scholarship, critics of the constitution-
making stream of literature have raised other problems, the question of whether 
constitutional change processes can be designed, and their endogenous effects 
(Ginsburg et al., 2009; Carey, 2009; Horowitz, 2008; Widner, 2008, p. 1536). 
Horowitz pointed out that it is difficult to talk about the design of constitution-making, 
since these procedures are often put together in a haphazard fashion and only a few 
choices might be available (Horowitz, 2008). This might be the case especially when 
constitution-making is interlinked with unruly transitions from authoritarian rule 
(Brandt et al., 2011, p. 18; Horowitz, 1999; 2008; Brown, 2011a, p. 12; 2013b). Even 
where availability is less restricted, because decisions about the procedures are highly 
political, they tend not to be designed, but negotiated (Brandt et al., 2011, p. 18). 
Constitution-making design thus may be contingent on other factors, a situation that 
can undermine its explanatory function (Pepinsky, 2014). If it is important that 
constitution-making develops in a certain fashion for agreement on the resulting 
constitution, we need to know whether options for various processes were actually 
available, and how the decisions about the course of constitution-making came about. 
To date, only a very few studies have paid attention to this issue (Offe et al., 1998; 
Horowitz, 2013; Eisenstadt et al., 2017). This thesis takes the question of the origins 
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of constitution-making design seriously, integrating it firmly in its theoretical 
framework.   
The first part of this chapter outlined the numerous assumptions about the role 
of constitution-making processes that have been expressed by scholars and 
practitioners in this interdisciplinary field, including the impact of constitution-
making on democracy and the inclusiveness of constitution-making designs. It also 
revealed that much room remains for efforts at specifying these assumptions and 
building solid empirical support for them. This is an especially pressing task with 
respect to the understudied context of democratization and the involvement of political 
parties. This thesis contributes to the narrowing of this gap while   overcoming some 
of the common problems faced in research into constitution-making. With that said, it 
is now appropriate to articulate the theoretical framework that this research explores.   
 
2.3 The Role of Inclusive Constitution-making Design during Democratization: 
Theoretical Framework   
The starting point of this thesis is the argument promoted by the international 
community in its efforts to build peace and democracy around the world, that 
constitution-making processes matter. The literature review in the first part of this 
chapter exposed how academic research has struggled to find empirical support for 
this claim. However, it also suggested that what might be especially important for 
democratic consolidation with regard to the process is the involvement of a wide range 
of political and social forces, be it citizens or other political actors with democratic 
legitimacy. This thesis focuses on the inclusion of one specific subset of these actors, 
political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition.  
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Transition and consolidation theories, which I discussed in Chapter 1, 
cautioned us that even though opposition parties may unite to push an autocratic 
president out of office, they might still represent different political and social interests 
and be considerably divided among themselves and over the precise institutional 
framework of democracy. Whether these competing parties find an agreement on a 
new constitution during a regime change is, therefore, uncertain. The democratization 
literature also tells us that such an agreement is a critical step on the road to democracy. 
What this thesis seeks to clarify is whether, and how, the design of the constitution-
making process, and in particular the way it promotes inclusion of political parties 
across the anti-authoritarian coalition, can foster the achievement of a broad 
constitutional agreement between these parties.  
This is an important question. Constitutional agreement is worth studying for 
its potential long-term implications on democracy, the durability of a constitution, and 
even on conflict reduction. It has been defined by the early transition and consolidation 
theories as a necessary, although of itself insufficient, condition if democracy is to 
take root and thrive. In addition, as I indicated above, it has also featured in the 
theorization of constitution-making and in policy work. Even where citizens 
participate in producing the constitution, it is difficult to imagine that in the long run 
a constitution would last and violence reduce if the text provoked conflicts between 
key political parties at the time of its approval. Moreover, considering constitutional 
agreement as the outcome has methodological benefits. It enables us to break down 
the long, and often abstract, causal chains supposed by large-N studies, and to 




The following analysis pays special attention to the origins of constitution-
making design and to the context that countries face when constitutional change is 
intertwined with transition from authoritarianism and former opposition parties are 
split between themselves and over the text of the constitution. Focusing on forces and 
factors that shape what constitution-making process emerges deals with the caveat that 
the design might not be an independent cause and that its inclusivity may be contingent 
on other factors. The second element relating to the context explored implies that 
democratization and divisions between political parties are the scope conditions of this 
thesis. In other words, both the expectations that I put forward, and the generalizations 
that I draw from my findings about constitution-making design are tied to this 
particular context.  
In the remaining part of this chapter, I develop this framework further. I first 
of all distinguish between two relevant ways in which existing policy-oriented and 
scholarly literature perceived inclusion of different political forces which serves as a 
starting point for this exploration. Secondly, I formulate alternative explanations of 
constitutional agreement and evaluate whether any of them would rule out the 
potential impact of constitution-making design. Finally, I build on different streams in 
institutionalist scholarship, the literature on democratization, and the Arab Spring, to 
formulate assumptions as to which factors might shape the adoption of a particular 
constitution-making design.  
 
2.3.1 Inclusive Constitution-making Design: Being at the Table and Having Influence   
If an inclusive process is conducive to constitutional agreement, what degree of 
inclusion is optimal? When reading both scholarly and policy-oriented literature about 
constitution-making processes, two distinctive ways in which authors have imagined 
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inclusivity are apparent, and both are relevant to this research. Distinguishing between 
them, however, is important as they might potentially influence constitutional 
agreement in different ways. 
At one level, inclusive constitution-making processes have been conceived in 
the sense of bringing all the relevant political forces to a negotiating table. Writing 
about the context where constitutional change followed war, Ludsin (2011, p. 276) 
argued that perhaps:  
 
the single-most important element of the process in determining 
whether a population and warring parties will accept constitution-
drafting as a peacemaking tool and/or the constitution as a peace 
treaty is inclusiveness. Who serves as the negotiators – how they 
are chosen, whose interests are represented, who has the 
opportunity to participate or, conversely, who is excluded from 
the process – all determine the likelihood of success of the 
peacemaking/constitution-drafting process.  
 
A similar view was expressed by Elster (2012, p. 160) who understood a constituent 
assembly that “reflect[s], in miniature, the diversity of the nation” to be “preferable to 
one that risks excluding significant minorities”. A comparative volume of 19 case 
studies in constitution-making, published by the USIP, concluded with a remark that 
several of these cases illustrated “the importance of ensuring that the deliberation and 
decision-making forum includes all parties whose agreement to constitutional terms is 
needed for conflict resolution or development of meaningful societal consensus” 
(Miller, 2010, p. 652). If there was any one international standard identified for 
constitution-making, Brown reasoned (2011a, p. 2), “it would be that constitutions 
should be written in a manner that includes all significant political forces”. Following 
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this logic, ensuring that all the major political parties are involved in the main 
constitution-making bodies should help to produce a constitutional agreement.  
 In what is, perhaps, a more pragmatic approach, authors thought about 
inclusion in a more substantive way. They cautioned against constitutions written by 
“temporary majorities”, and recommended that potentially divisive issues should be 
dealt with in a “consensual rather than majoritarian manner” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 
p. 81).35 Others warned of the “disproportionate influence of one political force” 
(Miller, 2010: 638). In the absence of more theoretical guidance, and to assist in the 
exploration of this approach, it is helpful to recall Lijphart’s (2012) thinking on 
majoritarian and consensus models of democracy. Lijphart wrote that the main 
political institutional rules and practices may be put on a scale where majoritarianism 
lays at one extreme of the spectrum and consensus at the other. Consensual institutions 
differ from the majoritarian ones in that they take majority rule as a “minimum 
requirement” but what is sought is to “maximize the size of these majorities” (2012, 
p. 2). While the majoritarian model “concentrates power in the hands of a bare 
majority”, consensus model seeks to “share, disperse, and limit power” (2012, p. 2). 
In effect, the first one is “exclusive, competitive, and adversarial”, whereas the latter 
is based on “inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise” (2012, p. 2). Lijphart (2012, 
p. 296) suggested the consensus model was especially well-suited for democratizing 
countries undergoing a constitutional reform. If we adapt this model to constitution-
making processes, we would expect that a constitution-making design that maximizes 
                                               
 
35 In a similar vein, Schmitter (2001, p. 10) recommended that the body responsible for drafting the 
constitution should make decisions by the “largest possible margin,” not by the “minimal winning 
majority”. Horowitz (2013, p. 294), whom I quoted above, recommended the criterion of “maximum 
consensus” to guide constitutional change in divided societies.  
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the leverage of smaller parties would be more conducive to a broad constitutional 
agreement.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 3), which elaborates on the key concepts of this 
thesis, I draw a distinction between formal inclusiveness that equates to being at the 
negotiating table, and substantive inclusiveness, which relates to the parties’ ability to 
shape the text of the constitution. It can also be the case that parties view the 
inclusiveness of a constitution-making process through different lenses. To gain an 
insider’s perspective, I therefore also consider participants’ perception of 
inclusiveness.  
 
2.3.2 Alternative Explanations of Constitutional Agreement  
Even if we find that the constitution-making design was highly inclusive, can this fact 
alone explain constitutional agreement? In the case study of Tunisia, which serves 
here as a typical case,36 I take into account alternative explanations for agreement that 
have been raised in both theoretical literature on democratization and in existing 
research on Tunisian transition.  To begin with, the distribution of power among the 
political forces that are to agree on the constitution might have a bearing on whether 
they manage to do so or not. Although it is usually not explicitly theorized by scholars 
of transition and consolidation literatures, balance of power figured as an important 
condition motivating political elites to negotiate pacts and institutional agreements 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1988, p. 64; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986, pp. 69-73; Stradiotto and Guo, 2010). O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 44) 
theorized that pacts were most likely in situations where the balance of power was 
                                               
 
36 For more detail see the methods section at the end of Chapter 3. 
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such that competing parties could not do without one another and “unilaterally impose 
preferred solutions”. Imbalance has been seen as dangerous for democratization, 
especially if smaller parties are not given enough assurances and have an alternative 
option “of subverting democracy or provoking others to subvert it” (Przeworski, 1991, 
p. 31; see also O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 71-3).  
Writing about the Arab uprisings, Brownlee et al. (2015) listed the power 
distribution between Islamists and non-Islamists following the first democratic 
elections among the most important factors which they saw as explaining why 
democracy eventually flourished in Tunisia and not in Egypt. They argued that in 
Egypt, Islamists were stronger and consequently could “ignore their opponents’ 
preferences when it came to constitution writing”. In contrast, the “relatively 
balanced” Tunisian political landscape forced Islamists to compromise (2015, p. 197).  
Next, observers have highlighted the fact that in Tunisia, progressive thinking 
and support for liberal democratic values by the leadership of Tunisia’s largest Islamist 
party, Ennahda, and especially its head Rachid Ghannouchi, coupled with the 
experience of political elites of cross-ideological negotiations that began before the 
revolution, facilitated compromise (Stepan, 2012; Stepan and Linz, 2013, p. 23; 
Brumberg, 2013). These negotiations enabled Ennahda and its secularist opponents to 
discuss contentious issues and to develop a common position on issues like political 
pluralism and gender equality (Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2011, p. 337). According to 
Linz and Stepan (2013, p. 23), the talks produced a situation in post-2011 Tunisia 
where “suspicions remain, but most secular liberals do not fear Ennahda badly enough 
to want to use authoritarianism as a shield against it”. At a more general level, Lijphart 
(1977, p. 100) has argued that previous experience of accommodation between elites 
can predispose “political leaders to be moderate and cooperative”. The recent history 
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of building connections, discussing and resolving divisive issues could have broken 
down some of the mistrust between antagonistic parties in the anti-authoritarian 
coalition. Having cooperated successfully once might also have made parties more 
amenable to further cooperation. If the parties were able to bridge the existing 
ideological differences, this could have made constitutional negotiations easier. In a 
similar vein, if the major Tunisian Islamist party was indeed moderate, the ideological 
difference between Ennahda and its secularist opponents might have, after all, not been 
that great a barrier.  
 Furthermore, Tunisian political elites have been applauded for their 
commitment to dialogue and compromise (Bellin, 2013, p. 3). This view was 
established during the constitution-making process, when Ennahda made important 
concessions regarding the constitution and agreed to leave government in response to 
a political crisis. This commitment was then perceived as having been confirmed after 
the next parliamentary elections, when Ennahda entered into government with its 
fiercest secular opponent, Nidaa Tounes. At its extreme, the inclination to dialogue 
has been viewed not as a choice under the atypical political circumstances of 
democratization, but as a natural predisposition of Tunisian politicians. As one NCA 
deputy told me:  
 
Tunisians can disagree, they can be in conflictual and dangerous 
situations, but [they] don’t go to the edge of a cliff. They always 
get to the point when… [they] discuss, make concessions, and 
establish consensus, and advance in saving their country… It goes 
throughout Tunisian history… Tunisians discuss and agree with 
each other.37  
                                               
 




However, the adoption of a compromise strategy should be explained, not used 
to explain. The idea of “compromise mentality” (Marzouki, 2015) as a uniquely 
Tunisian inclination has not passed without criticism. For example, Marzouki (2015; 
see also 2017, pp. 343-52) argued that more than by normative considerations, 
Ennahda adopted a strategy of “risk avoidance”, because of the explosive national and 
international political context which the party had to navigate during the transition 
combined with the party’s history of exile and repression. Others have stressed the 
role of Tunisian civil society, and above all the role of the labour unions, known under 
the French acronym UGTT, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, in facilitating the 
dialogue between the political parties (Bellin, 2013, pp. 4-5). The Nobel Prize 
Committee appreciated Tunisian civil society’s “role as a mediator and driving force 
to advance peaceful democratic development in Tunisia” amid the 2013 political crisis 
that jeopardized the constitutional agreement, when it awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
to the “Quartet” of organizations that included the UGTT.38   
The arguments about the balance of power, previous experience with cross-
partisan negotiations, and the moderate nature of the major Tunisian Islamist party do 
not necessarily preclude a significant role for constitution-making design in bringing 
about the outcome. They only suggest that it might be of lesser importance for 
constitutional agreement when compared to other factors. This is in line with 
theoretical accounts. The arguments about the impact of constitution-making design 
that I showcased in the first part of this chapter have been rather tentative. It has been 
understood that while well-designed processes can help to minimize problems that are 
                                               
 
38 NobelPrize, “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015”, 10 October 2015, available at: 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/press-release/ [accessed 5 September 2018].  
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endemic in constitutional reforms, in cases where delegates are misguided, even “the 
best procedures may lead to a suboptimal outcome” (Elster, 2012, p. 149). Therefore, 
constitution-making design might not be the only, or even the most important, factor 
influencing constitutional agreement but it can, nevertheless, strengthen the chances 
for such an outcome. In contrast, if we accept the logic that Tunisians agreed on the 
constitution because “that is the way they do things”, there might be little rationale for 
including the constitution-making design as part of the explanation. This is because 
such political elites should be able to find agreement through any process.  
In the last section of this chapter, I address the issue of the origins of 
constitution-making design, asking the question why some processes are more 
inclusive than others.  
 
2.3.2 Origins of Inclusive Constitution-making Design  
Building on institutionalist and democratization scholarships, I distinguish between 
factors that may restrict and drive parties’ decisions about the procedural side of 
constitution-making, and develop theoretical assumptions about factors most 
conducive to inclusive constitution-making design. The expected causal relationships 
are illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model 
 
Pathway 1 Pathway 1 
Pathway 2 
 






the constitution   
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On the one hand, what constitution-making process is chosen is likely to be 
influenced by the availability of different designs in the first place. In other words, can 
major political parties in the anti-authoritarian coalition choose from an available 
range of different types of processes? As I pointed out above, critics of constitution-
making scholarship and practitioners warned that constitution-making designs are, in 
fact, outcomes of complex political processes and negotiations, where the options 
available may be restricted by the particular context (Brandt et al., 2011, p. 18; 2008; 
Brown, 2011a, p. 12; 2013b). This brings up concerns about factors that shape how a 
transition from authoritarianism develops, and above all, who decides how the 
constitution-making will proceed.  
On the other hand, if more types of constitution-making designs are available 
and relevant political forces can make choices about the constitution-making design, 
their decisions are likely to be informed by their strategies. These, in turn, can be 
shaped and motivated by other factors. What conditions make inclusive constitution-
making design more likely to emerge? Renwick’s (2011) research on the choice of 
electoral systems provides useful insights into strategies that actors may pursue when 
having the chance to shape the outlook of important political institutions. Renwick’s 
(2010, p. 11) typology is informed by Tsebelis’ differentiation between redistributive 
and efficient institutions (1990, p. 104). Redistributive institutions are those that 
improve the conditions of one group at the expense of another. Electoral systems are 
a typical example. If one party wins more seats, it means, logically, another one will 
gain less (Renwick, 2010, p. 11; Tsebelis, 1990, p. 104). Power-seeking actors who 
perceive electoral systems as redistributive institutions would consequently aim to 
change the electoral system in such a way as to secure these gains for themselves. The 
design of constitution-making can be conceived in a similar way. Whether power-
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seeking parties are able to push through their preferred design then depends on 
whether they have the power to do so. 
However, Renwick argued that under specific circumstances actors can 
understand electoral systems as efficient institutions that can improve conditions for 
all, or almost all, individuals (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 104; Renwick, 2010, p. 11). This can 
happen when they face extreme uncertainty about their future prospects, or when the 
political system is threatened. Alternatively, politicians can act in ways that are 
consistent with their ideals and convictions, even though such instances might be rare. 
This was the case for Czechoslovak dissidents following the 1989 Velvet Revolution, 
where decisions to introduce a proportional representation electoral system were 
shaped by values, not by efforts at maximizing their own power (Renwick, 2011). 
Constitutional politics in the midst of an authoritarian breakdown can also provide a 
setting in which concerns about the common good can over-ride strategic calculations. 
Like Renwick (2010, p. 12; also Birch and Millard, 2002, p. 10), I understand that 
individuals may be guided by a mixture of motivations and that the distinction between 
acting on normative values and power-seeking may be better imagined on a continuum 
rather than as a dichotomy, that is, that one does not necessarily rule out the other 
entirely.  
I now chart arguments on three factors that can shape the availability and 
choice of inclusive constitution-making design, and introduce thoughts on how 
relevant they might be for the two empirical cases this study considers. These factors 
are: (1) the availability of constitution-making designs, (2) the distribution of power 
between political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions, and (3) the normative 
value that political parties and their leaders place on consensus and inclusion. 
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Additionally, the analysis is cognisant of the immediate political context, the 
importance of which has been highlighted by much of the policy-oriented literature.  
 
Availability of Constitution-making Designs 
Parties in the anti-authoritarian coalition may not have the absolute freedom to choose 
the design of constitution-making that they prefer. How the transition from 
authoritarianism advances, and especially who controls it, may restrict the parties’ 
ability to adjust constitution-making design to their preferences (Linz and Stepan, 
1996, p. 71). Interim governments that take power between the start of a transition and 
its assumption by a freely elected government might be particularly important, as they 
often have a bearing on the nature of the first elections and their timing, on the 
constitution-making process, and other interim issues (Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 9). 
Two types of interim situations tend to occur during a transition (Linz and Stepan, 
1996, pp. 71-2). The first one takes place when regime-related actors control the 
government until the first elections (1996, p. 72). In such a case, how constitution-
making will proceed may be either unilaterally decided, or at least influenced by the 
remnants of the outgoing regime. In the second situation, a transition leads to the 
establishment of a provisional, interim government (1996, p. 71). Parties of the anti-
authoritarian coalition might have more influence over the constitution-making design 
in such cases. Alternatively, in the messy empirical context of a democratic transition, 
decisions about constitution-making processes might come together “haphazardly” 






Distribution of Power among Parties of the Anti-authoritarian Coalition  
When warning that political institutions might not be the major explanatory factor in 
democratizing countries because of their endogenous origins, Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 
12) recommended turning attention to power configurations among those political 
actors who shape the “institutions and democratic procedures in the formative phase 
of new democracies”. If political parties are in charge of deciding how the 
constitution-making process would proceed and how inclusive it would be, their steps 
are likely to be marked by an effort to maximize their power over the constitution’s 
content (Renwick, 2011). Whether they would be able to put in place a constitution-
making design that would benefit them in turn depends on their standing.  
Lijphart (1977, pp. 55-61) has argued that power-sharing institutions of 
consociationalism, which are close to our concern about inclusive constitution-
making, are more likely to emerge in situations under a particular power configuration 
among relevant groups. He built his theory around the size of segments in plural 
societies, arguing that a situation of a multiple power balance was more likely to lead 
to power-sharing than a hegemony consisting of one segment, or a dual balance where 
two groups are approximately equal in size as, in such cases, they might seek to 
compete rather than cooperate with each other. A situation of a multiple balance of 
power, in contrast, means that there is an approximate equilibrium between at least 
three different groups. Building on this theory, I anticipate that inclusive constitution-
making design would be least likely to emerge where the largest party, or a political 
stream, controls a majority and is hence able to decide the constitution-making design 
unilaterally. A situation in which a multiple balance of power exists would then be the 




Political Elites who Value Inclusion and Consensus  
Even where this is not the case, inclusive constitution-making design can be 
introduced if relevant parties put a high enough normative value on inclusion and 
consensus (Renwick 2011). As I demonstrated above, this argument has found 
considerable support among students of Tunisian politics and local politicians. 
Conversely, such support for inclusivity has been seen as lacking in Egypt. Amongst 
the factors that favoured the democratization progress in Tunisia, Bellin (2013, p. 3) 
listed that the country was endowed with a political elite “committed to the principle 
and the practice of inclusiveness” and to dialogue. She argued that these qualities of 
the Tunisian political elites impacted positively on the establishment of an inclusive 
constitution-making process, as well as the consensual nature of its outcome (2013, p. 
3). Marks (2015) juxtaposed Ennahda’s “participation-oriented positions that evinced 
much thicker understanding of democratic politics” with that of the “majoritarian 
strategy” adopted by Ennahda’s counterpart in Egypt, the Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP). If the argument stands, the adoption of inclusive constitution-making rules may 
be a function of consensual political culture in its thick version and an inclination to 
consensus as a value in the particular context of democratization and constitutional 
politics, in its thin version. Following this logic, even if the constitution-making design 
did somehow shape the attainment of an agreement on the constitution, it was not a 
totally independent factor. Rather, parties who valued consensus as a general principle 
decided to create an inclusive constitution-making design in the first place to attain 
this goal. 
These three factors, the availability of different constitution-making designs to 
parties in the anti-authoritarian coalition, the distribution of power among them, and 
the existence of a consensus-oriented largest party, might overlap in shaping the 
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choice of the constitution-making design. It is not my intention to hold up one of them 
as the single explanation. Rather, I want to weight their influence against one another. 
However, I will also pay attention to, and analyse, the political context and country-
specific factors in which these decisions emerged. 
The same factors that shape a party’s strategies in deciding whether 
constitution-making would be more or less inclusive might impact on constitutional 
agreement. There is thus a possibility that constitution-making designs are 
endogenous. In other words, not the constitution-making design itself but factors that 
led to its adoption might cause constitutional agreement. In such a case, some would 
argue that the procedural choices for making a constitution have little explanatory 
value on their own (see Przeworski, 2004; Shvetsova, 2003; Pepinsky, 2014; Kitschelt, 
et al. 1999). This caveat is especially acute because the channels and procedures that 
shape constitution-making are not durable institutions but are put in place specifically 
for the one-off purpose of drafting a constitution.  
This thesis takes a step forward from the existing research on constitution-
making processes, which in the majority of cases has not dealt with the question of 
their origins, and assesses what factors were behind the adoption of inclusive 
constitution-making design. I consequently consider the Pathway 1 in the theoretical 
model above (Figure 1). A logical follow up would be to test whether the same factors 
that led to a particular constitution-making process can also explain constitutional 
agreement (Pathway 2). Although this is an important agenda in its own right, it lies 






2.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I took on the task of reviewing the burgeoning body of literature on 
constitution-making processes and their design, focusing especially on how scholars 
have confronted the core themes of this thesis: constitution-making design that is 
inclusive of political parties across the political spectrum, democracy, and 
democratization. In recent years, scholars have moved away from the predominant 
emphasis on the design of macro-political institutions and, instead, begun to explore 
processes through which constitutions are negotiated, written, and approved. This 
thesis follows this trend. However, despite growing attention, and the proliferation of 
comparative research that complements earlier case study literature, I have argued that 
we still cannot say with much certainty whether constitution-making processes matter 
and if they do, how. This is most notably because existing research has faced 
conceptual and methodological challenges resulting especially from a heterogeneous 
research agenda that scholars in this field have adopted, and the lack of attention paid 
to the origins of constitution-making designs. Furthermore, I have shown that the 
context in which constitution-making overlaps with democratization, and the effect of 
inclusion of a broad range of political parties on democracy, remains underexplored.  
In the second part of this chapter, I laid out the theoretical framework of this 
thesis which concentrates on these understudied themes, while making sure not to fall 
into the same trap, with resulting problems, that constitution-making scholarship has 
faced up to now. Specifically, this thesis studies the link between the design of 
constitution-making processes that promote the inclusion of political parties across an 
anti-authoritarian coalition, and the constitutional agreement reached by these forces 
who invariably champion different visions of the configuration of the political regime 
following the removal of an autocrat. Apart from asking whether, and how, 
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inclusiveness affects the agreement on a constitution, this thesis also investigates how 
the procedures for drafting and negotiating constitutions emerge, and why some 
countries end up with more inclusive processes than others. I utilize this theoretical 
framework in Chapters 4 – 7. Before that, the next chapter (Chapter 3) unpacks these 
issues further by specifying the key theoretical concepts, and by introducing the 






Concepts, Methods and Data 
 
The underlying issue that this thesis explores is the linkage between constitution-
making design that encourages the inclusion of political parties of an anti-authoritarian 
coalition, and their ultimate agreement on a new constitution. In the previous chapter 
(Chapter 2), I introduced the theoretical framework that guides the analysis in the 
remainder of this thesis (Chapters 4-7). Before that, however, this chapter (Chapter 3) 
clarifies key concepts. I first of all introduce the context in which the central causal 
relationship may be theorized, democratization, and clarify what I mean when I use 
the phrase, “political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition”. I then turn to the main 
outcome explored in this thesis: constitutional agreement. Next, I elaborate on the 
main explanatory factor: constitution-making design and inclusiveness, the 
importance of which is tested in this thesis. Finally, I conceptualize additional factors 
that might influence the adoption of a particular constitution-making design. These 
are the availability of different designs, distribution of power among parties of the 
anti-authoritarian coalition, and the value that they place on inclusion and consensus. 
I close the chapter by explaining the choices of research methods, empirical cases, and 
data upon which the analysis builds.  
 
3.1 Defining the Context: Democratization 
This thesis concentrates on constitution change processes following popular 
revolutions that initiated democratic reforms. Democratization is, therefore, the 
context in which constitution-making plays out. I understand democratization to be 
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composed of two distinct processes: democratic transition and democratic 
consolidation. While a country has to complete a democratic transition so that it 
becomes meaningful to speak about democratization, democratic consolidation, in the 
sense of maintaining the progress towards democracy achieved during transition and 
hence avoiding a breakdown in democracy or its erosion (Schedler, 1998; Brownlee 
et al., 2015, p. 171), is a longer-term aspiration. I define the underlying concept of 
democracy in accordance with the procedural, unextended, minimum definition which 
is the standard in comparative politics.  
 
3.1.1 Democracy  
Democracy is a vague concept that has acquired different meanings throughout history 
and in different contexts. The same can be said about its usage by authors writing in 
the field of democratization. However, to define what democratic transition and 
consolidation are, it is first necessary to define democracy as clearly as possible 
(Munck, 2001, p. 126). There are broadly speaking two major ways in which 
democracy has been understood in political science. The first group of scholars asks 
“how?” and is concerned with democracy as a procedure or a method. The second 
group asks “what?” and focuses on its substance (Moller and Skating, 2013, p. 41).  
While within the first tradition democracy has often been seen as a set of 
institutions or procedures, the most important of which are free, fair and competitive 
elections, the understanding of the concept in the second tradition is more demanding. 
Democracy is regarded not just as a method; it also requires a specific content such as 
socio-economic equality. Since the acquisition of substantive democratic attributes 
such as social and economic equality is a long-term goal, scholars of democratization, 
concerned with the development of non-democratic countries into democracies, have 
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tended to follow the first tradition. Highlighting Schumpeter’s (2010) and Dahl’s work 
(1997) in particular, authors have conceived of democracy as a set of institutions and 
procedures. The other reason for this preference is more practical. While scholars 
agree, more or less, on what institutions make a democracy, there is much less 
consensus on what needs to be done, content-wise, for a regime to be called democratic 
(Collier and Levitsky, 1996, p. 13).  
Authors in the procedural tradition nevertheless differ as to the minimum 
institutional features that are necessary to ensure a viable democracy (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997, p. 433). Collier and Levitsky (1996) distinguished between three 
major trends of how democracy has been conceptualized in this stream of literature: 
the electoralist definition, the procedural minimum definition, and its expanded 
version. The least demanding of the definitions, the electoralist one, delimits 
democracy based on the single criterion of holding “reasonably competitive 
elections”, with broad suffrage, and devoid of “massive fraud” (Collier and Levitsky, 
1996). In contrast, for scholars using the procedural minimum definition, not all 
elections can be counted as democratic. Only those elections that are conducted within 
a context of civil and political liberties, and through which citizens select the “top 
political offices of the state”, form a democratic regime (Bratton and van de Wallle, 
1997, pp. 12-3).39 Finally, the expanded procedural minimum definition has developed 
from the caution that in some cases, holding elections and providing guarantees for 
civil and political liberties, might still not be enough to ensure democracy. This is 
because non-democratic actors, such as wealthy businessmen and military officers, 
might prevent newly elected governments fully executing their policies. Others, 
                                               
 
39 While this is often not made explicit, scholars adding civil and/or political liberties in their 
definitions often rely on a list put together by Dahl (1971, p. 3).  
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therefore, added two more conditions to the procedural minimum: that there is no such 
“non-elected realm” where non-elected actors have a veto power on certain policy 
areas, and that elected officials do not require the approval of actors outside of their 
territorial domain, by which is meant the exercise of control by any foreign individual, 
institution or state, and includes forces of occupation (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 
104; see also Moller and Skating, 2013, p. 44).  
The definition of democracy that I use in this thesis draws on the procedural 
understanding of democracy and the trend towards defining democracy in minimalist 
terms, which is a standard in the field of comparative politics (Collier and Levitsky, 
1996, p. 13). Following Levitsky and Way (1997, p. 434), I rely on the procedural 
unextended minimum definition where a government is selected through “fully 
contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud”, and where 
such elections are underpinned by guarantees of civil and political liberties as specified 
by Dahl (1971, p. 3). These include the freedom to form and join organizations, 
freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political 
leaders to compete for votes, and freedom to access alternative sources of information.  
The advantage of the minimum definition is that it allows us to think about 
democracy after the popular upheavals that in 2010 and 2011 swept the Arab world. 
Up until that point, countries within that region were known for the resilience of their 
authoritarian regimes. Keeping the threshold of democracy low opens the way for the 
comparison of  democratization in Arab Spring countries with the processes of 
democratic change in other parts of the world. This is not to say that the development 
of other democratic institutions such as independent legislatures, courts and civilian 
control over the military, which are sometimes added as conditions in extended 
procedural minimum definitions, are not important. However, I argue, as do Bratton 
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and van de Walle (1997, p. 8), that these extended elements can be attained after basic 
democratic institutions have already been established. Taking these additional 
conditions into account is further complicated by a situation in which we lack 
agreement on what criteria, exactly, are required for the extended minimum (Munck, 
2001, p. 124). Keeping the threshold too low, however, and perceiving democracy 
exclusively through the perspective of elections would deny its essence. In other 
words, it would be difficult to distinguish such a democracy from an authoritarian 
regime that simply utilized elections as mere window dressing. That is why to be 
meaningful, elections should be competitive, inclusive, and reinforced by civil and 
political liberties. The conceptualization of a democratic transition and its completion 
that follows below draw on this procedural minimalist definition of democracy.  
 
3.1.2 Democratic Transition 
The concept of democratic transition was first introduced by Rustow (1970) in an 
article, critical of the structure-oriented inquiry into democratization that was 
dominant at the time (see Chapter 1). However, it was not until the publication of 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s seminal volume Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
(1986) that the concept found its place in mainstream democratization literature.40 In 
their account, transitions were situations immersed in “abnormality”, uncertainty, and 
with important roles played by individual agency and factors such as “fortuna”, where 
normal political science methodology was inappropriate (1986, pp. 3-5). Put within a 
timeframe, transitions were seen as intervals “between one political regime and 
another” (1986, p. 6). It began when authoritarian incumbents embarked on the 
                                               
 
40 See, for example, Przeworski (1991), Linz and Stepan (1996), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), 
Collier (1999), and Doorenspleet (2005).    
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process of modification of “their own rules in the direction of providing more secure 
guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups” (1986, p. 6). Transition finishes 
when democracy or an alternative form of authoritarian regime is installed (1986, p. 
6).41 
  While the theoretical account by O’Donnell and Schmitter remains influential, 
because the boundaries of transitions were not set with any degree of precision, other 
scholars sought to delineate them more clearly. How they perceived democratic 
transitions, and especially how they identified its completion, depended on authors’ 
different understanding of democracy (Munck 2001, p. 123). I draw on two definitions 
of transition completion that resonate with the concept of democracy introduced 
above. The first one is less demanding: a democratic transition “can be said to have 
occurred only when a regime has been installed on the basis of a competitive election, 
freely and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, with results accepted by 
all participants” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p. 194). The second definition is 
useful because it breaks down criteria for identifying the completion of a democratic 
transition. Completion is marked by: (1) “sufficient agreement” about “political 
procedures to produce an elected government”; (2) the government has to come to 
power as “the direct result of free and popular vote”; have (3) “de facto authority to 
generate new policies”; and, finally, (4) “the executive, legislative and judicial power” 
does not have to “share power with other bodies de jure” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 
3). While the first three conditions might be sufficient for a democratic transition, in 
the empirical analysis I also ask whether the last threshold, which is based on the 
extended minimum definition of democracy, has been passed.  
                                               
 
41 The authors also stressed that democracy was only one among many possible outcomes of a 
transition (1986, pp. 3-6). 
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The concept of democratic transition has been criticized for a number of 
reasons. There has been a large number of definitions but little consensus as to what 
exactly it means and what cases it encompasses (Munck, 2001; Schedler, 2001; 
Plattner, 2014; Diamond et. al., 2014). Horowitz suggests it might be more useful as 
a category of thought or a container “into which you can pour a lot of useful content”, 
rather than as a pure concept (Diamond et. al. 2014, p. 94). The difficulty in delineating 
the confines of democratic transitions led to the emergence of an idea, especially 
current in policy circles, that all countries undergoing reforms are transitioning to 
some extent, when, in reality, they are often not moving anywhere but remain stuck 
between democracy and authoritarianism (Carothers, 2002). This is why, to pinpoint 
a democratic transition, I rely on the criteria for its completion.  
Another critique has been directed towards the way transitions are studied 
empirically, and to the gap between the theory and conceptualization, on the one hand, 
and the actual operationalization and measurement, on the other. On the theoretical 
level, there has been a broad acknowledgement that transitions are nonlinear and 
multistep processes. Yet, both Munck (2001, pp. 124-6) and LeBas (2011, p. 253) 
lamented the fact that despite this criticism, most empirical studies continue to capture 
them as one-shot moments of change where the movement from nondemocratic to 
democratic regime can be pinned down to a single date. Narrowing transitions down 
to single moment, Munck (2001, p. 125) argued, lacks the recognition that 
democratization might proceed at a different pace, developing different attributes of 
democracy, something that might entail crossing more than one threshold. I deal with 
this problem on an empirical level by being attentive to the “messy” empirical reality 
of transition processes. I now need to differentiate the concept of transition from that 
of democratic consolidation.  
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3.1.3 Democratic Consolidation 
Democratic consolidation is a catch-all concept, to which scholars often assign 
different meanings depending on the context they are studying and their research 
agenda (Schedler, 1998, 2001). To delineate the boundaries of what it is not, I define 
it in negative terms as concerns about regime continuity (Schedler, 1998). In this way, 
democratic consolidation is seen as about avoiding a breakdown or erosion in 
democracy (Schedler, 1998), and about the maintenance of the democratic progress 
achieved during the transition (Brownlee et al., 2015, p. 171). 
 This conceptualization builds on Schedler’s (1998) categorization of the 
different understandings of democratic consolidation that have appeared in 
democratization literature. He usefully distinguished between negative approaches to 
consolidation, where authors cared about avoiding a certain outcome, and the positive 
understanding of consolidation, where authors focused on extending what had already 
been achieved. In the former stream, depending on their starting point, authors were 
inclined to view consolidation as: (1) avoiding the breakdown of democracy, or (2) 
avoiding the erosion of democracy. In the first approach, the goal is to secure what 
“democrats” have achieved, an important part of which might be curbing various 
undemocratic actors, including the military or powerful businessmen.42 The second 
one pre-supposes that a liberal democracy has already been established and the task is 
to guard against an incremental decay or lessening of democracy and the creation of 
                                               
 
42 Although as Schedler (1998) recalls, even within this stream of the literature “preventing 
democracy breakdown” does not always mean the same thing. On the one hand, actors with 
undemocratic motives that authors focus on, might be very different, ranging from guerrillas, to 
elected presidents, and disenchanted populations. On the other hand, scholars invoke a number of 
other goals apart from curbing the enemies of democracy and basically “anything positively valued in 
the name of democracy sustainability”. 
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some kind of a hybrid regime. In contrast, in the positive approach to consolidation, 
authors look either at: (3) completing the democratic change, for example by moving 
on from a minimal democracy defined by free, fair and competitive elections to the 
establishment of institutions of liberal democracy, or (4) deepening democracy, that 
is, at enhancing its quality.   
I expect that constitution-making following the ousting of an autocrat would 
take place in a situation framed by the negative understanding of consolidation, when 
political actors focus on the maintenance of the democratic progress achieved during 
transition, and seek to avoid the breakdown of democracy or its erosion. It is this 
negative understanding of consolidation that best describes the context in which 
constitution-making took place in Egypt and Tunisia. This conceptualization is 
preferable for two additional reasons pinpointed by Schedler (1998). First, positive 
notions of democratic consolidation can be studied through other concepts, such as the 
quality of democracy. Second, if we think about democratic consolidation in positive 
terms, it becomes even more difficult to see an end to consolidation, since there is 
always space for enhancing the quality of any democracy. In other words, if we accept 
this reasoning, we accept that most democracies can never be consolidated.  
To summarize, in this thesis I understand democratization to be composed of 
both democratic transition and consolidation. While I rely on a definition of 
democratic transition completion to analyse whether we can frame a particular context 
as democratization, consolidation of democracy, which I describe in negative terms, 
is regarded as a longer-term aspiration. It is in this context of democratization that 
political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition, which I examine in the next section, 




3.2 Defining Actors: Political Parties of the Anti-authoritarian Coalition 
This thesis explores the inclusion of parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition in the 
constitution-making process and their agreement to constitution. Przeworski (1988), 
who coined this term, used it to underline the point that former opposition forces and 
new ones emerging during a transition, who together formed the anti-authoritarian 
coalition, usually struggled on two fronts. To eliminate the old regime, they had to 
unite against it. However, shaping the new democratic regime to meet their 
preferences often meant turning against each other when competing interests came 
into play. This thesis adapts this notion, but limits it to refer exclusively to political 
parties. This is consistent with the theoretical framework that I presented in Chapter 
2, as well as with transition and consolidation scholarship introduced in Chapter 1. 
Given the nature of the constitution-making processes, in both my case studies, it was 
political parties that retained the most influence in the process, and whose agreement 
on the new constitutions was essential. This is not to say that other groups, including 
civil society organizations, revolutionary and activist groups, were not important in 
the process of reaching constitutional agreement. Nevertheless, they remain at the 
margins of this thesis as the main focus is on the inclusion of political parties and the 
process by which they reached agreement. In line with Sartori (1976, p. 63), I define 
a political party as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at 
elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for 
public offices”.43  
                                               
 
43 By this definition, the Civic Forum that run in the 1990 parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia 
that followed the 1989 Velvet Revolution could be said to be a party, despite the fact that its 
members, for whom a word ‘party’ had a negative connotation, disavowed the term.  
82 
 
Two types of parties are identified as being part of the anti-authoritarian 
coalition: opposition parties formed prior to the revolution, and newcomers 
established during the transition period. To identify the first group of parties, I rely on 
the definition of opposition in the context of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes 
fashioned by Albrecht (2010). He described opposition as “an institution located 
within a political system but outside of the realm of governance that has decisive 
organizational capacities and engages in competitive interactions with the incumbents 
of a political regime based on a minimum degree of mutual acceptance” (2010, p. 3). 
This definition allows me to take into account opposition parties that were co-opted 
by the regime for limited periods and participated in legislatures but were never 
involved in the government. It also allows for the inclusion of any illegal opposition 
group whose members might have been in jail, hiding, or abroad. Given the influx of 
new political parties that is characteristic of transitions, restricting the anti-
authoritarian coalition to former opposition groups would not enable me to account 
for some of the major political forces whose agreement on the new constitution was 
vital for democratization, even though they did not organize themselves under the 
outgoing regime. Newly formed political parties qualify as members of the anti-
authoritarian coalition where they are not directly related to the former ruling parties. 
This could be the result of having key echelons of the party coming from the ranks of 
the former ruling party, or by directly claiming, for example in their programme, that 
they saw themselves as the inheritors of the legacy of the ruling party.   
The following analysis will focus primarily on what I call the major political 
parties. This is a pragmatic decision. Dozens of political parties emerged from the 
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and accounting for their individual involvement in the 
constitution-making process would add little value to the overall analysis. I, therefore, 
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take into account only parties that won seats in the first democratic elections following 
the revolutions, and mark as marginal those whose share of seats or contribution to the 
debate about the constitution was minimal for reasons other than controlling a few 
seats. Focusing primarily on parties with representation in the legislature is a necessity 
in countries where party systems are still in the making and not yet institutionalized. 
In such cases, elections might be the first and only clue to the parties’ standing in 
society. However, to ensure no important actor was omitted, I take a case sensitive 
approach to the identification of potentially influential parties so that all relevant 
parties are captured in this conceptual net.    
This thesis assumes that an agreement on the new constitution between the 
parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition is essential for democratic consolidation but 
also difficult to attain because of the potential divisions between themselves and/or 
because of their divergent preferences for the new political institutional framework. 
To understand the nature and the quality of divisions between the parties in the 
coalition, I inquire into the main political cleavages. I consider the relevance of seven 
dimensions of programmatic differences: socio-economic, religious (dividing 
secularist and religious parties, or different religions), cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, 
regime support, foreign policy and post-materialist issues (Lijphart, 2012, p. 77). I 
assessed which ones were the most relevant, historically and during democratization. 
The next section defines the concept of constitutional agreement.  
 
3.3 Defining the Outcome: Constitutional Agreement  
To define constitutional agreement, I deliberate on three questions: (1) What is a 
constitution?, (2) What degree of agreement is sufficient?, and (3) Which of the 
elements of the constitution are the most critical components of any agreement on the 
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constitution? Answers to the first and second questions are relatively non-problematic. 
In contrast, authors in the two distinct areas of scholarship upon which this thesis 
builds, constitutional politics on the one hand and democratization on the other, offer 
different responses to the third question. I draw on both these scholarly streams to 
break down constitutional agreements into individual elements whose relevance I 
assess in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.3.1 Overall Constitutional Agreement  
This thesis adopts a “thin” conceptualization of constitutions. A constitution can be 
distinguished from other documents based on its form; in other words, we can 
recognize a constitution when it looks like one. Generally, a constitution is a formal, 
and written, document, whose text directly specifies that it is a constitution, 
Fundamental Law, Basic Law, or the highest law (Elkins et al. 2009, pp. 38-40, 49).  
An alternative to the understanding of constitutions as formalistic is the 
functional approach which proceeds by identifying the functions tied to constitutions. 
In this case, a document can be called a constitution once it performs certain functions. 
This “thick” conceptualization comprises a broader range of elements that perform 
functions that can be defined as constitutional, including laws, theories, customs, 
understandings and interpretations which together create a constitutional order for a 
particular country (Elkins et al. 2009, pp. 38-39). Its elements may be found elsewhere 
than in a written constitution and they might precede it in the sense of specific 
behaviour or cultural traditions that a constitution later ratifies, are developed as a new 
constitution is drafted, or develop over time, as the constitution is put into practice and 
interpreted (Elkins et al. 2009, p. 53). For example, while parties and elections might 
be essential for the operation of a democratic state, Elkins et al. (2009, p. 52) noticed 
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that they were often regulated by separate documents, not constitutions.44 The 
advantage of the thin conceptualization adopted here, compared to the latter approach, 
is that it is applicable across cases, as most modern states have formal written charters 
(Elkins et al. 2009, p. 38). More importantly, it is the formal, written constitution, 
rather than less formal rules or norms of behaviour, that are the immediate end-
products of constitution-making processes.  
To assess whether an overall constitutional agreement has emerged, I follow 
suggestions put forward by scholars of democratization. In particular, I look for 
negative statements about the constitution by parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition 
made at the time of its drafting (Higley and Gunther, 1992, p. 7). An indicator of the 
absence of a broad agreement is “a substantial vote against a constitution motivated 
by fundamental disagreements” (1992, p. 7). Nonetheless, it is also clear that not 
everyone has to accept the constitution. In line with Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 3), I 
maintain that parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition must find at least a “sufficient 
agreement”. In other words, although a certain degree of disagreement is natural, 
“deep and continuous confrontation” with “no sign of accommodation” might be 
problematic as it can hinder democratic consolidation (1996, p. 4).  
 
                                               
 
44 Elkins et al. (2009, p. 52) pointed out that most constitutions in their extensive sample left the task 
of defining the design of electoral systems to the legislature to law, or did not mention it at all. This 
was also the case with the legal framework for the functioning of political parties. According to the 
authors, 47 percent of constitutions did “not even mention political parties” and only 21 percent of 
them mention central banks. Not all the paragraphs of a final document perform what is generally 
seen as the most critical functions of a constitution, which is to constrain or enable government, and 
often deal with supposedly less vital issues such as the symbols of state to be adopted. As Elkins et al. 
(2009, pp. 52-3) succinctly pointed out, not all that is constitutional is written and, likewise, not all 




Key Elements of Constitutional Agreements  
The functionalist approach to defining a constitution is, nevertheless, helpful for 
unpacking the most crucial aspects of constitutions, and informs our understanding of 
what an agreement on a constitution is about. Constitutionalist literature generally 
highlights that constitutions, above all, limit the power of the government, define the 
patterns of authority and set up government institutions (Elkins et al., 2009, pp. 38-
40). For instance, Galligan and Versteeg (2013, p. 6) stated that a constitution 
“establishes a system of government, defines the powers and functions of its 
institutions, provides substantive limits on its operation, and regulates relations 
between institutions and the people”, thus performing the functions of constraining 
and enabling government. Political actors are often expected to clash over the specific 
paragraphs in constitutions that are related to these functions, such as those defining 
the executive and legislative branches of government. Other important means of 
constraining government can be the inclusion of a catalogue of rights into a 
constitution, along with the institutions necessary to protect them against government 
incursion, such as supreme or constitutional courts (Stone Sweet, 2014, pp. 151-2).  
In addition, especially in societies marked by religious conflicts, clauses 
relating to other constitutional functions, those that are more symbolic, identity and 
value-oriented, may be as crucial, and as difficult, to find an agreement on as 
distributional political institutions such as the type of executives and legislatures (Bâli 
and Lerner, 2017). As Bâli and Lerner (2017, p. 2) pointed out, conflicts over religious 
law, identity, and relationships between the state and religion were central to 
constitutional debates in democratizing Muslim-majority countries such as Tunisia, 
Egypt, or Indonesia. It proved difficult to find compromises on these issues because 
they involved long standing patterns of “beliefs, values, and normative commitments” 
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(Bâli and Lerner, 2017, p. 7). Furthermore, institutions created by religion may 
compete with political and legal institutions defined by the constitution. For example, 
while Catholicism raises the issue of the relationship between the state and the 
Vatican, Islam raises questions about the relationship between Islamic law, sharia, and 
the state (Bâli and Lerner, 2017, pp. 6-8).45 Brown (2017, p. 303) argued that the 
struggles for these symbolic aspects of constitutions, usually manifested in long and 
heated debates about preambles and basic proclamations, have been on the rise 
globally, as constitution drafting has increasingly become a public process as opposed 
to being the preserve of elites who bargain between themselves.   
In the democratization literature authors highlighted other elements that were 
important for an agreement between political forces on the framework of the new 
democratic regime, although some of these might be found outside of the constitution 
as defined above. Scholars in this tradition have referred to such agreements by 
different terms and held different ideas as to exactly what it constitutes.46 Of these 
different notions, the closest to the agreement on a constitution as conceived here is 
its most minimal understanding. For O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, pp. 69-70), 
institutional agreement involved three major elements of the new political regime: (1) 
a regime’s inclusiveness or, in other words, the question as to which actors would be 
permitted to enter political competition, and especially whether “antidemocratic” 
                                               
 
45 Islamic sharia is usually translated as Islamic law. However, sharia includes areas of personal 
conduct not commonly covered by legal systems in non-Muslim countries. These range from 
questions of ethics and the conduct of prayers, business transactions and inheritance, to criminal 
punishments and legal procedures. Brown (2012a) thus suggests a “vaguer but more accurate” 
translation. According to him, sharia can be understood as “the Islamic way of doing things”. 
46 E.g. Przeworski (1988) spoke of “institutional compromise”, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 4) 
mentioned a “sufficient agreement” on “political procedures to produce elected government”, and 
Higley and Gunther (1992) refer to it as a “consensus” on the institutional framework of democracy. 
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actors would be able to do so, through what threshold, and whether the representation 
of minority groups would be guaranteed; (2) the type of electoral system, that is the 
formula used for distribution of seats, and the size and number of constituencies; and 
(3) the form of government. To this list, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 4) added the issue 
of whether the new form of state would be unitary or federal.  
This agreement on the political framework of democracy, or as I put it more 
simply, institutional agreement, can be distinguished from other kinds of pacts and 
agreements pertinent to democratization, identified in this scholarly tradition. For 
instance, some authors broadened the meaning of institutional agreements to include 
more than just the core, institutional elements. On the one hand, this is the case when 
taking a longer-term perspective into account. In this view, what is important is not 
only that actors agree on political institutions but that they, too, adhere to them in the 
long run: that they become habituated to solving conflicts within these new 
institutional boundaries, and come to expect that others would do so as well 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1988; Higley and Gunther, 1992; Linz 
and Stepan, 1996). Although compliance, habituation, and adherence to the new 
democratic institutional framework are perhaps crucial if democracy is to last, whether 
these conditions are present may only be judged once some time passes from the initial 
agreement on the constitution, and hence it will be left out from the analysis here. 
On the other hand, several studies understood the appreciation of the value of 
democracy and the worth of democratic institutions by political actors also to be 
crucial for democracy, and that this was interlinked with the agreement on the 
institutional framework (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 3-4; Higley and Gunther, 1992, 
pp. 3-4, 32). The authors did not, however, specify what, exactly, an agreement on the 
value of democracy involved or how it could be differentiated from adherence to 
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democratic institutions. It may be that elites adhere to democratic institutions because 
they value democracy but it could also be the case that political actors do not value 
democracy from the outset but chose to support the installation and maintenance of 
democratic institutions as a better option compared to keeping an authoritarian system 
or to drawing the country into a civil conflict. Finally, it is important to distinguish 
institutional agreements highlighted in this scholarly tradition from an agreement on 
particular policies or a long-term political course of action, because democracy does 
not emerge from a substantive compromise, such as an agreement on the type of 
taxation. Conversely, democracy can be established in places where political actors 
have conflicting interests and visions about policies they want to adopt (Przeworski 
1988, p. 64). However, what they should settle on are the rules of democracy that 
would specify how they can compete for the right to implement such a policy. 
When disentangling the constitutional (dis)agreement in Egypt and Tunisia, I 
ask what elements of the constitution were the most important for the political parties 
and, at the same time, the most complicated in terms of finding an agreement on due 
to conflicting preferences. The elements of the constitution highlighted by the 
functional approach to constitutions and democratization literature guide this inquiry. 
In a case in which components of the institutional agreement specified by 
democratization scholarship were negotiated outside the constitution’s scope, I also 
consider its potential linkage with the constitutional agreement reached. Going beyond 
the idea of overall constitutional agreements as one-shot moments that either happened 
or not, and asking about key components, enables me to track how constitutional 
agreement developed by means of agreements on individual issues over time. The next 
section defines the main explanatory factor postulated in this thesis, the design of a 
constitution-making process and its inclusiveness.  
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3.4 Defining the Main Explanatory Factor: Constitution-making Design and its 
Inclusiveness 
There seems to be no comprehensive, explicit definition of constitution-making 
processes that a majority of authors employ. Nevertheless, when discussing 
constitution-making, authors in both the academic and policy world usually specify 
the object of analysis by delineating activities that it typically entails, and this thesis 
follows this trend.47 In this sense, constitution-making can be differentiated from a 
broader concept of constitution-building that encompasses a longer timeframe and 
more tasks. To Böckenförde et al. (2011, p. 2), constitution-making is limited to “the 
period when a constitution is drafted.” Meanwhile, constitution-building involves also 
“agreeing on the need for constitutional change and its scope”, “establishing 
institutions, procedures and rules” of constitution-making, “giving legal effect to the 
constitution and ratification”, as well as the stage of implementing the constitution. 
Constitution-making, hence, can be seen as an activity directed at producing a 
constitution, not towards deciding how a constitution would be produced, nor 
implementing the political institutions that its drafters described in its pages.  
 The design of a constitution-making process, then, refers to a combination of 
rules and mechanisms that guide how the production of a constitution develops 
through the main channels that are dedicated to this task. These rules and mechanisms 
regulate who is involved in constitution-making channels, when this involvement 
takes place, and how actors are to proceed with producing a constitution (Ginsburg et 
                                               
 
47 For instance, Ginsburg et al. (2009) specified they were interested in “conditions and rules under 
which founders write, deliberate, and ratify” constitutions. Carey (2009, p. 155), studying the impact 
of inclusive constitutional moments, asked about processes whereby constitutions were drafted and 
adopted. The study of public participation by Eisenstadt et al. (2015) focused on three stages of 
constitution-making: drafting, debating, and ratification.  
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al., 2009, p. 204; see also Elkins and Ginsburg, 2013). We can imagine the rules and 
mechanisms that frame the production of constitutions playing out across three 
constitution-making stages: convening, debating, and approval.48 Convening here 
refers to “selecting those actively and directly involved in crafting the constitution’s 
content”, debating concerns the method for making decisions “about content and 
retentions and omissions from the text”, and approval refers to “procedures for 
approving the constitution” (Eisenstadt et al., 2017, p. 28).  
Constitution-making usually proceeds through formal channels dedicated to 
that task, such as constituent assemblies.49 In these cases, the conduct of constitution-
making is likely to be enabled and constrained by formal rules (Lowndes and Roberts, 
2013, pp. 49-62). An example of such rules are electoral mechanisms that shape who 
is included in this body and who is not, the internal organization of the body and its 
decision-making mechanisms, and the rules that guide how a constitution is to be 
adopted once its text is finalized. We should be able to find these rules formally 
specified in one or more documents, such as the electoral law, by-laws of a constituent 
assembly, and so on. However, there might be other channels through which parts of 
the constitution are produced, which may be as critical as more formal ones for 
shaping the content. As with informal institutions, they might be “created, 
                                               
 
48 These stages are adapted from the book by Eisenstadt et al. (2017) on public participation in 
constitution-making processes with one alternation. The authors referred to the last stage as 
“ratification” not approval, and maintained that this stage consisted not only of the “procedures for 
approving the constitution” but also of “making it binding for all citizens, including those who did not 
participate in its creation” (2017, p. 28). However, if understood in this broader sense, the definition 
would erase the difference between thinner concepts of constitution-making and thicker ones of 
constitution-building.      
49 Elster (1995, p 373) even referred to constitution-making straightforwardly as to an activity 
happening in constituent assemblies. 
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communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2006, p. 1) and less visible or formally articulated, but their existence would 
nevertheless be acknowledged by actors (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, pp. 47, 58-62). 
They can be more difficult to spot than formal channels and, in addition, as their 
conduct can be regulated by means other than written rules, qualitative inquiry is 
essential for identifying them and their importance in the overall constitutional change 
process.  
 The design of constitution-making should not be conflated with the conduct of 
constitution-makers, which it constrains and enables. The design of a constitution-
making process is different from the specific activities involved in constitution-
making and is analogous with the difference between electoral systems and electoral 
competition. An electoral system encompasses formal rules that define what it is that 
parties are competing for, as well as how they compete. They frame the activity of 
electoral competition but are not identical to it. Further, a design is different from the 
general mode of constitutional change, such as whether it develops in a consensual 
fashion. This is important because while many accounts of constitutional change 
highlight the benefits of consensual constitution-making, they often do not make it 
clear whether they focus on actors’ ability to compromise, or on rules and mechanisms 
that incentivize consensus, for example, by requiring greater majorities than the simple 
50% plus one to pass articles within the constitutions (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 81-
3). As this thesis focuses on the question whether the design of constitution-making 
matters for constitutional agreement, distinguishing between actors’ ability, or 
inclination, to compromise and the process that might shape their actions, is essential. 
Having specified what constitution-making is and how it is different from the design 
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of a constitution-making process, I can now define inclusiveness and constitution-
making design that promotes it.  
 
3.4.1 Substantive, Formal and Perceived Inclusiveness  
At a general level, three criteria confine what inclusiveness constitutes: who are 
included, how they are included, and when that inclusion takes place. What this thesis 
primarily explores is the inclusion of parties across the anti-authoritarian coalition in 
the process of producing a constitution, as defined in the previous section. To specify 
how these parties are included in constitution-making, I return to the distinction 
between two types of inclusiveness present in both academic and policy discussions 
about constitution-making that I identified in Chapter 2. I have argued that even 
though this distinction is not explicitly theorized, authors usually refer to the inclusion 
of political elites, either in terms of bringing all relevant political forces to the 
negotiating table, or as the necessity to give them substantive influence over the 
constitution. Building on this distinction, I separate two types of inclusion: formal 
inclusion, which simply captures the fact that a political party is a participant in main 
constitution-making channels, and substantive inclusion, which refers to the ability of 
a political party to influence the actual shaping of a constitution. In addition to these 
two categories, the empirical analysis also assesses the parties’ perceptions of 
inclusiveness, which captures how leading members of the relevant political parties, 
themselves, judge how their party was involved in the constitution-making process.    
I understand formal inclusion as a dichotomous concept, where a political 
party is either granted a membership in the constitutional negotiations, or it is not. 
What matters is whether a party is included, through its presence, in the process of 
constitution-making. While the actual numbers of deputies that a political party has 
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within a constitution-making body might be an important indicator in terms of the 
influence it has over the content, these figures become irrelevant when we want to 
know, simply, whether a party takes part in the process or not. For example, a deputy 
for a given political party can be either a member of the constituent assembly or not; 
he or she cannot be a deputy to a greater or lesser extent than another deputy. In 
contrast, substantive inclusion, which refers to the political influence or leverage a 
party has on shaping the constitution, is a matter of degree. In other words, some 
parties might have more power over the drafting of the constitution than others. This 
assertion is similar to that of Reynolds’ (1999, p. 60) category of actual inclusion 
which is, however, tailored to involvement of citizens and not political elites through 
electoral systems and refers to whether “the citizenry have an influence on the process 
through which life-affecting decisions are made”. 
The analytical distinction between formal and substantive inclusion is 
important as the two modes of inclusiveness may trigger different causal mechanisms 
through which they can influence the agreement on a constitution. For instance, just 
being a member of a body in charge of writing a constitution without having any actual 
influence over its content might make members of a political party feel excluded and 
negatively impact on the prospects for agreement. It also may be the case that the 
simple fact of being a member of a constituent assembly and meeting political rivals 
on a daily basis may help building relationships and confidence among members of 
political parties who might have previously distrusted one another (Samuels, 2006a). 
While being analytically distinct, two modes of inclusion are hence also 
fundamentally related. The less demanding formal inclusion is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition of substantive inclusion. Only those who have attained the formal 
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membership in the constitution-making channels have the power to shape the 
constitution.  
Which parties are formally included in constitution-making and how much 
they can shape the constitution depends on the constitution-making design, as well as 
the electoral popularity of each party. A minor political party that enjoys little electoral 
support can find it difficult to shape the text of the constitution. Nevertheless, a 
constitution-making design that promotes substantive inclusion can still make it 
difficult for a party or a political current with a small majority to pass decisions against 
the will of a minority. In this sense, inclusive constitution-making design is similar to 
Lijphart’s (2012, p. 2) consensus model of democracy in that it takes majority rule as 
a “minimum requirement” and aspires to “share, disperse, and limit” power over the 
constitution’s content.  
At the convening stage of the constitution-making process, this might be done 
by using a formula that translates parties’ electoral popularity proportionally into seats 
in the main constitution-making channels (Carey and Reynolds, 2011). At the debating 
stage, the internal organization of the main constitution-making channel, such as a 
constituent assembly, can help to strengthen the voice of smaller parties in 
negotiations. In this regard, Brown (2011a, p. 11) has urged researchers and policy-
makers to pay close attention to the committee structure, as it is where “a lot of the 
detailed drafting gets done”. In particular, he recommended that most major groups 
and orientations should be represented on committees, that decision-making rules 
favour consensual approaches, and that the chairmanship of the committees rotates 
(2011, p. 11). Finally, at the approval stage, the size of the majority necessary to 
approve the constitution can be more demanding than a simple majority requirement 
(Schmitter, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Miller, 2010; Lijphart, 2012). In Nepal, for 
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example, constitution-makers were intended, initially, to adopt the constitution by a 
consensus which meant that while abstentions were allowed, no one could vote against 
a particular provision. Even if total consensus could not be achieved, a majority of two 
thirds of all eligible members, not those voting, was still required to secure approval 
(Miller, 2010, pp. 197-8). Smaller parties can be given further safeguards against 
constitutions written by “temporary majorities” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 81) in a 
form of a popular referendum.  
 
3.4.2 Operationalising Inclusiveness  
Formal inclusion, or inclusion as membership, can be evaluated by looking at the 
composition of the main body responsible for producing a constitution. In my two 
cases, these were the constituent assemblies created shortly after the revolutions, the 
Tunisian National Constituent Assembly and the Egyptian Constituent Assembly. 
Their membership is indicative of whether all the major political parties of the anti-
authoritarian coalition took part in constitution-making or not. I was interested in 
whether these parties were formally included in other important, and perhaps less 
formal, constitution-making channels. Further, if a major political party was missing 
from the main constitution-making channel, I asked whether this was due to the 
particular design of the process at the convening stage, such as that members of that 
party were not selected to the constituent assembly, or for other reasons, for example, 
because the party decided to boycott these negotiations. To reach a conclusion on 
formal inclusiveness, I consider the following questions: 
• Do all the major political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition have 
members in the constituent assembly?  
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• Do members of all the major political parties of the coalition participate in 
other constitution-making channels? (This question was asked in case these 
arenas were important in terms of influencing the text of the constitution.)  
• Is any major political party of the coalition excluded from constitution-making, 
by being refused membership in the main channels through which the 
constitution is negotiated?  
Substantial inclusion, in turn, can be understood as the influence a political party 
has over shaping the text of the constitution. That level of influence depends on two 
main criteria: (1) its electoral popularity, and (2) the constitution-making design, and 
in particular the mechanisms used for selection of members of the main constitution-
making channels, internal organization of the constituent assembly, and approval 
mechanisms. To assess a party’s capacity to influence the constitution, we need to 
know not only how many seats it has in the main constitution-making bodies, but also 
what it can do with that influence. Constitution-making design that promotes 
substantive inclusion is not necessarily characterized by each party being an equal 
partner in the process of producing the text. A highly inclusive design would be one 
where the strongest party is not overrepresented, where the internal organization of 
the constituent assembly does not undermine the voice of smaller parties, where the 
required size of majority for the adoption of the constitution is maximized, and where 
smaller parties are granted safeguarding mechanisms that they can use if a majority is 
strong enough to push through a constitution against their will. In investigating 
substantive inclusiveness, I consider the following questions:      
• Is the number of seats that parties receive in the main constitution-making 
channels proportional to their electoral popularity? Is the strongest party 
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significantly overrepresented, or smaller parties significantly 
underrepresented?  
• What is the internal organization of the constituent assembly? How do 
constituent commissions or other, less formal, constitution-making channels 
make decisions regarding the content of the constitution? Are these adopted by 
a vote and if so, what majority is necessary for approval? 
• What majority is required to pass the entire constitution? Does that majority 
have to be greater than a simple majority?   
• Are there any safeguarding mechanisms, for example, procedures a party can 
use when it disagrees with the constitution, such as a referendum?   
The first question deserves further explanation. To assess (dis)proportionality, I 
draw on Lijphart’s (2012, p. 144) definition, where disproportionality refers to the 
difference between a party’s vote share and its seat share. Achieving precise 
proportionality, that is, a situation where “every party wins seats in exact proportion 
to its share of the votes”,50 is unlikely even if electoral systems based on proportional 
representation principle are used (Lijphart, 2012, p. 131). This simple measurement is 
sufficient for the research purposes of this thesis. There is no need to assess the 
aggregate of vote-seat share across parties as what I am particularly interested in is 
whether larger parties are overrepresented, or not, vis a vis smaller parties.51 I evaluate, 
                                               
 
50 Renwick, A., “Electoral disproportionality: What is it and how should we measure it?” Politics at 
Reading blog series, 29 June 2015, available at: 
https://blogs.reading.ac.uk/readingpolitics/2015/06/29/electoral-disproportionality-what-is-it-and-
how-should-we-measure-it/ [accessed 22 April 2018].  
51 Measuring proportionality of electoral scores has been an area of large-N comparative studies. In 
most cases, scholars sought to assess the extent to which different electoral systems produce 
proportional or disproportional outcomes. Different indices have been developed to assess the 
proportionality of results produced by competing electoral procedures. In his recent study, Karpov 
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negatively, a situation when the largest party gains considerably more seats in the 
constitution-making channels than votes. In contrast, if smaller parties receive more 
seats than votes, it can be viewed positively in terms of enhancing their ability to 
impact the constitution and, therefore, their substantive inclusion. For the purposes of 
my assessment, I ask whether the percentage of seats that each party controlled in the 
relevant constitution-making body corresponded to the percentage of votes it received 
in the first democratic elections after the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali. In Tunisia, 
where the NCA was popularly elected, a comparison of parties’ vote share with their 
NCA seat share, and evaluating whether the strongest party was, or was not, 
overrepresented, is viable and appropriate. This is, however, more difficult to measure 
in Egypt, where an appointed CA was, apart from partisans, composed also of experts 
and other individuals. In that case, I assess proportionality only with the CA’s partisan 
component and use a more qualitative approach for the rest of the Assembly.     
In addition to these two forms of inclusivity, this thesis assesses a special category 
on parties’ perceptions about inclusiveness. This is to take into account the 
perspective of leading members of the relevant political parties about the inclusivity 
of the constitution-making process, and to better understand: (a) what inclusiveness 
meant to them and what they saw as an ideal inclusive process under their particular 
circumstances, and (b) to identify if there were any potential informal barriers to their 
                                               
 
(2008) identified as many as 19 different indices for measuring disproportionality, and his list was not 
exhaustive. Renwick attributed this heterogeneity to the lack of agreement on what disproportionality 
actually is. This is clear from looking at the indices listed by Karpov. Some measure the absolute 
deviation from proportionality (i.e. assign a large deviation and a group of small deviations the same 
value) while others differentiate between large and small deviations between the vote and seat share. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis a simpler way of measuring proportionality is sufficient. See 
Renwick, A., “Electoral disproportionality: What is it and how should we measure it?” Politics at 
Reading blog series, 29 June 2015.  
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ability to impact the constitution which might have gone unnoticed in this research. I 
gathered this information through interviews with party officials involved in the 
constitution-making process. I tapped into their perceptions by asking indirect 
questions, such as “What do you think about how the constitution-making processes 
was organized and how it proceeded?”, “What were the main problems you faced 
during constitution-making?”, and “What were the main negotiating channels?”.  
 Having defined constitution-making, its design, and inclusiveness, I now turn 
to the last set of key concepts employed in this thesis. These are the factors which I 
singled out in Chapter 2 as being the ones that might influence what kind of 
constitution-making design is put in place during democratization.  
 
3.5 Origins of Constitution-making Design 
Apart from investigating whether constitution-making design matters, this thesis also 
seeks to explain why a particular constitution-making design is put in place and, above 
all, why some are inclusive and others less so. I consider three different factors that 
might affect which design is adopted: availability, distribution of power, and 
normative value that parties assign to consensus and inclusion. Availability relates to 
whether parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition can choose from different designs. 
Their choices might be limited when other actors, such as interim governments 
composed partially or completely of incumbents of the outgoing authoritarian regime, 
are involved in framing how constitution-making would proceed. It might also be that, 
under the particular context of a transition, more choices are either not available or 
non-viable. To inquire into availability, I ask the following questions: Who makes the 
decision about the constitution-making design? Are parties involved in this process, 
and if so, are different designs available to them?  
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If parties are involved in designing the constitution-making process, the 
choices they make, and whether they are able to push through their preferred process, 
can depend on the distribution of power between them. To inquire into the relative 
strength of individual political parties, I rely on several types of measurement. I 
consider the percentage of votes that each political party received in the first legislative 
elections, or the percentage of seats for each party or party bloc if the former is not 
available. If alternations to constitution-making design were introduced at a later date, 
I also examine whether the distribution of power changed. However, during 
democratization, where party systems are not consolidated and permanent political 
institutions are in the making, the relative strength of parties and their ability to adjust 
constitution-making design to their own preferences might also be structured by the 
context of the transition and, in particular, the forums in which these decisions take 
place (Birch and Millard, 2002, p. 20). I take this possibility into account.  
 Even in situations where the largest party or a political stream is strong enough 
to attain the constitution-making design it prefers, inclusive constitution-making can 
be initiated if its leading members assign a normative value to consensus and 
inclusiveness. Yet normative convictions are difficult to prove. Party leaders might 
express that consensus has always been their priority, even when the choice of 
inclusive process, in fact, resulted from a strategic decision motivated by other 
considerations. In a similar way, Benoit and Schiemann (2001, p. 157), in their study 
of the choice of electoral system during a democratic transition in post-communist 
Hungary, made the caveat that parties often use arguments about the general good only 
to defend their interests. In the cases where party leaders explain their choices by 
normative justification, I ask whether this conduct could not be better explained as 
being the result of strategic calculations or other constraints. Before applying these 
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concepts in the empirical exploration, I should say more about research methods, case 
selection, and the data with which I work.        
 
3.6 Methods, Case Selection, and Data 
To probe the role of constitution-making design during democratization, this thesis 
employs a comparative research method in combination with within-case analyses of 
two cases of constitutional change, Egypt and Tunisia after the 2010/11 uprisings. The 
remaining part of this chapter explains the comparative logic, the rationale behind 
selecting these two cases, and the type of data that I use, how I gathered and analysed 
it, and how I considered research ethics.  
 
3.6.1 Method and Case Selection 
This thesis employs a small-N comparative method and the Most Similar System 
Design (MSSD) in particular. The MSSD is based on a comparison of cases that are 
as similar as possible and allows the researcher to “identify the key features that are 
different” and can, therefore, be used to account for differences in political outcomes 
(Landman, 2017, p. 74). This method is considered to be stronger than its alternative, 
Most Different System Design (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 81; Landman, 2017, p. 
83). Further, it is suitable for the study of countries within one geographical region 
that share historical and cultural features (Landman, 2017, p. 75). However, given the 
number of potentially similar cases that can be chosen from is limited, the method 
usually implies a comparison of a small number of cases. The downside, then, is that 
inferences that can be drawn from such comparisons are relatively weak (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2016, p. 239). This is why any small-N qualitative analysis remains centred 
on within-case processes (Collier, 2012, p. 87). Even as the narrative proceeds mainly 
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through within-case analysis, to be considered comparative, it is important that the 
same questions are asked in each case to guide data collection (2005, p. 67). This 
combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparison is, according to 
George and Bennett (2005, p. 18), “the strongest means of drawing inferences from 
case studies”. 
  The advantage of the case study approach is that it allows for high levels of 
conceptual validity in the sense that concepts can be operationalized in such a way 
that they closely represent the theoretical concepts and, in addition, provide better 
indicators to fit the cases under study. By studying only a few cases, researchers can 
gain a deeper understanding and provide more nuanced answers to the questions posed 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 19; Landman, 2017, pp. 73-4). Internal validity and 
richness in case study research, therefore, takes precedence over broad external 
generalizations. The trade-off is that generalizations, if at all possible, can be extended 
only to a limited number of cases that share the scope conditions. Nonetheless, the 
method is well-suited for the research at hand, where there is a relatively limited 
amount of prior knowledge on the relationship between constitution-making design 
and constitutional agreement. Case study research comes at the cost of spending 
considerable time and resources on language training and field research (Landman, 
2017, p. 76). To be able to conduct this research, I undertook both French and Arabic 
classes, and spent several months conducting fieldwork in Tunis and Cairo, which I 
describe below. I believe that it is the thorough understanding of the empirical reality 
of the cases acquired through this intensive research, and especially the rich interviews 
and other primary material that I gathered through having the necessary linguistic 
skills, that makes this thesis a strong foundation on which further studies of 
constitution-making design can build.  
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The thesis compares and investigates the experience of two countries that 
underwent constitutional change following the recent wave of popular revolutions that 
swept through the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011. The Arab Spring 
countries are of critical importance for the exploration of constitution-making 
processes because of the attention that both the international community and local 
actors have paid to them, as I demonstrated in Chapter 1. The popular demonstrations 
that in December 2010 started in Tunisia, initiated constitutional reforms in Yemen, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. The last two were selected as case studies 
because they were the only countries where the protests forced their respective 
dictators to step down and, at the same time, did not immediately fall into a situation 
of prolonged civil conflict, as was the case with Libya and Yemen (Brownlee et al., 
2015, p. 126). In this thesis, I approach constitutional change that took place between 
2011 and 2014 in Tunisia as a typical case in the sense that both the theoretical cause, 
and the outcome, an inclusive constitution-making design and broad agreement on the 
constitution, were present. This, together with the fact that I was able to gather 
invaluable empirical insights, made the case ideal for a more detailed inquiry (Beach 
and Pedersen, 2016, p. 281).    
The Tunisian and Egyptian cases are well-suited for a comparison using MSSD 
because of additional characteristics that make them similar. They are both situated in 
North Africa and in the wider region of the Middle East, the majority of their 
population is Arabic speaking and Muslim, they share a history of European colonial 
rule, and it was the French who shaped each country’s legal traditions. The two were 
classified as lower-middle-income economies by the World Bank in 2011.52 In each 
                                               
 




case, the military apparatus was central in forcing their presidents out of power in that 
year (Bellin, 2012). Finally, parties of their respective anti-authoritarian coalitions 
were divided along religious lines, and those divisions were reflected in their 
contrasting preferences for the constitutional text, as well as in mistrust and personal 
animosities between participants which made for delicate constitutional negotiations.  
There is, however, one important difference that sets the countries apart and 
makes them ideally suited for a comparison and that is the outcome of constitution-
making. Tunisia is a case where agreement was reached. The constitutional change, 
which was initiated as Ben Ali was ousted in January 2011, concluded when the NCA 
almost unanimously passed the constitution. The case of Egypt, on the other hand, is 
one of disagreement. There, too, the constitutional process was a product of an 
uprising that led Mubarak to step down almost a month after the Tunisian President. 
Despite the approval of the constitution in a popular referendum in December 2012, 
the document was rejected by non-Islamist parties. The question of what the role of 
constitution-making design was in bringing about these different outcomes 
immediately suggests itself.  
Of course, this is not the only difference. With 11.4 million inhabitants, Tunisia 
is a much smaller country than Egypt, with its rapidly growing population which, in 
2016, reached nearly 96 million.53 Nor is Tunisia as strategically important as Egypt, 
which shares a boarder with Israel and upon which the United States government 
                                               
 
enuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#Lower_middle_in
come [accessed 10 April 2015]. 
53 See World Bank, “Population, total, Tunisia”, Databank, available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TN [accessed 22 August 2018]; and 
World Bank, “Population total, Egypt, Arab Republic”, Databank, available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=EG [accessed 22 August 2018].  
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annually sends around $2 billion in military aid.54 Finally, compared to the Egyptian 
military, the Tunisian army is smaller and less entrenched in politics and the economy 
(e.g. Bellin, 2004; 2012; Abul-Magd, 2018). This presents a difficulty for this research 
but, as Beach and Pedersen (2016, p. 234) put it, “there is no such thing as a perfect 
comparison, especially when comparing countries or other complex social entities”. It 
would be hard to find more broadly similar cases, at least not in this region, with recent 
experience of bottom-up driven democratization intertwined with constitutional 
change. Within case analysis can help to identify whether these disparities could have 
accounted for the differences in the outcome (George and Bennet, 2005, p. 81). I, 
therefore, decided to proceed with the comparison in spite of these difficulties.  
 
3.6.2 Data 
To analyse and measure the concepts defined in the first half of this chapter, I worked 
with both quantitative and qualitative data. The bulk of the qualitative data comprises 
56 qualitative interviews with political elites, experts and informants, supplemented 
by additional informal consultations with journalists, experts and civil society 
activists, and analysis of over 150 newspaper articles. I conducted the interviews in 
several rounds in Tunis, Cairo, and Prague between 2014 and 2017. I stayed in Tunis 
for a month between June and July 2014, for two weeks between September and 
October 2015, and for an additional two months between October and December 2016. 
I visited Cairo for two weeks in August 2014. My first trips to both Egypt and Tunisia, 
from June to August 2014, were designed as pilot research for this project and took 
                                               
 
54 The Telegraph, “Most US aid to Egypt goes to military”, 29 January 2011, available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/8290133/Most-US-aid-to-Egypt-goes-to-
military.html [accessed 22 August 2018].  
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place a few months before I was officially registered on the doctoral programme in 
Warwick. While I was able to travel to Tunisia twice more, and was always well-
received by local politicians whom I interviewed, in Egypt, research that investigated 
democratization and the 2012 Constitution became highly sensitive as the political 
climate became more tense following the 2013 military takeover. Ultimately, I decided 
not to return to Egypt after a fellow doctoral student from the University of 
Cambridge, Giulio Regeni, was brutally tortured and murdered under circumstances 
that still remain unclear. No one has ever taken responsibility for his death though 
accusations have been levelled at the Egyptian state security service for carrying out 
the murder while he was conducting his field research in Cairo.55 My decision has had 
implications for my data collection and the way I approached the interview material, 
which I discuss below. It also led me to rely to a larger extent on media analysis in my 
inquiry into the Egyptian case.   
When analysing the two case studies, I also drew on primary data such as 
election results and opinion polls, documents, including multiple constitutional drafts, 
and secondary data in English and French, including existing academic research and 
reports produced by local and international organizations. I always verified key pieces 
of information by triangulating between independent sources of data. In the next sub-
sections, I introduce this material in more detail and explain how I collected and 
analysed it.  
                                               
 
55 The Egyptian government has, however, denied any involvement. An overview of the investigation 
was written for the New York Times. See Walsh, D., “Why was an Italian graduate student tortured 
and murdered in Egypt? The strange twists in the case of Giulio Regeni’s disappearance in Cairo”, 
New York Times, 15 August 2017, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/magazine/giulio-regeni-italian-graduate-student-tortured-
murdered-egypt.html [accessed 22 August 2018].  
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Data Related to the Tunisian Case 
The interviews that I conducted in Tunisia considered four themes that are at the centre 
of this thesis: the constitution-making design, its origin, relationships between 
political parties, and the agreement on the constitution. To explore these aspects of 
constitutional change, I interviewed members of three groups of actors. These 
included: (1) the leading members of political parties who were involved in the 
constitution-making process, (2) representatives of civil society organizations actively 
implicated in constitutional negotiations, and (3) a final group of experts, such as local 
and foreign journalists, scholars, and members of non-governmental organizations 
who observed the constitution-making process. At the same time as analysing the 
content of interviews I conducted with the first two groups, I used interviews with the 
final group to deepen my understanding of the wider political context, to gain insider 
information on the functioning of the NCA and political parties, and to better navigate 
the selection of my interviewees. Altogether, I conducted 36 individual elite semi-
structured interviews and more than 10 interviews with experts, informants and 
additional shorter consultations. The list of interviews can be found in Appendix III.  
In the first group, I interviewed leading members of all the parties that I 
identified as belonging to the anti-authoritarian coalition, representing different 
political tendencies from left to right and from Islamist to non-Islamist. In addition, I 
spoke to representatives of Nidaa Tounes, a party that I identified as staying outside 
the anti-authoritarian coalition yet having considerable political influence (see Chapter 
4). Altogether, I interviewed 23 partisans, the majority of whom were NCA deputies, 
representing eight different political parties. The figure includes top party officials, 
and in particular three party leaders and two presidents of parliamentary groups. 
Additionally, I interviewed NCA President, Vice-President, and the constitution’s 
109 
 
General Rapporteur, to name just some of the important positions my interviewees 
held at the NCA. I also interviewed 11 out of 23 members of the NCA’s Consensus 
Commission (CC), which turned out to be the most important constitution-making 
channel between the 2013 summer political crisis and the adoption of the constitution 
in January 2014. I also made sure that I interviewed at least one member from each of 
the six remaining constituent commissions that functioned within the NCA. 
Importantly, several of my interviewees had been implicated in the decisions on the 
course of constitution-making chosen between Ben Ali’s fall and the NCA’s election, 
which allowed me to inquire into the origins of constitution-making design. I met with 
some of my interview partners more than once over the years, resulting in 30 
individual interviews.    
I supplemented partisan points of view with the perspective of civil society 
actors actively engaged in the constitution-making process and in the development of 
the constitution-making design. Among the six interviewees from this group were 
leaders of two civil society organizations that formed the Nobel Peace Prize winning 
Quartet, who brokered political negotiations which came to be known as the National 
Dialogue following the 2013 crisis (see Chapter 6). I also interviewed expert members 
of the interim parliament, so called Higher Authority for the Realization of the 
Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, referred to 
as the Higher Authority, or HA, who were involved in the debate over the type of 
electoral system to be used for the NCA election. In addition, while in Tunis, I attended 
conferences and workshops relating to the political situation following Ben Ali’s fall, 
the constitution-making process, and aspects of the constitution. This strengthened my 
understanding of the context in Tunisia and enabled me to widen my network, as NCA 
deputies and other participants to the constitutional process often attended. 
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The questions that I asked during interviews revolved around the origins of 
constitution-making design, the most important channels of constitution-making, and 
the functioning of the NCA. I also covered the most important and the most 
contentious content-related issues that the protagonists negotiated and why that was 
so. I enquired as to what were the main problems that they encountered, how the 
agreement on the key aspects of the constitution came about, and what factors were 
involved in facilitating the successful constitution-making process. Finally, I 
investigated the relationships between the parties and the ideological distances, 
personal divisions, and mistrust they faced. The semi-structured logic of the interview 
allowed me to be sensitive to the important issues that my interview partners raised 
themselves, instead of pursuing only those matters that I deemed relevant. I listened 
attentively to their accounts of what had transpired but remained vigilant, constantly 
questioned and clarified their statements, and later checked their versions of events 
against other types of data including interviews with members of other parties, civil 
society representatives, and expert consultants. This approach to interviewing also 
meant that I was not able to cover all the themes identified above with all of those 
interviewed. Nevertheless, thanks to the relatively high number of interviews that I 
conducted, I was able to ensure that I collected a significant number of points of view 
on any given topic, from across the partisan spectrum.  
The fact that I gathered this data in three rounds helped me to build stronger 
relationships with those I interviewed, gain better access to relevant information 
because of the connections that I made, and to compare information on the different 
political circumstances and individual political trajectories that emerged from these 
interviews. When my first research trip began in June 2014, before I started the 
doctoral programme, the NCA was still in place, although deputies’ agenda was by 
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then limited to legislation and controlling the government because the constitution had 
been passed three months previously. The subsequent field trips took place after new 
legislative and presidential elections resulted in a change in government as well as in 
the composition of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, which replaced 
the NCA. The set of interviews that I gathered in 2014 was especially beneficial 
because the participants had fresh memories of the events that had led to the adoption 
of the constitution. Some of the interviews took place directly at the NCA headquarters 
in the capital’s Bardo Palace. This enabled me to observe how deputies from different 
parties related to one another and led to my better understanding of the special 
characteristics of this main constitution-making venue. The next rounds of field 
research, from 2015 and 2016, proved important as some of my interviewees became 
more open, having left active politics when their mandate expired. Having sharpened 
my research focus and gained considerable contextual knowledge, by the time I visited 
Tunis for the last and the longest round of field research, I was in a position to ask 
more informed questions and investigate those specific themes I had previously 
identified as most relevant, at a deeper level. The fact that the sample involves such a 
heterogeneous and numerous group of actors directly involved in the constitutional 
change and who were interviewed over an extended period of time provides a strong 
basis for the analysis and the validity of the inferences that I draw from this case.   
 On average, the interviews took from an hour to an hour and half. They were 
all conducted with the informed consent of the interviewees. None of the participants 
wished to remain anonymous and only a few of them preferred not to be recorded, 
which I respected. I conducted most of the interviews in French, except when 
interviewees wished to speak English. When field research is condensed into several 
hectic visits, it is not always possible to transcribe interviews immediately upon 
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completion as is ideal. Immediate transcription proved especially problematic for me 
when I had several meetings logged in one day, usually scheduled to take place in 
different parts of the city, necessitating time consuming travel to each new location. 
These issues were exacerbated by the warm weather, which was draining, and by the 
unreliable public transport system that sometimes made the journeys even longer than 
planned. In such cases, I always made sure to note my own impressions of the meeting, 
including the important aspects of context and what I felt were the key points that I 
had learned. I found these pieces of reflection useful when I analysed the interviews 
later at the comfort of my desk.  
 After conducting the interviews and transcribing them, I proceeded to code 
each one. I did so manually, without using any coding software. The logic was, 
however, the same. I went through all the interviews and decided on the themes and 
sub-themes around which to organize them. I then went through the material for a 
second time, linking individual sentences and paragraphs to the previously identified 
codes that corresponded to different issues and sections of the chapters of the thesis. 
That I collected all the interviews, transcribed them, coded and analysed them myself 
meant that by the time I was writing the chapters, I was extremely familiar with the 
material.   
 I also worked with additional primary and secondary resources. Election 
results and opinion polls were used to assess the electoral popularity of political parties 
and I analysed the consecutive drafts of the constitution, as well as internal documents 
produced by the NCA, to supplement the information had I gathered through 
interviews. While some of these documents were publically available through the local 
watchdog organization Al-Bawsala, which monitored the work of the NCA, and the 
Sweden-based International IDEA, others I collected directly from the personal 
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archives of my interviewees. Although the bulk of this material was in English and 
French, I had several of these documents translated from Arabic.  
I worked with another set of material to identify the main constitution-making 
channels, and to analyse the NCA’s internal structure and the approval mechanisms. 
Apart from interviews, I relied on reports on the constitution-making process produced 
by the UNDP and the American Carter Center, data collated by Al-Bawsala, and 
primary documents, such as the NCA’s internal regulations. Next, I delved into the 
relationship between the political parties, the ideological distance between them, and 
examples of past cooperation using information from my interviews, as well as from 
existing academic research on Tunisian opposition parties, written in both French and 
English. Finally, I read existing scholarship on Tunisian politics and both local and 
foreign online newspapers to learn about events and any nuances relating to them that 
might have otherwise slipped my attention.  
  
Data Related to the Egyptian Case 
To analyse the Egyptian case, I relied mainly on analysis of media coverage of events, 
which I supplemented with interviews and other primary and secondary material. To 
analyse the constitution-making process, its design and origins, as well as the overall 
disagreement on the constitution, I conducted a systematic review of over 150 articles 
from two major Egyptian English medium online newspapers, the Ahram Online and 
the Egypt Independent. I limited this analysis to the period between February 2011 
and December 2012, the point when discussions on constitutional change began up to 
the passage of the new constitution. Using a keyword search tool in the newspapers’ 
online archives, I reviewed articles under the keywords ‘constitution’ and 
‘constituent’, before undertaking a more deliberate search through Egyptian online 
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dailies. To reduce the risk of potential bias caused by reliance on these media outlets, 
I also consulted foreign newspapers. Among them, I used especially articles produced 
by the New York Times and The Guardian, whose coverage of the events tended to be 
the most detailed and accurate. The media analysis was important for establishing the 
sequence of consecutive events and hence the political context in which the 
constitution-making took place. Following the media coverage of the Constituent 
Assembly sessions, which were otherwise not made public, allowed me to understand 
the nature of problems and disagreements with which those involved in drafting the 
constitution had to deal. 
I supplemented this information with 10 elite and expert interviews, nine of 
which I conducted during the two-week-long field trip to Cairo in August 2014, before 
I was officially registered in the doctoral programme. The full list of interviews is 
provided in Appendix III. Given that I was not able to return to Egypt after that date 
due to the political situation, these interviews, even if rather preliminary in nature, 
contain useful and unique material. I carried out an additional interview in Prague in 
October 2017 where, following a number of failed attempts, I managed to arrange an 
appointment with a prominent member of the Egyptian opposition, Amr Hamzawy, 
who was visiting my home town for a conference. I applied the same logic to 
interviewing for the Egyptian case as I had in my interviews for the Tunisian case. 
Interviews were semi-structured to provide insights into the question of the 
relationships between the parties, constitution-making design and its origins, and the 
outcome, in this case the disagreement on the constitution. In combination, they gave 
me a grasp on the views of the constitution-making protagonists on the constitutional 
disagreement and its causes, as well as on the most problematic issues that they faced 
during constitution-making. As the majority of my interviewees withdrew from the 
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Constituent Assembly before its members passed the constitution, the material enabled 
me to inquire into their motivation, and go beyond the short explanatory statements 
that they gave to the media.  
The semi-structured elite interviews comprised of leading members of six 
major political parties who were involved in the constitution-making process, either 
from within the CA or through other channels. However, while there are a variety of 
non-Islamist parties within the anti-Mubarak coalition in the sample, I was not able to 
interview members of Islamist parties due to political circumstances in Egypt in the 
summer of 2014. At that time, the repression of the major Islamist party, the Freedom 
and Justice Party, was at its peak. It was unlikely that its leading members were in 
Egypt as many had left the country and others were imprisoned following the 2013 
military intervention. Even if I had travelled to Egypt, I would have considered the 
risk involved in arranging interviews to be too great, both to myself and to those to 
whom I wished to speak. Consequently, I had to rely on publically accessible 
interviews with the leading members of the FJP and their statements made to the 
media. I always assessed this information based on its source and against other data at 
my disposal.  
While in Egypt, I also conducted two substantive interviews with experts and 
met for less formal consultations with representatives of international organizations, 
scholars, local and foreign journalists. I organized some of these consultations prior to 
conducting my interviews with the idea that by so doing I could make more informed 
choices about whom to interview. In both selecting and approaching potential 
interviewees, I drew on my previous experience with conducting field research in 
Egypt. Between May and June 2013, I spent a month in Cairo to carry out interviews 
with representatives of the major political parties about the choice of the electoral 
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system for the 2011/12 Egyptian legislative elections which I used in my M.A. 
dissertation. This experience provided me with indispensable contacts in the relevant 
parties and a better understanding of the broader context of Egyptian politics and its 
main actors.  
The interviews usually lasted for an hour, and I recorded those where the 
interviewee had given consent. Most of these interviews were conducted in English. 
One interviewee preferred to speak in Arabic and for that occasion I hired an 
interpreter. When we met in 2014, all my interviewees agreed that their names and 
affiliations could be made public. As the Egyptian government gradually became more 
repressive, I considered making the material anonymous, but ultimately decided not 
to do so. This is because the field work took place a year after the military intervention, 
by which time the authoritarian nature of the new regime had already become 
apparent. As a result, my interviewees often made hints, lapsed into ambiguity on more 
sensitive subjects, or turned down our meetings altogether. The person who spoke the 
most candidly was Amr Hamzawy, whom I interviewed in 2017 after he was forced 
to leave Egypt and had moved to the United States. There is no denying that the 
number and the quality of interviews that I conducted on constitution-making in Egypt 
are not comparable to those I carried out in Tunisia. The political circumstances 
impacted both the quality and quantity of the interview material. The way I dealt with 
this problem was by not relying on these interviews as my main source of data but 
rather by using them as a supplement, to bring nuance and context to the media 
analysis.  
I analysed additional data, both primary and secondary. I used election results 
to evaluate parties’ electoral popularity. To learn about the issues that eventually led 
non-Islamist parties to reject the constitution, I supplemented the media analysis and 
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interviews with an analysis of consecutive drafts of the constitution that had been 
translated into English by the International IDEA, and assessments of the 
constitutional debates produced by local and international constitutional experts. 
Navigating the CA membership, its internal structure, and decision-making 
mechanisms was rendered difficult by the nature of the constituent body and the 
general context in which the constitution-making took place. I discuss these challenges 
in Chapter 6. At this point it suffices to say that I collected this information through a 
variety of sources including my own interviews, publically available interviews with 
constitution-making protagonists, newspaper articles, and reports produced by local 
organizations. To gauge the nature of the relationship between the political parties, the 
ideological distance between them and their efforts at alliance-building, I relied 
primarily on the existing scholarly literature on Egyptian anti-Mubarak forces, which 
is more voluminous than in the Tunisian case. Finally, to assess the progress of 
democratization and to be sensitive to the political context in which the constitution-
making took place, I considered official documents, such as constitutional declarations 
and decrees produced by the executive during the interregnum before the new 
constitution was adopted, scholarly literature on Egyptian politics during and after the 
revolution, and local and foreign newspaper articles. The last section of this chapter 
outlines ethical considerations linked to this research and data collection.  
 
3.6.3 Ethical Considerations 
This research was conducted in line with guidelines for the ethical conduct of research 
published by the Department of Politics and International Studies of the University of 
Warwick. The essential principle underlying these guidelines is one that should 
underpin any research activity: the researcher must considers the implications of any 
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research “for the well-being of participants, the wider community,” and the researcher 
herself.56 As part of the First Year Review at the end of the first year of the doctoral 
programme, I submitted the “PhD Ethics Form” which outlined the ethical 
considerations of the project, and received approval for conducting this research and 
fieldwork in Cairo and Tunis. I took a number of actions to protect my interviewees 
and myself.     
  Interviewing political elites is potentially less sensitive and harmful than 
interviewing other groups, largely due to the expectation behind the concept that elites 
are proximate to power (Morris, 2009, p. 209). As such, interviewing elites has been 
typically described as a situation where the power dynamic favours the respondents 
(Morris, 2009, p. 209; Mikecz, 2012). Furthermore, most politicians and civil society 
representatives with whom I spoke with throughout the course of this research project 
regularly came into contact with journalists and researchers and, so, were used to being 
interviewed. This is not to say elite interviewing does not involve ethical issues. Some 
authors have recently questioned the assumptions about asymmetrical power 
dynamics in elite interviewing, suggesting power relations to be more complex, and 
elite interviewing, consequently, to be not as non-problematic (Smith, 2006; Morris, 
2009; Lancaster, 2017). Researchers, for example, might not be as ‘powerless’, since 
they are able to exercise considerable control over the produced narrative by selecting 
certain excerpts from the interviews and not others. Also, the background of the 
researcher, for example being a foreigner, might alter the dynamic of the interview 
(Morris, 2009, p. 214). Throughout the research, I therefore reflected on the question 
                                               
 
56 PAIS, “Ethics”, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, available at: 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/masters/academic/mahandbook/regs/ethics 
[accessed 22 August 2018].  
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how my research would impact my participants. I took care to protect those involved 
in my research, both before, during, and after their interviews. I consciously aimed at 
communicating with my interviewees about the project and their rights clearly and 
honestly. I also invested in listening and being open to participants’ perspectives and 
sought transparency in communication of the research results. 
I generally introduced myself and described the research project via email or 
SMS ahead of talking to potential interviewees by phone or in person. Before each 
interview, I gave participants an information sheet with basic information about 
myself, the University’s contact details and those of the research project, along with a 
consent form. The consent form explained the University’s policies further and gave 
the interviewees options regarding the interview procedures. They could, for example, 
decide whether or not to remain anonymous, though, in the event, none of my 
interviewees chose this option. Similarly, they were given the option of whether or not 
to give permission for the interview to be recorded or whether they agreed notes being 
taken. In addition, the form notified them about their right to stop the interview or 
withdraw their consent at any point, during, as well as after the interview. In several 
cases, an oral consent replaced a written one. This happened especially when busy 
politicians were impatient about signing yet another research form. Even then, I sought 
to communicate to them their rights and basic information about the research as clearly 
as I could.  
I understood the price in time that my interviewees spent with me. I was 
particularly conscious of the fact that many researchers descended on Tunisia after 
2011 to inquire into its “successful case”. To lessen this burden, I always endeavoured 
to be as well-prepared for the interview as I could and refrained from asking for 
information that I could acquire by other means. When I found an intersection with 
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other researchers’ interests, as I did on a few occasions, I tried to organize joint 
meetings when each of us could ask our questions of the interviewee.  
 I also took steps to protect myself. For example, before planning a research 
trip I evaluated the security situation in the country. It was for security concerns 
described above that I decided not to proceed with fieldwork in Egypt after 2015. 
Following terrorist attacks on tourists in the Bardo Museum in the capital Tunis and 
in Tunisia’s sea resort in Sousse that took place in March and June 2015, the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a recommendation advising against all but 
essential travel to most areas of Tunisia, including the capital. This complicated my 
plans for fieldwork that was scheduled to begin in March 2016. The University of 
Warwick recommended that I cancel the trip altogether or reschedule. After careful 
assessment of the situation and discussions with other PhD students from international 
universities who were conducting research in Tunis, I left the UK in November 2016 
for a two month visit to Tunis, instead of the six month stay I had originally planned. 
During my time there, I benefited from having already built a strong network of friends 
and colleagues during my previous research visits. Finally, I maintained regular 
contact with my supervisors and my partner. Although one can never prevent all 
possible complications while conducting fieldwork, be it in Europe or elsewhere, 
proceeding with caution, as I did, helps to minimize unnecessary risk.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
To recapitulate, in the first part of this chapter, I outlined the key concepts of this thesis 
and their operationalization. This involved defining democratization, i.e. the particular 
context in which constitutional change can happen and on which this thesis focuses. 
Political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition, which I introduced next, are the 
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primary actors whose inclusion in constitution-making this thesis assesses. I then 
defined the outcome that is explored here, that is, the agreement on the constitution 
between those parties. The final element of the conceptual part of this chapter tackled 
the main explanatory factor: constitution-making design and inclusiveness. This made 
clear also what I mean by the origins of constitution-making design and the factors 
that affect it. The remaining sections of this chapter explained the methods that guide 
the research and selection of the cases. It also introduced the types of data used, 
methods employed when analysing them, and ethical considerations linked to their 
collection and usage. The empirical analysis that fills the following chapters builds on 
these definitions and considerations. Before inquiring into the role of constitution-
making design in bringing about constitutional (dis)agreement in Egypt and Tunisia 
(Chapters 5-7), the next chapter (Chapter 4) sets the stage by introducing the transition 






Democratic Transitions and Anti-authoritarian Coalitions 
 
The Tunisian revolution, known in Tunisia itself as the Revolution for Dignity,57 
started at the end of 2010 and was the first in a series of popular upheavals that spread 
through, but were not limited to, the region of the Middle East and North Africa, which 
came to be known as the Arab uprisings. The sight of citizens protesting against their 
government in large numbers over an extended time period, and the sense of 
opportunity created by the fact that the country’s president Zine El-Abidin Ben Ali 
subsequently escaped to Saudi Arabia after almost twenty-four years of authoritarian 
rule, inspired activists and protesters in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, among other places.  
 The demonstrations were triggered by the death of Tarak Bouazizi on 17 
December 2010. Bouazizi was a 26 year old vegetable and fruit seller who set himself 
on fire in front of a police station in Sidi Bouzid, a small town in the country’s interior. 
The different versions of his story, as recounted by various media outlets, generally 
describe the act, the motivation for which remain unknown, as a protest in response to 
police bullying, the poverty of the central regions and high unemployment.58 Local 
activists, mainly trade unionists, immediately took up the opportunity presented to 
them and framed the story as political, by linking it to wider socio-economic 
                                               
 
57 See Hmed (2016, p. 81).  
58 See e.g. The Observers, “Public suicide attempt sparks angry riots in central Tunisia”, France 24, 
21 December 2012, available at: http://observers.france24.com/en/20101221-youth-public-suicide-
attempt-sparks-angry-riots-sidi-bouzid-tunisia-poverty-bouazizi-immolation [accessed 3 September 
2018]; and Ryan, Y., “The tragic life of a street vendor”, Al-Jazeera, 20 January 2011, available at: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html [accessed 3 
September 2018].   
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grievances, and made sure that it became widely known (Chouikha and Gobe, 2015, 
pp. 75-7; ICG, 2011, pp. 3-5).  
In the days following the incident, protests spread from Sidi Bouzid to 
neighbouring towns before making its way to the larger coastal cities, reinforced by 
police brutality and further deaths.59 New actors joined in, notably lawyers, students, 
journalists, and members of both former legal and illegal political opposition groups. 
On 11 January 2011, the national leadership of the country’s major labour union, 
UGTT, weighed in, expressing its solidarity with the protests and announcing a 
general strike for 14 January (ICG, 2011, pp. 4-6; Chouikha and Gobe, 2015, pp. 76-
8; Dot-Pouillard, 2013, pp. 30-1). During the twenty-eight days of the revolt, the 
slogans chanted by protesters shifted from those centred on employment to ones also 
expressing opposition to the ruling regime. On the morning of 14 January, the day 
President Ben Ali fled the country, the famous catchphrases of the revolution, “The 
people want the fall of the regime!” and “Dégage!”60 echoed through Habib Bourguiba 
Avenue, the capital’s major boulevard (Baraket and Belhassine, 2016, pp. 11-2, 81-
5).61 The context in which the revolt started is mirrored in the motivations of those 
who took to the streets. Economic grievances and disappointment with the high levels 
                                               
 
59 The Tunisian revolution was not a peaceful event. The initial UN estimates from 2011 indicated 
that at least 300 people were killed between the start of the protests, on 17 December 2010, and the 
flight of Ben Ali, on 14 January 2011. More than 700 people were injured. See CNN Wire Staff, 
“About three hundred people killed in original Tunisian uprising, U.N. report”, CNN, 21 May 2011, 
available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/05/21/tunisia.un/ [accessed 3 September 
2018].  
60 “Dégage!” translates from French as “Out!” or “Go!”.  
61 Kirkpatrick, D.D., “Tunisia leader flees and prime minister claims power”, New York Times, 14 
January 2011, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15tunis.html?pagewanted=1 [accessed 3 
September 2018].  
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of corruption featured most often among reasons cited by those surveyed about their 
participation in protests, followed by demands for civil and political freedoms 
(Beissinger et al., 2015, p. 4).62  
The revolutionary tide that originated in Tunisia soon reached Egypt. On 25 
January 2011, ten days after Ben Ali flew to Saudi Arabia, protesters gathered at Tahrir 
Square in downtown Cairo, while smaller demonstrations were held in other parts of 
the city and around the country. Protesters managed to reclaim the famous square in 
the days following, despite the repressive tactics adopted by police, and launched an 
18 day sit-in. The slogan, “bread, freedom and social justice” soon evolved into a 
resolute call for the overthrow of the regime. Accompanied by civilian resistance 
outside Tahrir, the revolution eventually yielded its first tangible result. On the eve of 
11 February, Hosni Mubarak’s vice president announced on state television that the 
president had decided to leave office after 30 years of rule, and that he had instructed 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to take over the running of the 
country.63 As with Tunisian revolutionaries, Egyptians who had joined the protests 
were surveyed and indicated that their primary motivations were dissatisfaction with 
their economic situation and the ever present, high levels of corruption. However, they 
were also disenchanted with the presidential succession of Mubarak’s son, Gamal, and 
demanded civil and political freedoms (Beissinger et al., 2015, p. 4).    
                                               
 
62 According to Beissinger et al. (2015, p. 4), 77 % of revolutionaries surveyed identified improving 
their economic situation as their primary or secondary motivation for joining the protests. 60% of 
them indicated combating corruption as the primary or secondary reason, and 50% cited demands for 
political and civil freedoms.  
63 For more detail on the 18 days of the uprising, see e.g. El Ghobashy (2011), Shehata (2011), and 
Shokr (2011).  
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 The two uprisings paved the way for constitutional reforms which could 
inaugurate some of these demands, especially by putting in place guarantees for 
democratic institutions, as well as rights and freedoms, giving Egyptians and 
Tunisians tools to choose and control their government. The main focus of this thesis 
is in exploring the designs of the processes through which the constitutions were 
changed, and their impact on the constitutional (dis)agreement among the major 
political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, 
while in Tunisia political parties widely embraced the constitution, disagreement 
surrounded the adoption of the charter in Egypt. Before probing these diverging 
outcomes and the role of the inclusive constitution-making design in bringing them 
about, this chapter sets the scene by introducing the empirical cases.  
 First, this chapter provides an outline of the transition processes in the two 
countries and evaluates whether democratic transitions were completed. The opening 
of the political environment following the uprisings created an influx of new political 
parties, some of which accompanied the traditional opposition forces in the writing of 
the constitution. The second part of this chapter therefore identifies and introduces the 
key forces whose involvement in constitution-making and agreement on the 
constitution this thesis investigates, the major parties of the anti-Ben Ali and anti-
Mubarak coalitions. In doing so, the chapter also explores the type and nature of the 
divisions that set these parties apart. I conclude that in both cases, anti-authoritarian 
coalitions were divided most notably along religious lines. The reasons for the deep 
divisions between the two camps were threefold. The first was the conflicting nature 
of their ideological visions and the second lies in the fact that authoritarian rulers had 
sown the seeds of mistrust between them. This mistrust was only increased by the 
growing popularity among the public of Islamist leaning parties. This chapter provides 
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evidence for the successful completion of democratic transition in both cases, but 
argues that Egyptians faced more impediments on their way to the minimum 
democratic threshold set in this thesis. Timelines of key events relevant to both cases 
are available in Appendix I and II.    
 
4.1 Democratic Transitions in Tunisia and Egypt   
The popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia unseated long-standing dictators, Ben Ali 
in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, triggering democratic change. Completing 
democratic transitions, however, proved to be difficult as there was resistance from 
forces and institutions which did not, as the two presidents did, disappear overnight. 
In Chapter 3, I introduced the criteria which would guide the assessment of the extent 
to which transition was completed. Drawing on the procedural and minimalist, 
unextended, understanding of democracy, I have argued, in agreement with Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997, p. 194), that a democratic transition “can be said to have 
occurred when a regime is installed on the basis of a competitive election, freely and 
fairly conducted within the matrix of civil liberties, with results accepted by all 
participants”. I also rely on a definition by Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 3) which divides 
the completion of a transition into four steps: (1) “sufficient agreement” about 
“political procedures to produce an elected government”; (2) the government has to 
come to power as “the direct result of free and popular vote”; and (3) have “de facto 
authority to generate new policies”. The authors add a fourth condition, which, in 
contrast to this thesis, draws on the extended democracy minimum definition. As such, 
it is not relevant in the context of this present research. This condition implies that 
“the executive, legislative and judicial power” does not have to “share power with 
other bodies de jure” (1996, p. 3).  
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The analysis below suggests that in Tunisia, relentless demonstrations 
eventually earned the protestors democratic elections for the National Constituent 
Assembly, which certified the close of the transition to democracy. In Egypt, 
unceasing popular unrest was also key to the continuation of democratic reforms. 
However, even though I maintain that the country passed the threshold for the 
completion of the transition, authoritarian institutions in Egypt and, above all, the 
military’s grip on political power proved difficult to dislodge, creating obstacles to 
democratization in general, and constitutional change in particular.  
 
4.1.1 Tunisia: From Kasbah Square to Electing the National Constituent Assembly 
Ben Ali’s regime, and its legitimacy, was shaken by the 28 days of protests at the end 
of 2010 and the beginning of 2011. Although the president himself was removed, he 
left behind some of the core institutional vehicles of his authoritarian rule. The two 
chambers of the national parliament and the RCD, the Democratic Constitutional 
Rally, known by its French acronym, remained intact. In the wake of Ben Ali’s 
departure, Fouad Mebazza, who had been the president of the lower chamber of 
parliament between 1997 and 2010, was appointed as an interim president of the 
country.64 The newly formed government of “National Unity” initially comprised 
some personalities of the former legal opposition parties and representatives of the 
UGTT. However, the heads of key ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior, 
continued to be filled by RCD figures and the government itself was headed by the 
last of Ben Ali’s prime ministers, Mohamed Ghannouchi (ICG, 2011, pp. 15-6; 
                                               
 
64 For details on constitutional procedure, see Ben Achour and Ben Achour (2012, pp. 717-19).  
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Chouikha and Gobe, 2015, pp. 81-2; Gobe, 2012, pp. 2-3).65 Wolf (2017a, p. 14) also 
points out, based on her interview with the then Prime Minister Ghannouchi, that Ben 
Ali, who left for Saudi Arabia in the wake of the protests, never actually intended to 
leave the country for good.    
The personnel and institutional continuity of Ben Ali’s regime was ended only 
after new protests broke out in front of the government’s seat in the capital’s Kasbah 
Square during late January and February 2011. Protesters demanded the resignation 
of Ghannouchi’s government, the dissolution of the RCD, and elections to a 
constituent assembly (Gobe, 2012, p. 3). The combination of the additional pressure 
of UGTT and other civil society organizations, as well as protests in the regions 
(Hmed, 2016, pp. 77-8), forced Ghannouchi’s resignation as prime minister on 27 
February. Beji Caid Essebsi, a politician linked to the previous president, Habib 
Bourguiba, rather than to Ben Ali, then took Ghannouchi’s place. The interim leaders 
announced that the elections to the National Constituent Assembly would take place 
in July 2011, although later postponed it to 23 October of the same year, and took 
steps to dissolve the parliament and suspend the 1959 Constitution. They also 
committed, along with the rest of the government, not to run for seats in the 
forthcoming elections (Chouikha and Gobe, 2015, p. 83; ICG, 2011, p. 18). On 9 
March, the RCD was formally dissolved by court order (Wolf, 2017a, p. 15), and its 
members subsequently banned from participation in politics for a 10-year period 
(Brownlee et al., 2015, p. 131). 
                                               
 
65 Please note that Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi and Ennahda’s leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, 
are not related. It is also important to note that after being confronted with discontent, the government 
was reshuffled to reduce the number of RCD figures, though Ghannouchi remained at its head. See 
e.g. ICG (2011, p. 16).   
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Between March 2011 and the NCA election in October, a body composed of 
political parties and civil society representatives was appointed with the remit of 
preparing the necessary reforms ahead of the elections. The Higher Authority for the 
Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic 
Transition, hereafter referred to simply as the Higher Authority, came about as a 
compromise between Essebsi’s government and opposition groups.66 At its height, the 
HA included 155 nominated members coming from a variety of social and political 
groups.67 The body drafted electoral law for electing the NCA and formed the Higher 
Authority for Elections, known by its French acronym ISIE, an independent 
commission tasked with supervising the NCA vote. Even though the HA was not 
formally granted legislative powers, it did initiate the adoption of laws during the 
interim period. Those were simply passed to the interim president for approval and 
adoption in the form of decrees and, according to one of its members, the president 
generally “didn’t change anything of what we proposed”.68  
The elections to the NCA, which was to serve the dual role of legislature and 
constitution-drafting assembly, progressed in October 2011, nine months after Ben Ali 
fled the country. The polls reflected the diversity of the political spectrum; 1512 
                                               
 
66 The HA comprised of opposition political parties, civil society organizations, national personalities, 
including young activists and family members of the revolution’s victims, commonly named the 
martyrs, representatives of regions, different occupations, academics and even those of the French 
diaspora (ICG, 2011, p. 19). Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, member of Ettakatol and at the 
time the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (and later on a member of the HA). 
Tunis, 8 October 2015.  
67 For a full list of the HA members, see Leaders, “La liste complète des membres du Conseil de 
Haute Instance pour la réalisation de la revolution”, 7 April 2011, available at: 
http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/4773-la-liste-complete-des-membres-du-conseil-de-la-haute-
instance-pour-la-realisation-des-objectifs-de-la-revolution [accessed 3 September 2018].  
68 Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, Ettakatol’s representative in the HA. Tunis, 8 October 2015. 
130 
 
electoral lists were presented to voters.69 The elections had a clear winner with the 
Islamist Ennahda Party winning 41 % of the total number of NCA seats. The rest of 
the seats were distributed between smaller groups. Four of them filled more than 15 
seats in the 217-member Assembly. Apart from one newcomer, the Islamist Aridha 
Chaabia (Popular Petition) Party which received 12 % of seats, these were three long-
standing opposition parties: Congress for Republic, known under the French acronym 
CPR, which gained 13.4 % of seats, Ettakatol, also known as the Forum Démocratique 
pour le Travail et les Libertés but usually referred to by its Arabic name, gained 9.2 % 
of seats, and the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) obtained 7.4 % of the seats (see 
Table 1). The ensuing negotiations resulted in the governing Troika coalition 
composed of three parties, Ennahda, the CPR, and Ettakatol, which together had a 
comfortable majority with 138 seats of the 217. These parties then distributed the key 
posts among themselves. The CPR’s leader, Moncef Marzouki, was elected president, 
Ennahda’s Hamadi Jebali became prime minister, and Mustafa Ben Jaafar from 
Ettakatol became President of the NCA (Brownlee et al., 2015, p. 139).  
The NCA ballots, which were judged by observers as free, fair and 
democratic,70 along with the appointment of the government that stemmed from them, 
signalled the completion of the democratic transition. They also unleashed the 
constitution-making process, which I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6. The next section 
examines the development of democratic transition in Egypt.  
 
                                               
 
69 Slightly more than half of them were put forward by political parties. See Carter Center (2011, p. 
32).  
70 See Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2012: Tunisia”, available at: 





Electoral coalition  
Seats 
Number                     % 
Votes  
%                        
Ennahda 89 41 37 
CPR 29 13.4 8.7 
Aridha Chaabia 26 12 6.7 
Ettakatol 20 9.2 7 
PDP 16 7.4 3.9 
Al-Moubadara 5 2.3 3.2 
Democratic 
Modernist Pole 
5 2.3 2.8 
Afek Tounes 4 1.8 1.9 
PCOT 3 1.4 1.6 
Peoples’ Movement  2 0.9 0.7 
Movement of 
Socialist Democrats 
2 0.9 0.6 
Free Patriotic Union  1 0.5 1.3 
WATAD  1 0.5 0.8 
Maghrebine Liberal 
Party 
1 0.5 0.5 
New Destourian 
Party 
1 0.5 0.4 
Social Democratic 
Nation Party 
1 0.5 0.4 
Justice and Equality 
Party  
1 0.5 0.2 
Social Struggle Party 1 0.5 0.2 
Party of the Cultural 
Unionist Nation  
1 0.5 0.1 
8 independent lists 8 3.7 1.5 
Total  217   
 
Table 1. Results of the 2011 NCA elections in Tunisia 
Source: Brownlee et al. (2015, p. 138).  
   
4.1.2 Difficult Transition in Egypt 
As in Tunisia, the progress of democratic change remained uncertain in Egypt even as 
President Mubarak resigned following the 25 January Revolution. Although the 
president was gone, it was the generals from the SCAF who assumed legislative and 
executive prerogatives in the aftermath. The military has been widely considered as 
the backbone of the outgoing regime.71 The ensuing period was marred by restrictions 
                                               
 
71 The military assisted Mubarak in cracking down on dissent on several occasions: after the 
assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat; during the 1986 bread riots; and during the repression 
of Islamists in the 1990’s (Droz-Vincent, 2007, p. 198). All of Egypt’s post-independence presidents, 
with the exception of Mohamed Morsi, were drawn from the ranks of the military. Under Mubarak, 
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on civil and political freedoms and violent suppression of protesters calling for the end 
of military rule (Pratt, 2015).72 The number of civilians tried before military tribunals 
had surpassed the total for the whole of the Mubarak era in just seven months after the 
protests began in January 2011.73 
With Mubarak ousted in February 2011, the SCAF moved to dissolve the 
acting parliament, suspend the 1971 Constitution and appoint a small committee of 
legal experts charged with the task of preparing changes to its text.74 The SCAF then 
announced that voters would decide on the implementation of the hastily drafted 
amendments in a popular referendum in March 2011. While being supported by 
Islamist parties, as well as by 77.2 % of voters who approved the changes on 19 March 
                                               
 
military men were not uncommon among local governors and became influential players in the 
business sector, manufacturing a variety of goods not linked to military-related production (Marshall 
and Stacher, 2012; Abul-Magd, 2018).  
72 Perhaps most indicative of the extent of the repressions under the SCAF are two specific events. On 
9 October 2011, over 20 protesters, primarily from the Egyptian Coptic community, were killed and 
more than 200 injured in clashes with security forces near the television station building at Maspero 
Square in Cairo. Over a month later, in November, security forces brutally crushed an anti-military 
protest at Mohamed Mahmoud Street near Tahrir Square. See Shenker, J., “Egypt protests: New street 
battles erupt in Tahrir Square”, The Guardian, 21 November 2012, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/21/egypt-protests-erupt-tahrir-square [accessed 3 
September 2018].  
73 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Retry or free 12,000 after unfair military trials”, 10 September 2011, 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10/egypt-retry-or-free-12000-after-unfair-military-
trials [accessed 3 September 2018]. 
74 See CNN Wire Staff, “Egypt’s military dissolves parliament, suspends constitution”, CNN, 13 
February 2011, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/13/egypt.revolution/ 
[accessed 3 September 2018]. For the work of the expert committee, see Kirkpatrick, D. and K. 
Fahim, “In Egypt, a panel of jurists is given the task of revising the country’s constitution”, New 
York Times, 15 February 2011, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/middleeast/16egypt.html?pagewanted=2&_r=5&hp 
[accessed 3 September 2018]. 
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2011, they faced objections from non-Islamist parties.75 Fearing that the vote would 
only serve to legitimize the military’s grip on power and that it would give an 
advantage to the more organized Islamists, as the amendments presupposed swift 
legislative elections, non-Islamists refused to accept the outcome of the referendum.76 
The SCAF ultimately decided not to abide by the result of the referendum under 
pressure from critics. Instead, it released another document intended to function as an 
interim constitution, incorporating some of the articles accepted in the referendum, as 
well as adding new ones. The Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 provided 
a detailed vision of the political system. It envisaged elections to two chambers of 
parliament, followed by presidential polls. The document prepared the ground for 
more thorough constitutional reform, and outlined the constitution-making process. 
Deputies of the incoming bicameral parliament were to elect a 100-member 
provisional assembly that would be responsible for drafting the new constitution. 
Voters would then approve the text in a referendum. The declaration also strengthened 
the SCAF’s role during the interim period. Article 61 assigned the generals executive 
and legislative duties, including the responsibility of appointing the head of the 
government and ministers until elections were held.77 
                                               
 
75 MacFarquhar, N., “Egyptian voters approve constitutional change”, New York Times, 20 March 
2011, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?pagewanted=all [accessed 3 
September 2018].  
76 Ezzat, D., “Egyptian Islamists, along with NDP, campaign hard for a ‘yes’ vote on constitutional 
amendments,” Ahram Online, 17 March 2011, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/7971/Egypt/0/Egyptian-Islamists,-along-with-NDP,-
campaign-hard-.aspx [accessed 3 September 2018].  
77 See the Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011, and especially Articles 60 and 61. 
ConstitutionNet, “The 2011 Constitutional Declaration”, International IDEA, available at: 
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The first democratic elections to the bicameral parliament unfolded in three 
rounds with additional run-offs between 28 November 2011 and 11 January 2012, and 
saw Islamists outperforming all other political forces (see Table 2). The major Islamist 
party, the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, obtained 45 %, and 
the conservative Salafi Nour (Light) Party, with its allies, won 24.7 % of the seats in 
the People’s Assembly (PA), the lower chamber of the parliament. Combined, the 
Islamist parties secured over 70 % of seats,78 and their majority was even greater in 
the upper chamber, the Consultative Council. The limited gains achieved by non-
Islamists were dispersed across nearly 10 political parties. Of these, the traditionally 
conservative Wafd Party, or New Delegation Party, in this thesis referred to without 
the “new”, attracted most voters and garnered 7.6 % of seats in the PA. The Egyptian 
Social Democratic Party (ESDP), with 3.2 %, and the Free Egyptians Party (FEP) 
supported by Coptic Christians, with 3 % of seats, followed. The poor showing by 
revolutionaries reflected the focus of pro-democracy activists on street protests as the 
major arena for their resistance against the former regime and the SCAF, rather than 
parliamentary politics.79 Their Revolution Continues Coalition, consequently, 




                                               
 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/march_2011-_egypt_interim_constitution-
english.pdf [accessed 21 August 2018].  
78 The figure provides the total number of seats held by the FJP, the electoral coalition lead by the 
Nour Party, the Islamist Alliance, the Wasat Party, and the Islamic Labour Party.  
79 For a good elaboration, see Sallam, H., “Elections in the midst of revolution.” 28 November 2011, 
Jadaliyya, available at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24717/Elections-in-the-Midst-of-










Number                        %        
Votes   
%* 
Democratic Alliance  235 47,2 37,3 
 FJP 224 45  
 Karama Party 6 1,2  
 Ghad Al-Thawra 2 0,4  
 Civilization Party 2 0,4  
 Islamic Labour Party 1 0,2  
Islamist Alliance  123 24,7 27,7 
 Nour Party 107 21,5  














Egyptian Bloc  34 6,8 8,9 
 ESDP                 16            3,2  
 FEP                 15 3  

















 Wasat Party 10 2 3,7 








 Egyptian Arab Union 1 0,2 0,6 
 Adl (Justice) Party 1 0,2 0,7 





 National Party of Egypt 5 1 1,6 
 Freedom Party 4 0,8 1,9 
 Egyptian Citizen Party 4 0,8 0,9 
 Union Party 2 0,4 0,5 
 Democratic Peace Party 1 0,2 0,9 
 Conservatives Party 1 0,2 1,1 
Independents  23 4,6  
Total   498 100 100 
 
 
Table 2. Results of the 2011/2012 PA election in Egypt 
Source: Hassan (2013, p. 373). 
* Results from votes casted for candidates running under the PR system only.  
 
 The election was a victory for the parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition at the 
expense of those linked to the former regime. However, the dissolution of the outgoing 
National Democratic Party (NDP) did not prevent its followers from regrouping and 
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six such entities participated in the 2011/12 polls.80 Together these offshoots of the 
NDP won as few as 3.4 % of seats. Yet despite the electoral success of Mubarak’s 
opponents, parliament found itself stripped of the power to form a new government. 
Under the Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011, these functions were retained 
by the SCAF, which was unwilling to surrender them. In November 2011, just before 
the legislative elections took place, the generals appointed a new prime minister, 
Kamal Ganzouri, who had served as prime minister under Mubarak in the 1990s.81  
Egyptians went to the polling stations again a few months later, on 23 and 24 
May 2012, this time to elect a president. Presidential candidates from the former 
regime performed better on this occasion. The second round resulted in a close contest 
between Mubarak’s former prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, and the FJP’s candidate, 
Mohamed Morsi. Although Morsi eventually won on 24 June, it was a tight margin of 
victory. He bettered Shafiq’s share by just 1.7 %, winning 51.7 % of votes in the run-
off (Carter Center, 2012, p. 5). Crucially, for our assessment of transition completion, 
observers have judged that the polls in which voters elected the executive were 
“generally consistent with international standards” for democratic elections.82   
                                               
 
80 The Supreme Administrative Court ruled to dissolve the NDP and nationalize its assets in April 
2011. See Bradley, M., “Egypt’s Former Ruling Party Dissolved – But Not Defunct,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 18 April 2011, available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703702004576269172473506278 [accessed 3 
September 2018]. 
81 CNN Wire Staff, “Would-be prime minister no stranger to Egyptian Government”, CNN, 25 
November 2011, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/24/world/meast/egypt-ganzouri-
profile/index.html [accessed 3 September 2018]. 
82 They have, nevertheless, criticized the excessive powers of the Presidential Election Commission, 
the restrictions placed on election observers, and other minor procedural irregularities. See Freedom 
House, “Freedom in the world 2013: Egypt”, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2013/egypt [accessed 22 July 2016].  
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Only a few weeks after announcing the results of the presidential election, 
SCAF ordered the dissolution of the PA following a controversial ruling by the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, SCC, that deemed the electoral system used for the 
legislative polls were unconstitutional.83 While this was not the first time the court had 
ruled against electoral law, and had done so under Mubarak based on similar 
arguments, the ruling had never been enforced so quickly, interrupting, as it did, the 
lower chamber’s term just five months after its election.84 The event marked the 
beginning of an open confrontation between the FJP and SCAF and the judiciary 
which impacted on the constitution-making process.85  
In August 2012, President Morsi appointed a new cabinet, and instigated the 
retirement of serving Minister of Defence, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and army 
Chief of Staff, Sami Hafez Anan, although he replaced them with other generals from 
SCAF. He also cancelled the provision adopted by SCAF in June 2012 which gave its 
members legislative powers following the dissolution of the PA. The event marked 
                                               
 
83 Egypt Independent, “People’s Assembly receives dissolution order from SCAF,” 15 June 2012, 
available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/peoples-assembly-receives-dissolution-order-scaf/ 
[accessed 3 September 2018]. 
84 The court argued that the electoral law was unconstitutional because it also allowed political parties 
to field candidates for the one-third of parliamentary seats reserved for independent candidates. This 
was deemed discriminatory and, hence, against the constitution. See Egypt Independent, “People’s 
Assembly receives dissolution order from SCAF,” 15 June 2012. Prior to the revolution, the PA was 
dissolved on two occasions. In 1986, Mubarak disbanded the PA two years after its election as he 
anticipated a similar ruling to that produced by the SCC in 2012. The manipulation of the electoral 
system ahead of the next elections did not diminish the argument about the unconstitutionality of the 
electoral law, and the SCC eventually declared the elections “null and void”. However, it did so only 
in 1990, three years after the elections had taken place in 1987 (see Kassem, 2004, pp. 60-1). The 
SCC’s move to dissolve the PA five months after its inauguration in 2012 was, therefore, 
unprecedented.    
85 For a more detailed account of the role of the SCC in the transition and its relationship to the FJP, 
see Brown (2013a). 
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the completion of the transition to democracy as defined above. However, the lower 
chamber was not reinstated and efforts to do so were immediately blocked by the 
courts. Morsi consequently assumed the privileges and responsibilities of the PA 
himself, becoming both executive and legislature (Brownlee et al., 2015, pp. 120-1).86  
 
4.2 Anti-authoritarian Coalitions in Tunisia and Egypt 
This section identifies the major political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition in 
Tunisia and Egypt, and explores the nature of the political divisions that set these 
groups apart. In Chapter 3, I defined the anti-authoritarian coalition as encompassing 
not only political parties who were excluded from the government under the previous 
regime but also newly founded parties established during the transition period. The 
criterion for considering these new parties as members of the anti-authoritarian 
coalition is that they had not been directly related to any of the former ruling parties. 
If any of those from the top echelons of these parties had been recruited from among 
former regime figures, or if the parties openly declared that they saw themselves as 
following in the path of the ruling party, the RCD in Tunisia and the NDP in Egypt 
respectively, they would not be categorized as forces of the anti-authoritarian 
coalition. The extraordinary growth of new political forces following the two 
revolutions makes it necessary to limit the analysis to political parties that were 
significantly involved in the constitution-making processes. Consequently, I 
concentrate on entities that were “identified by an official label” and which ran in 
elections and won seats (Sartori, 1976, p. 63). I designated as marginal those whose 
seat share, or contribution to the debate about the constitution, was minimal.  
 
                                               
 
86 For an alternative view of democratization in Egypt, see Pratt (2015).  
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4.2.1 Anti-Ben Ali Coalition in Tunisia 
In Tunisia, the most important political cleavage that shaped the work on the 
constitution set apart “conservative” and “progressivist” political forces.87 The divide 
goes back to the historical antagonism between secularist leftist and Islamists activists, 
who found themselves pitted against one another by ideological differences, 
competition for the support of similar social constituencies, and the divide and rule 
tactic employed by Ben Ali’s regime. Under Ben Ali, state-sponsored secularism and 
the promotion of fear of Islamism became instruments of opposition co-optation. This 
policy ensured that many left leaning parties and civil society organizations, such as 
women’s rights movements, were “equally afraid” of Ennahda “for the policies it 
might implement if in power” as they were of the regime itself (Haugbølle and 
Cavatorta, 2011, p. 333; see also Wolf, 2014, p. 4). Nevertheless, episodes of 
cooperation between Ennahda and several parties of the centre-left in the second half 
of the 2000s helped to smooth the edges of the divide before the revolution began 
(Marzouki, 2017, p. 344, pp. 351-2; Choikha and Gobe, 2015, p. 70; Haugbølle and 
Cavatorta, 2011, p. 337). Hamma Hammami, a left-wing figure, commented on efforts 
at cross-ideological cooperation, stating, “Before the revolution, the political power 
sought to exploit the ideological fights between left, liberals and Islamists, and we 
realized it.”88 Some of this cooperation continued in the NCA, as two parties, Ettakatol 
and CPR, entered into a governing Troika coalition with Ennahda, even though they 
cannot be characterized as Islamist parties.    
                                               
 
87  These are the terms in which NCA deputies from the “progressivist” camp referred to themselves 
and their opponents. Author Interview with Lobna Jeribi, 23 November 2016, Tunis.  
88 Author Interview, 14 December 2016, Tunis.  
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Overall, however, the electoral politics triggered by the revolution accentuated 
the religious cleavage once again, and it was fully restored by the time the NCA came 
into being in October 2011. During the work on the constitution, it manifested itself 
in the divisions between those who supported a more conservative social project in 
which religion had an important place, and political forces on the left and centre-right 
of the political spectrum. The second group coalesced around their support for a 
constitutional order based on a division between religion and the state, strong 
guarantees for human rights, and equality between men and women, as explored in 
Chapter 5. Apart from these ideological differences, proponents of the two groups 
often laboured under prejudices and mistrust. Opponents feared, for example, that 
Ennahda had a “hidden” agenda. A member of a secularist party, Nidaa Tounes, told 
me: “Ennahda was a foreign party. Their leaders did not have a Tunisian accent. Their 
dream was not a Tunisian dream, not a Tunisian nation. It is the Islamic umma. They 
were a totalitarian party.”89 The lack of trust was also acknowledged as one of the 
major challenges for the constitution-making process by Ennahda’s leading 
members.90  
Another major dividing line that marked inter-party relations at the NCA was 
between the government of the Troika and the opposition. This divide crossed the 
Islamist and secularist camps, as the Troika coalition incorporated Islamist Ennahda, 
on the one hand, and parties that cannot be labelled simply as Islamist, the CPR and 
Ettakatol, on the other. I dive deeper into these issues when I introduce the individual 
                                               
 
89 Author Interview with Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, member of Nidaa Tounes and and former 
director of a branch of Amnesty International Tunisia, who used to defend victims of regime 
repression including members of Ennahda. Tunis, 8 December 2016.  
90 Author Interviews with Mehrezia Labidi, Ennahda deputy who served as NCA Vice-President (10 
July 2014, Tunis), and Zied Ladhari, Ennahda’s Spokesperson (9 July 2014, Tunis).  
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political parties and their relationships. To do so however, I first need to explain how 
I assessed which parties could be classified as major members of the anti-Ben Ali 
coalition.    
Assessing the roles of the major political actors within the anti-authoritarian 
coalition in Tunisia and their influence was complicated by the weakly 
institutionalized party system, which was characterized by the parties’ “weak 
organizational structure, vague ideological profiles, and strong focus on personal 
leadership” (Sartori, 1976, pp. 217-26). In particular, the NCA was characterized by 
frequent crossing of the floor by members. Soon after its formation, deputies began 
changing their political affiliation, which resulted in the creation of new parties, the 
disappearance of existing ones, and a growth in the number of independent and 
unaffiliated members. The extent of these developments was such that during the first 
year of the NCA’s existence alone, 47 out of 217 deputies switched their party 
allegiance (Perez, 2016, p. 232). This phenomenon affected almost all the parties that 
had performed well in the 2011 elections, with the single exception of Ennahda. 
During the NCA’s term, the political landscape was in consequence significantly 
redrawn (see Table 3 below). 
The influence that different political parties could exert on constitutional 
negotiations changed as time went by. The nomadism experienced by so many parties 
was both a root cause and an indication of the power shift away from the government 
to the opposition between the October 2011 elections and the January 2014 vote on 
the constitution. In the 2011 ballots, Ennahda won 89 seats in the 217-member NCA. 
The next election to the Assembly of People’s Representatives that took place in 
October 2014 saw Ennahda’s representation falling to 69 seats and its former coalition 
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partner, the CPR, to 4.91 Finally, navigating the political maelstrom was made difficult 
by the NCA’s internal organization, which gave more importance to parliamentary 
blocs than to individual parties. 
 
Parliamentary bloc  
(individual parties are in italic) 
Seats in NCA  
(as to February 2012) 
Number                 % 
Seats in NCA  
(as to December 2013) 
Number                   %  
Ennahda 89 41 89 41 
Democratic Bloc 30 13.8 35 16 
CPR 29 13.4 15 6.9 
Ettakatol  22 9.2 13 6 
Freedom and democracy 13 5.9 - - 
Freedom and dignity 12 5.5 12 5.5 
Aridha Chaabia 26 12 - - 
Wafa Movement  - - 9 4.1 
Independents - - 10 4.6 
No bloc  11 5 34 15 
Total 217  217  
 
Table 3. Tunisian parliamentary blocs in February 2012 (as initially composed) 
and in December 2013 
Source: Carter Center (2014, p. 47-8); Weslaty (2012). 
 
To determine the strength of different political forces and, therefore, to identify 
the major members of the anti-Ben Ali coalition, I rely on a number of pieces of 
information: I take into account the support each party won in the October 2011 
elections to the NCA and the number of seats they were subsequently allocated in the 
Assembly (Table 1); the number of seats they held a month before the adoption of the 
constitution, in December 2013; and opinion polls from October 2013. In some cases, 
in addition, I consider the results of the next legislative elections from October 2014. 
Where it is relevant, I utilize figures for the parliamentary blocs rather than for 
                                               
 
91 For results of the 2014 parliamentary elections, see Election Guide, “Tunisian Republic, Election 
for Majlis nawaab ash-aa’b, Tunisian Assembly of People’s Representatives”, IFES, 26 October 
2014, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2746/ [accessed 3 September 2018].   
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individual parties. I distinguish between several groups of political parties based on 
each party’s relationship with the governing coalition, and their Islamist or secularist 
leaning: Ennahda, non-Islamist parties of the government coalition, and non-Islamist 
parties in the opposition. I introduce Nidaa Tounes, an increasingly influential 
secularist force that was not included in the anti-Ben Ali coalition due to the presence 
of former regime figures in its ranks, and Aridha Chaabia, a conservative Islamist 
party that turned out to be a marginal player in the constitutional debates.    
 
Ennahda  
The support of 37 % voters in the 2011 ballots gave the moderate Islamist Ennahda 
89 seats in the NCA, making it by far the strongest political force after the revolution. 
The party developed gradually from a religious activist group, the Islamic Group (Al-
Jama’a Al-Islamiyya) that emerged in the late 1960s. The group was focused on 
reviving Islam through preaching and education in a society marked by secularist 
reforms of the first post-independence president, Habib Bourguiba. In 1979, its 
members, who over time grew willing to become involved in political debates in 
addition to social activities, adopted a more organized internal structure (Wolf 2017b, 
pp. 31-6, pp. 50-1). Both Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali sought to curb the 
influence of the increasingly popular movement, renamed Harakat Ennahda 
(Renaissance Movement) in 1988. It was, consequently, never allowed to function 
legally as a political party. Nevertheless, independent candidates backed by Ennahda 
participated in the 1989 polls and attracted 14.5 % of the vote,92 a spectacular result 
that established Ennahda as the strongest opposition force against the ruling RCD. 
                                               
 
92 In some urban constituencies, the figure went as high as 30 % (Wolf, 2017b, p. 71).   
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However, its success also frightened its secularist opponents and prompted a harsh 
response from the regime. Following the subsequent crackdown at the beginning of 
the 1990s, Ennahda’s official structures almost completely disappeared as many of its 
activists and their families faced prison sentences and torture, the organization went 
underground amid increased political restrictions, and others left for exile in Europe 
(Chouikha and Gobe, 2015, p. 51).   
 For most Tunisians, political Islam, as represented by Ennahda, became visible 
only after the ousting of Ben Ali, when its leader Rachid Ghannouchi returned to Tunis 
from exile in the United Kingdom.93 With re-established institutionalized channels of 
internal democracy, a stable membership base bound closely together by years of 
repression, and a regional presence across Tunisia re-activated through its local cells 
in record time after January 2011, Ennahda stood head and shoulders above most of 
the other parties that competed in the 2011 elections. The unparalleled electoral 
victory of a group that promoted the Islamist agenda, therefore, raised concerns and 
suspicion. These concerns were exacerbated by the perception that it did not suffer 
from the internal divisions that contrasted so vividly with the low levels of 
institutionalization of other parties and, taken together, gained Ennahda a reputation 
as an “intimidatingly well-organized” political actor (Marks, 2014, p. 5). Fears were 
only enhanced by the fact that the party continued with its charitable activities after 
entering parliamentary politics and continued to impact society through hundreds of 
loosely affiliated charities (Marks, 2014, p. 18). Ennahda’s tentative, sometimes 
ambivalent, position towards radical Islamists gave the impression that its leaders 
                                               
 
93 BBC News, “Tunisian Islamist Leader Rachid Ghanouchi returns home”, 30 January 2011, 
available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12318824 [accessed 3 September 2018].  
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were engaged in sophistry; moderate when talking to those on the outside, yet more 
fundamentalist in its attitudes when communicating with its base.94  
 
Other Parties of the Governing Coalition: The Congress for the Republic and 
Ettakatol    
Two other parties entered the governing coalition along with Ennahda, the CPR and 
Ettakatol. The parties had a shared history of opposing Ben Ali’s regime and, crucially, 
during the run-up to 2011 elections refrained from campaigning on the polarization 
between Islamists and secularists, which made them suitable coalition partners. The 
CPR was never legalized under the previous regime due to its leader, Moncef 
Marzouki, a human rights activist, taking an uncompromising stance against the 
regime. The party, held together by his personality, combined members of different 
ideological leanings, including those with left-wing, Arab nationalist, and Islamist 
views. This mixture resulted in tensions soon after the elections (Wolf, 2014, p. 7). By 
December 2013, a month before the adoption of the constitution, the party had lost 
more than half of its deputies. Some of them founded the conservative Wafa 
Movement, which retained close ties to its mother party and Ennahda but refused to 
enter the government. Ettakatol, a centre-left, social democratic party, was founded in 
1994 by Mustapha Ben Jaafar, an opposition figure who grew dissatisfied with the 
uncritical position taken by his party, The Movement of Socialist Democrats,95 vis-à-
vis Ben Ali’s regime and his repression of Islamists. Legalized in 2000s, Ettakatol did 
                                               
 
94 Author Interview with Hamma Hammami, leading member of the leftist Popular Front, 14 
December 2016, Tunis.   
95 That party was essentially a splinter group formed from members of the post-independence 
President Bourguiba’s Neo-Dostour Party (Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2011, pp. 332-3). 
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not enter parliament before 2011, preferring to retain its oppositionist credentials 
(Brody-Barre, 2013, p. 218).   
 The parties’ position in the NCA was to some extent schizophrenic, as their 
ideological preferences with respect to the constitution were often closer to some 
opposition, non-Islamist parties than to Ennahda’s. As one of Ettakatol deputies 
described it, “Troika was a coalition to run the affairs of the country… [During the 
work on the constitution, the key] was the vision for the society. And there, we often 
diametrically opposed Ennahda.”96 Ettakatol’s parliamentary bloc, consequently, 
suffered from floor-crossing and fell from 20 to 12 seats at the end of 2013 (see Table 
3). Compared to the CPR, which was widely seen as Ennahda’s ally due to having an 
Islamist-leaning wing within it, Ettakatol’s defence of the notion of the division 
between religion and state gained it respect among the wider opposition (Wolf, 2014, 
p. 9), and the party was, as a result, able to play a bridging role in constitutional 
negotiations at times of deadlock.  
 
Non-Islamist Opposition 
The results of the 2011 elections saw the opposition camp fragmented between several 
smaller groups, from left to right of the political spectrum, who united in their dislike 
of Ennahda and, especially later, strove to remove the Islamist party from government. 
A key member of the opposition bloc was Al-Massar (Democratic and Social Path) 
formed in Spring 2012 by merging the long-standing Ettajdid Movement (Movement 
for Renewal), parties of the Democratic Modernist Pole electoral coalition, and the 
Tunisian Labour Party, which was not represented in the NCA. Al-Massar was 
                                               
 
96 Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, 8 October 2015, Tunis.   
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dominated by members of Ettajdid, formerly a communist party that underwent a 
transformation into a centre-left group, and was the only party with some opposition 
credentials, holding a number of seats in the national parliament between 1994 and 
2009 (Storm, 2014, p. 72), although they never entered government. Motivated by an 
anti-Islamic tendency, which Al-Massar inherited, Ettajdid begun toning down its 
criticism of the regime in the mid-1990s (Storm, 2014, p. 80; Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 
2011, p. 334). It succeeded in attracting some of the disenchanted members of 
Ettakatol who crossed the floor to join its ranks. At the time of the adoption of the 
constitution, Al-Massar had 10 seats in the NCA.    
 Similar to Al-Massar, Al-Jomhouri (Republican Party) was also a product of a 
mix of several parties, foremost of which was the Progressive Democratic Party. 
During the 2000s, the PDP leader, lawyer and former Marxist Ahmed Najib Chebbi, 
became increasingly sceptical of Ben Ali’s pledges of gradual democratization. 
Understanding the need to form a wider anti-regime coalition, Chebbi, along with 
Marzouki, was at the forefront of the creation of the 18 October Collectif in 2005, an 
opposition platform that also involved Ennahda (Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2011, pp. 
330-6; Storm, 2014, p. 98). Chebbi’s tactics, however, changed after the revolution 
when his party became a champion of those opposed to the Islamists. The union of the 
centre-left Al-Jomhouri was short-lived, and with most of the PDP’s partners leaving 
it, the number of seats Al-Jomhouri’s held dropped to 7 at the time of the adoption of 
the constitution. The Democratic Alliance, created in 2012 by former PDP members 
who became disenchanted with Chebbi’s leadership, controlled 11 seats (Carter 
Center, 2014, p. 47).   
 Further on the left of the political spectrum and holding no less anti-Islamist 
positions could be found the Popular Front (PF). Created in October 2012, the 
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coalition, rather than a unified party, with former opposition figure Hamma Hammami 
as its spokesperson, brought together 12 smaller radical left and Arab nationalist 
parties whose electoral gains in the 2011 elections were insignificant. Among others, 
it included Hammami’s Workers’ Party, Parti communiste des ouvriers de Tunisie 
(PCOT), before 2011 a clandestine opposition force of those with a Marxist-Leninist 
backgrounds, and the Democratic Patriots Unified Movement (WATAD) of Chokri 
Belaid whose assassination foreshadowed the political crisis of 2013.97 The PF’s seat 
share in the NCA never exceed 10 (Honwana, 2013, p. 158),98 nevertheless, polls from 
October 2013 put the party in third place, indicating its actual leverage was greater 
than its seat share might indicate.99 As Hammami told me, “As the Popular Front, we 
had 5 to 6 deputies, but our weight was bigger than the number of deputies would 
suggest”, pointing to the support of the “street” the party could call on at key points.100 
Despite its secular ideological background, the PF initially sought to present itself as 
an alternative to the Islamist-secularist bipolarization. The hostility between Ennahda 
and the PF gained traction again after the assassination of one of the PF leaders in 
February 2013, as members blamed Ennahda’s non-assertive approach to radical 
                                               
 
97 For a full list of the individual parties that joined forces in the PF, see Sallon, H., “Tunisie : qui sont 
les principaux partis politiques ?”, Le Monde Afrique, 13 February 2013, available at: 
https://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2013/02/13/tunisie-qui-sont-les-principaux-partis-
politiques_1831005_1466522.html [accessed 3 September 2018].  
98 It is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of seats the coalition held due to the fact that the parties 
continued to act separately in the NCA, rather than under the PF banner.  
99 IRI, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion”, International Republican Institute and ELKA 
Consulting, 1-2 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2013%20December%203%20Survey%20of%20Tunisian%20Pu
blic%20Opinion%2C%20October%201-12%2C%202013.pdf [accessed 3 September 2018].  
100 Author Interview with Hamma Hammami, 14 December 2016, Tunis.  
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Salafists for the attack. This tense relationship lasted until the adoption of the 
constitution (Honwana, 2013, p. 158).      
 Within the NCA, some of the opposition parties coalesced into the Democratic 
Bloc. The bloc included members of the PDP, Democratic Alliance, Al-Massar, the 
smaller, business-oriented Afek Tounes, the PF, and deputies who had previously left 
Ettakatol, as well as independents. At its height in December 2012, it had 35 deputies, 
making it the largest political entity after Ennahda which controlled 89 seats.101   
  
Not Anti-authoritarian but Influential: Nidaa Tounes 
The leading force among Ennahda opponents did not, however, appear on the political 
scene before June 2012, when Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia) was founded by Beji 
Caid Essebsi, a prime minister in the post-revolution interim government between 
March and October 2011, who had also held several key political positions before the 
revolution. Calling for unity of the secularist parties,102 Nidaa Tounes attracted people 
from different political traditions including proponents of the liberal left and unionists, 
artists and intellectuals, a newly politicized economic elite, and former members of 
Ben Ali’s RCD (Geisser and Perez, 2016, pp. 36-7; Wolf, 2014, p. 15).103 What 
brought them together was a shared concern with Ennahda’s dominance. As one of its 
                                               
 
101 Weslaty, L., “Le bloc démocratique, déuxième force à l’Assemblée Constituante après Ennahda”, 
Nawaat, 24 December 2012, available at: https://nawaat.org/portail/2012/12/24/le-bloc-democratique-
deuxieme-force-a-lassemblee-constituante-apres-ennahdha/ [accessed 3 September 2018].    
102 Amara, T., “Tunisian ex-PM launches secular party to challenge Islamists”, Reuters, 16 June 2012, 
available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-party/tunisian-ex-pm-launches-secular-party-
to-challenge-islamists-idUSBRE85F0I220120616 [accessed 3 September 2018].  
103 Geisser and Perez (2016, pp. 36-7) cite the example of the head of the electoral list in the district 
of Kasserine under Nidaa Tounes for the 2014 elections, who was previously a member of the RCD’s 
central committee. More figures of this kind could be found in Nidaa’s top ranks.  
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leading members remarked, at the centre of the party’s existence was the ambition to 
“defeat Ennahda.”104 Due to its links to the authoritarian regime, the party cannot be 
counted as a force of the anti-authoritarian coalition. However, given its influence on 
securing the agreement on the final constitution through negotiations with Ennahda in 
the last phase of the constitution-making process, it is, nonetheless, considered in the 
analysis.        
Despite being formed outside of the NCA and not springing from parties that 
won representation in the October 2011 ballots, the party gained NCA representation 
by attracting deputies who crossed the floor, mainly from the CPR and Ettakatol. In 
January 2014, Nidaa’s NCA base was six members (Carter Center, 2014, p. 47). These 
deputies were instrumental in pushing Nidaa Tounes’ agenda within the Assembly, 
but the party’s influence went far beyond that. By autumn 2013, Essebsi had emerged 
as the leading voice of the secularist opposition. This could be seen in opinion polls 
from October 2013, which suggested Nidaa Tounes popularity was even higher than 
Ennahda’s.105 Being recognized as Ghannouchi’s main counterpart, Essebsi 
participated in key political negotiations.106 The results of the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections which followed upon the conclusion of the constitution-making 
process further illustrate Nidaa’s strength. Essebsi became the new president, and 
                                               
 
104 Author Interview with Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, 8 December 2016, Tunis. 
105 IRI, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion”, International Republican Institute and ELKA 
Consulting, 1-2 October 2012. 
106 This includes the meetings between Ghannouchi and Essebsi in Paris in August 2013, which was 
seen as a turning point in the political crisis that had started with the assassination of leftist NCA 
deputy, Mohamed Brahmi. See Dahmani, F., “Que se sont dit Rached Ghannouchi et Béji Caïd 
Essebsi à Paris ?” JeuneAfrique, 20 August 2013, available at: 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/169039/politique/que-se-sont-dit-rached-ghannouchi-et-b-ji-caed-
essebsi-paris/ [accessed 3 September 2018].    
151 
 
Nidaa Tounes obtained 37.56 % of the parliamentary vote, leaving Ennahda 
languishing behind with 27.79 %.107  
Secularist, opposition parties entered a tighter coalition with Nidaa Tounes 
when they created the National Salvation Front (NSF) after a second leftist politician, 
Mohamed Brahmi, was assassinated in 2013. Apart from Al-Jomhouri, Al-Massar and 
other entities who supported Nidaa from the very beginning, it also included left-wing 
members of the PF, previously critical to the party’s ties to the former regime.  
 
Marginal: Aridha Chaabia 
Ennahda was not the only Islamist party that received considerable electoral support 
in 2011. To the surprise of many observers, Aridha Chaabia fared well in the NCA 
polls, winning 26 seats. The newly formed Islamist populist party campaigned on 
themes of religious reform and unrealistic pledges of social welfare programmes. Its 
founder and former Ennahda member, Mohamed Hechmi Hamdi, a London-based 
business tycoon continued to lead his party from abroad after the October 2011 
elections.108 The party, however, suffered from fragmentation soon after the 2011 
elections, with many of its members becoming independent deputies, and remained at 
the margins of the constitution-making process. Non-Islamist opposition parties, 
nevertheless, feared that its former deputies, along with the Islamist-leaning wing of 
the CPR and other religiously conservative independents in the NCA, could join forces 
with Ennahda to push through their conservative constitutional vision.109   
                                               
 
107 Election Guide, “Tunisian Republic, Election for Majlis nawaab ash-aa’b, Tunisian Assembly of 
People’s Representatives”, IFES, 26 October 2014. 
108 Cherif, Y., “Democracy in the making”, Majalla, 26 February 2014, available at: 
http://eng.majalla.com/2014/02/article55248709 [accessed 3 September 2018].  
109 Author Interview with Lobna Jeribi, Ettakatol, 23 November 2016, Tunis.  
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The Tunisian partisan spectrum after the revolution was diverse and difficult 
to navigate due to its lack of institutionalization. However, it is possible to say that the 
religious cleavage was the major political divide that framed Tunisian politics post-
2011 and the debates on the new constitution. This divide widened throughout the 
constitution-making process, and the creation and popularity of Nidaa Tounes as a 
primarily anti-Islamist vehicle exemplifies this development. Still, cross-ideological 
cooperation was not totally absent after the revolution, as was apparent in the 
governing Troika coalition, which combined both Islamist and non-Islamist elements.  
 Throughout the constitution-making process, the Islamist Ennahda maintained 
the strongest position, controlling 41 % of seats in the NCA. Initially highly 
fragmented opposition parties from the left to the right of the political spectrum were, 
however, increasingly able to coalesce against Ennahda. The foundation of Nidaa 
Tounes tipped the scales of power even more in favour of the opposition, making the 
political scene during the final phase of the constitution making process more balanced 
between the proponents of a stronger role for religion in politics and those who 
opposed such a change. As Mustafa Ben Jaafar, the NCA President representing 
Ettakatol put it: “They [the opposition parties] gradually reappeared on the political 
scene and resembled around this new-born, Nidaa Tounes. As a result, the balance of 
power began to change.”110  
 
4.2.2 Anti-Mubarak Coalition in Egypt 
As in Tunisia, the rift that separated Islamists and secularists, muted during the 
                                               
 
110 Quoted in M’rad (2015, p. 62). 
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uprising in which they joined forces,111 came to the fore again in the lead up to the 
first democratic elections for which an Islamist victory was predicted.112 Political 
parties were internally divided by organizational, generational, and ideological issues. 
In addition, they were pitted against each other by the “divide and rule” tactics of the 
Mubarak regime, which, while co-opting some groups by enabling them to participate, 
to a limited extent, in politics, excluded and repressed others (Steuer, 2012; Shehata, 
2010).  
The ideological underpinning of the religious cleavage relates to the 
importance that the two camps attributed to the role of religion in politics. The best 
example is their contradictory understandings of the concept of a “civil state” (al-
dawla al-madaniyya), which was, for all these groups the ideal arrangement for the 
post-revolutionary political order to which they aspired. To the secular forces and 
intellectuals, the term denoted separation between religion and the state, and strong 
guarantees for human rights, including equality between men and women, and 
Muslims and non-Muslims (Steuer and Blouët, 2015; Hill, 2014). The Islamist Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the FJP that it created, also endorsed the concept of the civil state, 
but “with an Islamic frame of reference” (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 14).  
However, this understanding of the concept might be, according to Steuer and 
Blouët (2015, p. 241), in contradiction with some elements of the idea of modern 
citizenship and, hence, the secularists’ vision. For example, the Islamic normative 
                                               
 
111 Sallam, H., “Reflections on Egypt After March 19,” Jadaliyia, 31 May 2011, available at: 
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112 See “National Voter Survey in Egypt”, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 22 
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framework, sharia, might have been difficult to reconcile with some aspects of a 
citizen’s freedoms, including freedom of faith and speech. Ideological differences, and 
especially secularists’ doubts over the MB’s commitment to democratic principles, 
coupled with the Brotherhood’s strong popularity among voters compared to the rest 
of the opposition and made them extremely wary and cautious (Shehata, 2010). 
According to a liberal opposition politician, Amr Hamzawy, secularists, historically, 
had been afraid that if the regime opened up political competition, “the only – that is 
the only organized – force which is out there, ready to ‘hijack’… the process through 
the ballot box… is the MB”. For Hamzawy, the mistrust that alienated Islamists and 
secularists, therefore, to some extent, resulted “from weakness”.113  
Despite these antagonisms, cooperation and coalition building across the 
dividing lines did occur before 2011. Reviewing over 20 attempts at alliance building 
between Egyptian Islamists and secularists in the period from 1980s to mid-2000s, 
Shehata (2010) noticed greater cooperation in the 1980s, and between 2000 and 2004, 
although she argued these alliances were short-lived and mostly tactical (2010, p. 3, 
p. 51). This included electoral alliances forged between the MB and secular parties. In 
addition, Islamists and secularists had the opportunity to meet and co-operate as they 
joined the leadership of the unions. The Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) 
formed in 2004 around leftists, liberals and Islamists, provides an example of the most 
long lasting cooperation. The platform, which organized a series of protests between 
2004 and 2005, called for political and constitutional reform that would allow for 
competitive elections, limit presidential terms to a maximum of two, and restrict a 
president’s powers (2010, pp. 100-2).  
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Some of these efforts continued after Mubarak resigned. Major forces of the 
anti-Mubarak coalition organized regular meetings between February and March 2011 
to agree on a roadmap for transition.114 Further, some of the left-wing and liberal 
parties joined the FJP to create an electoral coalition for the 2011/12 legislative 
elections named the Democratic Alliance for Egypt, which aimed to bridge the 
religious divide. This alliance in the end was dominated by the FJP as most of its non-
Islamist partners eventually withdrew from the initiative.115 However, the general 
tendency after 2011 was towards a parting of the ways between the FJP and secularists 
and increasing polarization along religious lines. This development was followed by 
the FJP’s rapprochement with more conservative Salafi parties on the one hand, and 
the liberals and leftists on the other coalescing with the military prior to the 
intervention of the generals in politics in July 2013. This latter alliance was tangibly 
expressed by the presence of secularists in the subsequent cabinet and the new 
constitution-making process (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, pp. 11-21).  
The remainder of this chapter introduces the major political parties of the anti-
Mubarak coalition in more detail. Although the party system in Egypt shared many of 
the characteristics of the weakly institutionalized party system that I found in Tunisia, 
political parties remained more coherent throughout the constitution-making process, 
possibly because it developed over a shorter time period. This situation made 
identifying major political parties simpler. I restricted the analysis to parties that won 
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over 2 % of seats in the People’s Assembly, the lower and more powerful chamber of 
the parliament. I kept the threshold low to be able to account for non-Islamist parties, 
whose electoral gains were often just above this limit. I have also chosen to rely on 
the percentage of seats as opposed to the percentage of votes because the latter figure 
is not available for each separate political party and, in most cases, only for electoral 
coalitions. If we follow the logic of cleavage lines introduced above, the anti-Mubarak 
coalition can be seen as comprising several overlapping political streams: the 
moderate Islamist one comprising the FJP and the Wasat (Centre) Party, conservative 
Islamists of the Salafi persuasion, and their non-Islamist opponents comprising those 
of liberal, left-wing and Arab nationalist backgrounds. 
 
Freedom and Justice Party and Wasat Party 
The moderate, Islamist side of the political spectrum was accounted for primarily by 
the FJP, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood established shortly after the 
revolution and officially recognized in May 2011 (Sallam, 2013, p. 94). Securing 45 
% of the seats in the PA and the presidency, the FJP was by far the strongest political 
party in post-revolutionary Egypt (Table 2). The origins of the MB go back to 1928 
when an Islamist thinker, Hassan Al-Banna, founded the movement with the goal of 
changing society through charitable work and preaching. In the 1970s, the group 
rejected violence, which its members had previously endorsed, as a response to the 
persecution they had suffered under the first post-independence president, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (Ashour, 2009). Instead, they decided to challenge the regime through 
the ballot box, despite not being recognized legally. Throughout the period of the 
limited multiparty system introduced by President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s and 
maintained by his successor, Mubarak, the MB contested a limited number of seats in 
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every election except for the 1990 and 2010 polls, either by fielding independent 
candidates or by running through the lists of other parties.116 The movement’s 
remarkable showing in the 2005 polls, which were expected to be the freest in 
Egyptian history post-1952, demonstrated the MB’s capacity to attract voters to a far 
greater extent than any other opposition party. However, it also generated a harsh 
response from the regime that involved electoral violence, arrests, and further 
harassment (see e.g. Abdulbaki, 2010).117 While the FJP and MB maintained that they 
were two separate entities, with the Brotherhood prioritizing social activities and 
preaching as opposed to the FJP’s political engagement, the dividing line between 
them remained blurred.118  
 Throughout their parliamentary activity in the authoritarian context, the MB 
deputies consistently demonstrated their endorsement of democratic reforms as they 
regularly stood up against human rights violations and the decline of political freedom 
after the 2005 elections. However, they also continued to pursue the movement’s 
religious agenda through calls for the application of sharia, even if this was done less 
                                               
 
116 A small number of MB deputies were elected to the People’s Assembly on five occasions before 
the revolution. The MB won 8 seats in the PA in 1984, 37 seats in 1987, 1 seat in 1995, 17 seats in 
2000, and 88 in the 2005 elections. Throughout these years, the number of seats in the PA ranged 
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its members to join the FJP. If they did not, they were expelled, as was the case with members of the 
Current Party established after the revolution by a younger generation of the Muslim Brothers. For a 
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vigorously.119 These ambiguities translated into the fears that their opponent had; that 
the MB would dominate post-revolution politics, the writing of the new constitution 
and, ultimately, succeed in carrying out its religious goals.120  
The other moderate Islamist entity in the PA was the Wasat (Centre) Party, 
which received 2 % of the seats. It was founded in 1996 by a group of former MB 
members as an alternative to their mother organization, with which it had maintained 
a strained relationship ever since (Sallam, 2013, pp. 253-4). Its members participated 
in the opposition Kifaya movement, and consequently maintained good relationships 
with non-Islamists (2013, p. 254).  
 
Salafist Parties 
The Salafist parties offered a conservative Islamist alternative to the FJP, whose 
engagement in politics they used to criticize from an ideological standpoint before the 
revolution (al-Anani and Malik, 2013, p. 59). However, despite their previous disdain 
for political activity, the post-2011 politics saw not one but several political entities 
emerge around Salafi leaders and the prominent Salafi organization, the Salafi Call 
(Al-Da’wa Al-Salafiyya). The most popular of them all turned out to be the Nour 
Party, which led an electoral coalition into the 2011/12 polls that, to general surprise, 
                                               
 
119 This is based on an analysis of the MB’s parliamentary activity in the period between 2000 and 
2010, produced by Brown and Hamzawy (2010).  
120 While the FJP’s leaders constantly reassured their opponents that they sought to “participate, not to 
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received 24.7 % of the seats in the PA, the second strongest showing (Table 2). 
Observers have attributed their electoral success to the fact that Salafists had 
developed a network that provided social services prior to the revolution, as well as to 
the resonance their conservative ideology found among pious Egyptians. Added to 
this, they proved to be skilful in their campaigning and outreach activities ahead of the 
first democratic polls (al-Anani and Malik, 2013, p. 64). However, despite embracing 
the democratic process, illustrated by their entry into the electoral arena, the parties 
held ambiguous positions towards some of the core principles of liberal democracy, 
especially concerning equal citizenship, personal freedom, and women’s rights (2013, 
p. 63, p. 68). They are, therefore, included as members of the anti-Mubarak coalition 
only with considerable reservations. 
 
Non-Islamist Opposition 
The non-Islamist camp was considerably more fragmented, comprising already 
established parties as well as new ones. Ten parties shared 18.6 % of the seats in the 
PA.121 The most popular of them, with 7.6 %, was the oldest, the liberal Wafd Party. 
Wafd was the only party of the anti-Mubarak coalition apart from the FJP that had 
established networks of branches across Egypt and had sufficient personnel and 
financial resources to field candidates in most districts for the parliamentary elections 
(Dunne and Hamzawy, 2017, p. 13). Its roots went back to 1919, when its predecessor, 
the Delegation Party, had been formed. After rebranding itself and gaining its legal 
                                               
 
121 The figure does not include the seats won by the Revolution Continues Coalition, which secured 
an additional 1.4 % of seats. However, the coalition also included the Current Party formed by the 
younger generation of the Muslim Brothers. The exact figures for individual parties within this 
electoral coalition are not available.   
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status in 1984 (Sallam, 2013, p. 233), Wafd participated in all elections, except for 
one, during the period of a limited multiparty system between 1984 and 2010, winning 
a relatively small share of seats on each occasion.122 The party adopted a more 
conciliatory stance towards Islamists than some other secular parties. It joined the 
Democratic Alliance, an electoral coalition for the 2010/11 PA elections that also 
included the FJP, but it eventually withdrew. According to Dunne and Hamzawy 
(2017, p. 14), Wafd’s deputies worked with the FJP and even Salafist parties, also 
represented in the short-lived PA. Another secular party running under the banner of 
the Democratic Alliance and opposing divisions along the religious lines was the 
Karama (Dignity) Party led by a prominent left-wing Arab nationalist opposition 
figure, Hamdeen Sabahi. While securing only a marginal share of seats in the PA, the 
20.7 % of votes that Sabahi received in the first round of the 2012 presidential 
elections indicate that the party’s popularity had grown substantially.  
 The other two non-Islamist entities that ranked just below the Wafd Party in 
the parliamentary ballots adopted a less conciliatory stance towards Islamists. The 
centre-left ESDP was founded in March 2011 but united members of opposition 
groups who were politically active before the revolution. Among them was its founder, 
the dissident Mohamed Abul Ghar (Sallam, 2013, p. 67). Winning 3.2 % of the seats 
in the PA, it established itself after 2011 as the leading leftist political force. A brand-
new party, the business-oriented FEP was launched in April 2011 by a Coptic 
telecommunication tycoon, Naguib Sawiris. Building on the support of Coptic 
                                               
 
122 In the 1984 and 1987 elections, the party garnered 50 and 36 seats, respectively, in the 458-
member PA. However, its support fell considerably after that date, with the party winning only 6 or 7 
seats in the subsequent elections. In 2005, Wafd won 6 seats, compared to 88 won by the MB (DRI, 
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Christians, as well as on Sawiris’ business network, it won 3 % of the PA seats. Both 
parties campaigned from within the Egyptian Bloc, an electoral coalition that united 
left-wing and liberal forces against Islamists. Ahmed Said, the leader of the FEP, 
explained that he entered politics to “fight the Brotherhood”, since he “hate[d] the idea 
of mixing politics and religion”.123 Dunne and Hamzawy (2017, p. 15), the latter 
himself being an independent non-Islamist MP in the PA elected in 2011/12, noticed 
that “tensions and mistrust” between the FJP and Salafi deputies on the one hand, and 
the secular deputies of the Egyptian Bloc on the other, were obvious from the first 
parliamentary session. When the SCC dissolved the Islamist-dominated PA in June 
2011, both the FEP and ESDP welcomed the decision.124  
 The increasing antagonism between the FJP and its non-Islamist counterparts 
provided a backdrop for the secular-leaning parties to cling together more tightly in 
the second half of 2012. Polarization hit its peak on 22 November 2012 after President 
Morsi issued his controversial Constitutional Declaration, which they rejected 
outright.125 The secular opposition platform, the National Salvation Front (NSF), 
formed in the following days, brought together the Wafd Party, the ESDP, the FEP, 
and the Karama Party, as well as other secular politicians and smaller parties. The NSF 
used their combined weight to campaign against the new constitution.126 If we 
consider the 36.2 % of voters who voted against the adoption of the constitution as a 
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125 See Chapter 5 for more detail. 
126 BBC, “Profile: Egypt’s National Salvation Front”, 10 December 2012, available at: 
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vote for the NSF,127 and compare it with their combined vote in the 2011/12 PA 
elections that reached just 19.5 % of the total,128 it is clear that the secular parties had 
become capable of mobilizing a larger segment of population. However, this union 
came late in the constitution-making process to enforce any changes.   
As was the case in Tunisia, the post-2011 political scene in Egypt and the 
debate about the new constitution, was shaped primarily by the divide between 
Islamists and non-Islamists. Controlling 45 % of seats in the PA, the lower chamber 
of the parliament elected after the uprising, the FJP was well-positioned to maintain 
considerable influence over the text of the constitution. Non-Islamists of the anti-
Mubarak coalition remained weak and fragmented during most of the constitution-
making process. Apart from the FJP, non-Islamists also faced a strong block of 
religiously conservative Salafist parties, which, in contrast to the more pragmatic FJP, 
aimed at strengthening the role of religion in the constitutional framework. Even 
though observers stressed differences between the FJP and Salafists concerning the 
constitution,129 as the strife between the FJP and non-Islamists increased during the 
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This chapter has served as an introduction to the analysis of the design of the 
constitution-making processes implemented in Egypt and Tunisia, the factors that 
initiated them, and the constitutional (dis)agreement that will be dealt with in depth in 
Chapter 5-7. Its purpose was twofold. Firstly, to describe the transition processes that 
followed the 2010/11 uprisings and assess whether democratic transitions were 
completed. It identified the fact that in both cases, removing authoritarian presidents 
from office in January and February 2011 was, of itself, insufficient to secure 
democratic transitions, as other authoritarian forces and institutions remained 
entrenched in the politics of each country. The transition in Tunisia, nevertheless, was 
smoother compared to that of Egypt, where efforts at democratization were weakened 
by the ambitions of the SCAF to retain power. These ambitions, along with other 
problems, most pressingly the controversial decision of the activist SCC to dissolve 
the lower and more important parliament’s chamber, the PA, proved to be significant 
obstacles to the consolidation of democracy.  
Secondly, the chapter identified and introduced the key political parties of the 
anti-authoritarian coalitions, and explored the divides that separated them. I 
demonstrated that in both countries, groups that were to draft the new constitutions 
were divided, especially by religious cleavages, which set Islamist and non-Islamist 
parties apart. The chapter also pointed out the differences in the distribution of power 
between the two political camps in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases. Although the 
major Islamist forces of the anti-Ben Ali and anti-Mubarak coalitions, Ennahda and 
FJP, engendered comparable support in the first democratic elections following the 
uprisings, in Tunisia the distribution of power between Islamists and secularists turned 
out to be more balanced.  
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This was partly because of the electoral popularity of more conservative 
Salafist forces in Egypt, which fared better than secular-leaning parties. Winning 24.7 
% of the seats, the Salafi electoral alliance emerged as the second strongest force in 
the PA. Religiously conservative parties were also present in Tunisia. Aridha Chaabia, 
for example, came third in the NCA 2011 elections. Still, the party obtained only 12 
% of seats in the NCA, only half of what the Salafists had won in Egypt. As a political 
force it crumbled soon after the election, becoming a marginal player in the 
constitutional change process. On the other hand, during the constitution-making 
process which developed between October 2011 and January 2014, secular parties in 
Tunisia succeeded in consolidating their position. This was, in one respect, because 
they found a way to coalesce more tightly. The emergence of a new party, Nidaa 
Tounes, onto the political scene was to prove decisive. Although its democratic 
credentials remained in doubt, it became increasingly popular and was able to counter-
balance Ennahda. As a result, power became more equally distributed across the 
Islamist and non-Islamist divide within the anti-authoritarian coalition in Tunisia than 
was the case in Egypt. Chapter 5 now explores (dis)agreements on the new 








The previous chapter has illustrated the fact that anti-authoritarian coalitions in both 
Tunisia and Egypt were divided along numerous political cleavages, most noticeably 
the Islamist-secularist divide. This situation was exacerbated further by personal 
animosities, mistrust rooted in the previous decades of authoritarianism and in Islamist 
popularity with the electorate. This chapter, Chapter 5, now explores the main 
outcome studied in this thesis, constitutional agreement. To do so, it first examines the 
overall (dis)agreement on the constitutions. In Chapter 3, I suggested that “a 
substantial vote against the constitution motivated by fundamental disagreements” 
among parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition is an indicator of the absence of 
overall agreement (Higley and Gunther, 1992, p. 7). Negative statements by a political 
party or an unsupportive current accompanying the drafting, and to which no 
resolution is found, might also point to the lack of an overall agreement. It is clear that 
not everyone will be content with all the formulations that found their way into the 
text of the constitution. Contentious confrontations with “no sign of accommodation”, 
based on deep division, however, suggest that sufficient agreement has not been 
reached (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 4).  
Firstly, empirical analysis presented in this chapter reveals that despite those 
considerable divisions that alienated political parties in Tunisia, deputies from parties 
across the anti-Ben Ali coalition, who were responsible for producing the new charter 
in the National Constituent Assembly, approved the constitution almost unanimously 
in January 2014, two years after negotiations officially commenced. Meanwhile, the 
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outcome of the five months of constitutional debates witnessed by Egypt’s Constituent 
Assembly ended in an overall disagreement between the parties of the anti-Mubarak 
coalition on the document presented for the final vote in November 2012.  
Secondly, this chapter investigates how these opposing outcomes came about 
by exploring individual areas of contention and how they were resolved. In particular, 
it asks what elements of the constitutions were most important and which were the 
most problematic in terms of reaching agreement. This involved an identification of 
the parties conflicting preferences and whether, perhaps, some elements of Egypt’s 
draft constitution generated more controversy among the main protagonists of 
constitutional change than it did in Tunisia. Instead of considering constitutional 
agreement as a static, one-off event, this approach enables me to examine how 
agreement developed over time and what building blocks were involved in its 
construction.  
While the analysis concentrates on the debates and individual (dis)agreements 
pertaining to the formal and written documents whose text directly specify that they 
are constitutions, it is also sensitive to other issues. In Chapter 3, I outlined the 
functional approach to understanding constitutions along with the debates among 
scholars about the institutional agreement which they theorized was an essential 
condition of democratization. Based on the constitutionalist literature, which stressed 
the aspects of constitutions whose function is to constrain and enable government 
(Elkins et al., 2009, pp. 38-40; Galligan and Versteeg, 2013, p. 6), it can be expected 
that political parties negotiating new constitutions after the downfall of an 
authoritarian regime will clash over the form of political institutions performing these 
functions. These are the type of executive-legislative relationships to be instituted and, 
perhaps less straightforwardly, also the specific clauses regarding individual rights 
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and freedoms, as well as those of any supreme or constitutional courts (Stone Sweet, 
2014, pp. 151-2). More recently, authors inquiring into societies marked by religious 
divisions have highlighted the symbolic identity and value-oriented aspects of 
constitutions, pointing out that those drafting them might be divided over the status of 
religious law, religion-state relations, and identity issues (Bâli and Lerner, 2017; 
Brown, 2017).  
Further, as part of their specifications for an institutional agreement, scholars 
of transitions stressed other potential important issues and those that might lead to 
conflict. These include the question of: (1) inclusiveness of the new regime, i.e. 
whether anti-democratic parties are allowed to enter the political competition, what 
the threshold is for entry, and whether there are guarantees for the representation of 
minorities; (2) the type of electoral system i.e. the formula for the distribution of seats, 
and the size and number of constituencies; (3) the form of the government; and (4) 
whether the state is unitary or federal (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 69-70; Linz 
and Stepan, 1996, p. 4). Although these elements might not be part of the constitution, 
I consider how they meshed with negotiations over the constitutional clauses in case 
they coincided in time.  
Chapter 5 provides evidence that in neither of the two cases did key divisions 
during the process of writing the constitutions pertain only, or most prominently, to 
the design of macro-political institutions. Other issues that led to conflicts were linked 
to the role of religion in the state and formulations about rights and freedoms. The 
diverging party preferences in the anti-authoritarian coalition on these issues set those 
drafting the constitution from the secularist camp apart from those in the Islamist camp 
in Tunisia to a similar extent as occurred in Egypt. The exploration also shows that 
the broad constitutional agreement in Tunisia that came together when the NCA 
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approved the constitution in January 2014, was possible thanks to compromises on 
individual issues negotiated during the two years of constitutional talks. The overall 
agreement materialized as secularist parties managed progressively to mould the 
constitution closer to their preferred shape.   
In comparison, the overall disagreement in Egypt that manifested itself when 
non-Islamist parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition called for the rejection of the 
constitution in the December 2012 popular referendum, developed through content-
related as much as procedural disagreements, and was ultimately aided by the broader 
political context. The chapter also points out that the constitutional agreement in 
Tunisia was inextricably interlinked with other political deals, most importantly 
relating to the resignation of the Ennahda-led government. The next section analyses 
the overall agreement in Tunisia and then deconstructs its building blocks.  
 
5.1 Constitutional Agreement in Tunisia 
On 26 January 2014, 200 of 216 deputies of the Tunisian NCA approved the new 
constitution, a figure far beyond the necessary absolute majority.130 The text enjoyed 
the support of both the largest Islamist party, Ennahda, and its secular-leaning 
opponents on the left and right of the political spectrum. This included MPs who had 
previously joined the ranks of Nidaa Tounes, Ennahda’s main political rival.131 The 
voting session evolved within a spirit of unity and joy, with political adversaries 
                                               
 
130 The NCA originally had 217 members, but one of the deputies died during the days leading up to 
the vote on the final draft of the constitution in January 2014.  
131 For the votes on the final constitution, see the website run by the non-governmental organization, 
Al-Bawsala. Marsad, “Adoption de la constitution de la République tunisienne dans sa totalité”, 26 




embracing each other while the public and members of civil society cheered from the 
balcony of the Bardo Palace. Across my interviews, NCA deputies and party leaders 
representing leftist, centrist, right-wing, Arab nationalist, Islamist and secularist 
inclinations, all agreed that the constitution was, overall, a success: “That is an 
extraordinary number. Everybody was happy with this constitution”, was a comment 
on the high approval rate by a leader of the secularist Al-Massar party and one of 
Ennahda’s most vocal critics.132 The majority of the 12 negative votes came from 
deputies of the Current of Love (Al-Mahaba) who entered the NCA in 2011 under the 
banner of Aridha Chaabia.133 The party, which I identified in Chapter 4 as a marginal 
player in the constitutional change process, rejected the constitution on the basis that 
it did not include a reference to Islamic sharia.134 Even without their vote, however, 
the constitution’s approval went far beyond the “sufficient agreement” prescribed by 
Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 4).  
 That the constitution would receive such a high approval was not always 
expected. In June 2013, opposition deputies protested what was supposed to be the 
final draft of the constitution, claiming it did not represent the agreements reached at 
the level of the constituent commissions. Non-Islamists argued that the draft opened 
the door for theocracy, and assured me that if Ennahda had presented that version for 
                                               
 
132 Author Interview with Samir Taïeb, 2 October 2015, Tunis.   
133 Marsad, “Adoption de la constitution de la République tunisienne dans sa totalité”, 26 January 
2014, available at: https://majles.marsad.tn/fr/vote/52e598b212bdaa593ad566f2 [accessed 21 August 
2018]. 
134 AFP, “Tunisie: Les sept élus du Courant Al Mahabba se retirent des débats sur la future 
Constitution”, 11 January 2014, available at: https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/01/11/courant-
mahabba-anc_n_4581792.html [accessed 21 August 2018].  
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approval, they would not have voted for it.135 Ennahda government coalition partners, 
too, raised concerns about the remaining stumbling blocks, namely the religion-state 
relationship, and wanted to see those issues resolved before those working on the draft 
embarked on voting.136  
In July 2013, when the second political assassination of a leftist opposition 
politician in the same year took place, tensions reached their peak. Around 60 
deputies,137 almost one third of the NCA, withdrew from the drafting body, 
denouncing both the draft constitution and the government’s failure to deal with the 
worsening security situation.138 As the deputies returned to the NCA in the autumn 
and winter months of 2013, and the negotiations re-commenced on the remaining 
divisive issues, few would have guessed that the constitution would eventually be 
approved by such a large margin: “I was sure we would have the two thirds [145 
deputies]. But I think nobody believed that that we would arrive at 200 votes. That is 
enormous,” remarked the constitution’s General Rapporteur in retrospect.139 This 
overall agreement came together over the two years of the constitutional negotiations 
in the form of individual agreements on the contentious issues, which I discuss below.  
                                               
 
135 Author Interviews with leftist opposition leader of the PF, Hamma Hammami (14 December 2016, 
Tunis), and Selim Ben Abdessalam, originally an Ettakatol deputy who represented Nidaa Tounes at 
the time of the constitution’s approval (6 June 2014, and 24 November 2016, Tunis).    
136 Author Interview with Lobna Jeribi, deputy from Ettakatol, 14 December 2016, Tunis.  
137 Estimates range from 42 deputies leaving the NCA in the first wave of withdrawals, to 70 during 
the peak of the crisis (Carter Center, 2014, p. 28). According to a former member of a local 
organization, Al-Bawsala, which monitored the NCA work and, at the time, counted the number of 
deputies that withdrew, the number never exceeded 60 (Author Interview with Ghada Louchichi, 11 
November 2016, Tunis). This estimate is supported by an NCA deputy, Selim Ben Abdessalam, who 
argued that the total of withdrawn deputies was 57 (Author Interview, 23 November 2016, Tunis).     
138 Author Interview with Selim Abdessalam, 26 June 2014, Tunis.  
139 Author Interview with Habib Khedher, deputy for Ennahda, 25 November 2016, Tunis.   
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5.1.1 Agreement in the Making  
To identify the most important and, at the same time, the aspects of the constitution 
that resulted in the greatest conflicts, as well as to understand whether, and how, these 
issues were resolved, I relied primarily on qualitative interviews with the NCA 
deputies. I asked them what they saw as the most important aspects of the constitution, 
which had proved the most difficult to reach consensus on, and how they had managed 
to resolve those differences. Having conducted interviews with members of all the 
main political forces of the anti-authoritarian coalition, both Islamist and non-Islamist, 
I was able to triangulate the different testimonies and to learn what each faction saw 
as the most important. I then contrasted this information with other material I had 
garnered. Specifically, I compared the progressive drafts of the constitution and 
consulted other primary documents which specified the controversial issues that were 
reconciled or provided the wording on which the parties eventually settled. These 
included documents produced by the NCA. Finally, I compared these findings with a 
detailed report on the constitution-making process produced by the Carter Center 
(2014).  
Two different discourses about the timing of these agreements were put 
forward, one by Ennahda, and the other by their secularist rivals primarily within the 
opposition. Ennahda’s deputies maintained that they made concessions on the key 
elements of the constitution well before the 2013 summer political crisis sparked by 
Mohamed Brahmi’s death. To them, the conflict with their opponents was “political,” 
not constitutional, meaning their opponents, led by Nidaa Tounes, ultimately sought 
to push them out of power, taking the constitution “hostage” in the struggle.140 The 
                                               
 
140 Author Interview with Latifa Habachi, deputy for Ennahda, 25 November 2016, Tunis.  
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opposition, and even some of the Ennahda’s coalition partners, said otherwise. They 
dismissed the penultimate draft in June 2013, arguing that it was a step towards 
building an Islamic state,141 and insisted that Ennahda made key compromises after 
the 2013 crisis. As put by one left wing deputy: “It was only after the assassination of 
colleague Brahmi that we left the assembly, demanding the constitution is finished as 
soon as possible and in a consensual manner… [that] we could really seize 
concessions... We couldn’t do that before.”142  
In the following sub-sections, I introduce some of the most divisive aspects of 
the constitutional negotiations and explore the resolution of these disputes, paying due 
attention to their timing. This will serve as a basis for the next chapter, where I assess 
the link between constitution-making design and constitutional agreement. The 
analysis shows that the issues that posed most problems in reaching a consensus on 
the drafts related to religion-state relationships, the universality of human rights, 
women’s rights, and the configuration of the new political system. Evidence from 
qualitative interviews also points to the interlinkage of constitutional agreement with 
other political deals, most crucially about government change, the timing of 
subsequent presidential and legislative elections, and election of an independent 
electoral committee, the ISIE.    
 
The Role of Religion, Rights, and Freedoms   
The place of religion in the constitutional framework and the status of Islamic sharia 
were highly divisive issues. Generally, non-Islamists preferred limiting the role of 
                                               
 
141 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 24 November 2016, Tunis.    
142 Author Interview with Mongi Rahoui, deputy for the Democratic Patriots Unified Movement, 2 
July 2014, Tunis.  
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religion to that of providing a marker of identity as opposed to embedding it as an 
important element of the constitution. One of the secularist deputies explained that 
embedding one religion in the constitution could have had serious legal consequences 
and, in the most extreme scenarios, meant that all legislation had to conform to the 
principles of sharia.143 Seeking to calm its opponents, prior to the 2011 elections, 
Ennahda’s leadership promised not to include a direct reference to sharia in the 
constitution. Sharia had not been mentioned either in the former constitution 
introduced in 1959. Nonetheless, to the chagrin of the secularists, Ennahda’s activists 
and some of its senior members in the NCA, accompanied by conservative deputies 
from Aridha Chaabia, argued that it should be otherwise. As a result, soon after the 
constitution-making process commenced, the inclusion of sharia became one of the 
most hotly debated topics in the NCA (Marzouki, 2017, p. 355; Wolf, 2017b, pp. 138-
9).  
In March 2012, after a heated public debate, strong opposition from non-
Islamist parties, controversy within Ennahda itself, and pressure from Ennahda’s 
coalition partners, Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi confirmed that they would not 
insert sharia into the text (Marzouki, 2017, pp. 353-6). In an effort to prevent open 
strife over the first article of the constitution, those drafting the document agreed to 
keep this element of the 1959 Constitution unchanged. This resulted in Islam not being 
explicitly defined as the state religion but did leave the whole issue open to 
interpretation. It stipulated that “Tunisia is a free, independent, and sovereign state. Its 
religion is Islam, its language is Arabic, and its form of government is a republic.” 
Article 2 of the 2014 Constitution, added to the text in April 2013, then confirmed 
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Tunisia as a civil state, eliminating potential ambiguity on this issue introduced by the 
preceding article.144  
Despite the early breakthrough on sharia and the confirmation of the civil, as 
opposed to religious, nature of the state, the conflict over the role of religion extended 
to other parts of the constitution and continued to divide those drafting it right up until 
the approval of the final draft. For example, the formula that Islam was “the religion 
of the state” was kept as one of the components of the constitution that could not be 
amended and was still in the June 2013 penultimate draft which led to the 
controversy.145 The statement in the preamble of the same draft that the drafters were 
building on the “fundamentals” of Islam was problematic for many deputies. Critics 
complained that such wording could have serious implications for the separation of 
politics and religion and the democratic character of the constitution.146 Both issues 
were successfully settled in the last phase of constitution-making, through the 
Consensus Commission whose role I discuss in Chapter 6. The term “fundamentals of 
Islam” was replaced by a more widely acceptable expression of the “people’s 
commitment to the teachings of Islam”. Members of the CC also eliminated the 
divisive article on Islam as the state religion, while safeguarding Articles 1 and 2 that 
                                               
 
144 Author Interview with Lobna Jeribi, deputy from Ettakatol, 23 November 2016, Tunis. See also 
the constitution draft from 22 April 2012. ConstitutionNet, “Draft Constitution of the Tunisian 
Republic”, International IDEA, 22 April 2012, available at: 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/tunisian_constitution-22_april_2013-_third_draft_-
english-idea.pdf [accessed 21 August 2019].  
145 Article 141 of the 1 June 2013 draft. See ConstitutionNet, “Draft Constitution of the Tunisian 
Republic”, International IDEA, 1 June 2013, available at: 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/tunisian_constitution-1_june_2013_-_fourth_draft_-
english-idea.pdf [accessed 21 August 2018].  
146 Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, deputy for Ettakatol, 28 November 2016, Tunis.  
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tackled state identity and religion-state relations from any future amendment (Carter 
Center, 2014, pp. 80-1). 
A related problem was a clash on the definition of individual freedoms, 
including the freedom of belief and conscience, and the state’s role in protecting 
religion. Non-Islamists were in uproar after an article proposed by Ennahda in one of 
the earlier drafts sought to criminalize blasphemy. The controversy escalated and 
created a heated atmosphere involving popular protests following the screening of the 
film Persepolis, which was critical of Islam, and an art exhibition that showed a 
painting many deemed disrespectful to religion (Marks, 2014, pp. 24-5). Opposed to 
the criminalization of blasphemy, non-Islamists pushed to strengthen the language on 
freedom of belief, and sought to guarantee freedom of conscience.  
Ennahda eventually backtracked on both issues. The resulting Article 6, which 
came into being gradually and emerged in its final shape only in January 2014, 
represents, as one deputy put it, “typical consensual article where you find 
everything”.147 Reflecting secularist demands, it guarantees freedom of conscience 
and belief, free exercise of religious practice, and the neutrality of mosques and other 
places of worship from partisan instrumentalization, although not political, a more 
general term preferred by secularists.148 It also forbids labelling another Muslim as a 
nonbeliever. On the other hand, it contains a vague formulation that the state is 
obligated to protect “the sacred”, despite the fact that this phrase would appear to 
contradict the rest of the article.149   
                                               
 
147 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 24 November 2016, Tunis. 
148 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 24 November 2016, Tunis. 
149 See Article 6 of the 2014 Constitution. ConstitutionNet, “The Constitution of the Tunisian 
Republic”, International IDEA, 26 January 2014, available at: 
176 
 
Finally, highlighted by all non-Islamist interviewees as being among the most 
important aspect of the constitution, was embedding the concept of the universality of 
human rights in the text and the reinforcement of women’s rights: “Ennahda said they 
recognized international human rights standards, equality between men and women, 
if they are not in contradiction with Islam,” explained an opposition NCA deputy, 
adding this stance was not acceptable.150 Secularists also shared the perspective that 
the penultimate draft of the constitution in 2013 did not sufficiently preserve freedoms 
and women’s rights.151 Ennahda’s deputies, however, claimed there were no real 
differences between the parties on those issues and that the opposition was taking the 
constitution hostage to score political points to take down the Ennahda-led 
government.152  
The universality of human rights was indeed already inscribed in the preamble 
to the June 2013 draft, after a breakthrough was negotiated in spring during the first 
round of what was termed national dialogue.153 That set it apart from the previous 
versions that spoke of  “noble human values and the principles of human rights” and 
                                               
 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2014.01.26_-
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150 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 24 November 2016, Tunis. 
151 Author Interview with Mohamed Fadhel Mahfoudh, head of the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, one of 
the organizations that formed the Quartet essential to the brokering of the last phase of the national 
dialogue in autumn 2013. In Tunis, 14 December 2016.  
152 Author Interview with Ennahda’s Latifa Habachi (25 November 2016, Tunis) and Amer 
Laarayedh (3 December 2016, Tunis). 
153 Several national dialogues were organized throughout the constitution-making process, as I discuss 
in Chapter 6. Apart from this instance of dialogue that developed in spring 2013, another important 
series of political negotiations that I refer to as the Quartet-led National Dialogue took place in 
autumn 2013.   
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did not mention the word “universal”.154 Yet in the June draft the non-amendable 
principle that Islam was the religion of the state was hidden.155 In the final phase of 
the constitutional negotiations that developed in the CC, secularist deputies, 
mistrustful of Ennahda’s intentions, sought to “announce clearly that Tunisia was a 
civil state based on universal [human] rights, and that Article 2 [on the civilian nature 
of the state] cannot be amended”.156 The solution to the problem found in the CC was 
the phrase that Articles 1 and 2 could not be amended, along with the addition of the 
limitation clause, which allowed the state to restrict citizens’ rights only under 
conditions of necessity and proportionality. Secular-leaning opposition deputies also 
managed to tone down the religious language used in the text. With regard to women’s 
rights, deputies gradually introduced stronger language in consecutive constitutional 
drafts. Its proponents gained acceptance of the most progressive wording in January 
2014 thanks to the formation of a women’s coalition which also involved Ennahda 
deputies.157 
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Another issue of major importance on which the political parties held diverging 
preferences was the political system to be adopted. On one side of the spectrum, 
Ennahda opted for a purely parliamentary system inspired by the United Kingdom, 
through which a president might be popularly elected but have only representative 
responsibilities. The party explained this preference by pointing to the years of one 
person rule.158 They also realized the advantage of having built a true political party 
with ties to society, institutionalized intra-party decision-making mechanisms and 
internal coherence, something that other parties that filled the newly opened political 
space after the revolution sorely lacked.159 In contrast, all the other parties desired a 
system that would balance the head of the government and an elected president. For 
their part, they pointed to the negative experience with the NCA, speaking about the 
dictatorship of parliament where Ennahda had most influence.160 A more prosaic 
reason, and one frequently remarked upon by insiders among journalists, experts, and 
deputies themselves, was the presidential aspirations of leaders of these parties.  
The relevant constituent commission did not manage to resolve the 
controversy. However, faced with the situation where everyone but Ennahda preferred 
something other than a parliamentary system, Ennahda settled on a “double system” 
where the powers of the head of the government and the president were “balanced”. 
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This came about during the spring 2013 phase of the national dialogue.161 What 
followed was a thorough negotiation about every single prerogative within the CC 
during autumn 2013, with Ennahda’s opponents seeking to enlarge the powers of any 
future president (Riahi, 2016, p. 52). Key Ennahda deputies told me those were the 
most difficult constitutional negotiations in which they were involved.162 Both camps 
eventually considered the outcome a compromise in which the agreed system was 
significantly further away from a purely parliamentary one and the president gained 
some important prerogatives, especially in foreign affairs, defence and diplomacy, in 
line with the preferences of non-Islamists who still hoped to see his/her role enhanced 
further.163  
Finally, towards the very end of the constitution-making process, the parties 
struck a bargain on withdrawing the upper limit on the age of the president and allowed 
presidential candidates to hold dual nationality. Both arrangements aimed to appease 
party leaders who sought to run in the forthcoming elections. The first agreement, on 
age limits, was initially opposed by Ennahda and its acceptance can be seen as the 
party giving a “green light” to the presidential candidature of Beji Caid Essebsi, the 
leader of Nidaa Tounes. Finally, the political parties held diverging preferences on the 
composition of the constitutional court, the final make up of which was a compromise 
                                               
 
161 “Final Communiqué of the sessions of National Dialogue” (translated from original Arabic), 
personal archive of Mouldi Riahi, 15 May 2013.  
162 Author Interviews Habib Khedher (Ennahda, 25 November 2016, Tunis), and Sabhi Atigue 
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brokered in the CC and which determined the number of professional judges and non-
judicial appointments to the court.164  
 
Related Political Deals 
That constitutional agreement could be reached was difficult to imagine without the 
other political deals that turned out to be interlinked with constitutional negotiations. 
Some of them related to the problems raised by scholars of democratization in their 
specification of agreements on political institutions that I have outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter. This was especially the case in relation to the members of 
the former ruling party, the RCD, and their participation in political life. The parties 
of the Troika coalition, including Ennahda, favoured pushing through a draft law that 
they proposed in 2012, which lay down limits on the political activities of former-
RCD members.165 The law, however, faced opposition from Nidaa Tounes, which for 
the sake of its own members sought to weaken any such restrictions.166 Ennahda’s 
leadership began to alter their stance on the topic in mid-2013 and eventually rejected 
the law outright (Gobe, 2016, p. 80), despite it being “a huge point of controversy” 
within the party whose members suffered from repression before 2011.167 Although 
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the party’s general reasoning was that they did not want to “exclude anyone”,168 the 
sudden turn rather suggests the victory of pragmatism amid increasing tensions in the 
country and the growing opposition to Ennahda’s government lead by the Nidaa (e.g. 
Gobe, 2016, p. 80; Preysing, 2015, pp. 126-7).  
Another package of political deals which were negotiated during autumn 2013 
was essential for attaining cross-partisan support on the constitution. This was the case 
following the resignation of the Ennahda-led government coalition, when a 
compromise on the head of the new caretaker government that was to replace the 
Troika and lead the country to the next elections had to be made. The deal also 
involved setting the date and sequence of the presidential and parliamentary elections, 
and the composition of the independent election-monitoring body, the ISIE. These 
issues were addressed during negotiations between political parties brokered by civil 
society organizations which I refer to as the Quartet-led National Dialogue (see 
Chapter 6). This dialogue overlapped with the discussions on the last contentious 
points in the constitution that took place in the CC. On the one hand, it responded to 
the demand of Ennahda’s secularist opponents, which they made a condition of their 
return to the NCA from which they had withdrawn in July 2013. On the other hand, 
Ennahda was willing to resign from government only once the constitution was 
finalized by the NCA, the ISIE was established, and the election date set. If those 
conditions were not met simultaneously, it could, its deputies concluded, open the door 
for the return of dictatorship. They understood that finishing the constitution quickly, 
and with a level of high approval, was essential to the prevention of such a possibility. 
Additionally, putting ISIE in place and setting the election dates before the 
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constitution was finalized then guaranteed that, indeed, there would be free and 
transparent elections after they left office.169 Compared to constitutional issues, these 
were more difficult for Ennahda to give up. According to a student of Ennahda, Marks 
(2014, p. 10), “the toughest debates inside the party and sharpest criticism of its 
leadership have come from Ennahda members upset not about sharia or classic so-
called “Islamist” issues, but about the party’s seeming over-eagerness to compromise 
with figures of the old regime”.   
 The interconnection between these political deals and constitutional 
negotiations could be deduced from their timing. The NCA approved the list of ISIE’s 
members on 8 January 2014. The constitution, which contained Article 148 specifying 
that presidential and legislative elections were to take place before the end of 2014, 
was adopted at the end of the month, on 26 January. The new government of Mahdi 
Jomaa, who replaced Ennahda’s Ali Laraayedh, won the vote of confidence two days 
later, on 28 January.170 “It was very connected. If the government didn’t obtain 
confidence, the constitution wouldn’t have been adopted, and vice versa. Everybody 
wanted to obtain their guarantees,” explained one of the key brokers of the 
negotiations.171  
These agreements, and especially the resignation of the Ennahda-led coalition 
government and the participation of former regime elites in political life, were at the 
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top of the agenda of Ennahda’s main rival, Nidaa Tounes. In contrast, according to 
Selim Ben Abdessalem, who was a deputy for Nidaa Tounes in the NCA, Nidaa 
Tounes leader Beji Caid Essebsi was not particularly preoccupied with the 
constitution. As part of the constitution, the party sought to raise the age limit for 
presidential candidature and strengthen the power of the president, “because Beji Caid 
Essebsi was well-positioned to win the elections; but no more than that. For the rest, I 
never had a very deep discussion in Nidaa Tounes on the constitution”.172 Meanwhile, 
the finalization of a new constitution was highly important for Ennahda, which saw it 
as a critical means of maintaining political stability and a safeguard against the return 
of the old regime.173  
 
5.1.2 Summary 
This section has deconstructed the agreement on the constitution, explored its key 
elements and their nature, as well as investigated whether, when and how the most 
divisive issues were settled. The constitutional agreement, symbolically, came 
together when the NCA approved the final draft in January 2014. Yet analysis shows 
this was only possible thanks to the resolution of individual contentious elements of 
the constitution over the two year period of constitutional negotiations. It also 
demonstrates that topics that created most controversy were not related exclusively to 
the design of macro-political institutions. This was most notably the case in the debates 
about religion-state relationships and on the universality of human rights.  
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 Understanding the sequence of the resolution of individual elements of the 
constitutional agreement is essential for assessing the role of inclusive constitution-
making design in shaping them. The analysis shows that contrary to Ennahda’s critics, 
the major Islamist party made key concessions throughout the process, and that parties 
in the anti-Ben Ali coalition consequently resolved many of the divisive issues before 
the 2013 summer crisis. One such example was the decision to forego the aspiration 
to include any reference to sharia while inscribing the civil nature of the state in the 
constitutional text. Ennahda had consented to these demands already in 2012 and April 
2013, respectively. Questions on the universality of human rights, freedom of 
conscience, and the compromise on the mixed presidential-parliamentary system were 
then settled in spring 2013. However, if we compare the 2013 draft of the constitution 
and its final version from 2014, it is clear that secularist opposition parties, after the 
2013 crisis, managed to turn the constitution even more to their liking. It was after 
July 2013 that those drafting the constitution strengthened any future presidents’ 
prerogatives and erased the phrase that Islam was the religion of the state that had 
surreptitiously been placed near the end of the June 2013 penultimate draft. Secularist 
deputies made sure that the article that confirmed Tunisia as a civil state could not be 
amended in the future, even if there was a constitutional majority agreed on changing 
it. They also secured stronger language on the definition of human rights, while 
generally scaling down the religious terminology contained in the whole text.  
The constitutional agreement, certified by the text approval of the NCA 
deputies, was interlinked with other political deals. The most vital was the agreement 
between Ennahda and its main rival, Nidaa Tounes, which cleared the way for the 
latter to compete in the forthcoming elections and provided guarantees for Ennahda 
that the NCA would complete the constitution-writing process. This arrangement 
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enabled the parties to overcome the 2013 political crisis and, ultimately, to solidify 
support for the constitution across the political spectrum. Both the testimonies from 
my interviewees and the timing of these deals suggest that they cannot be understood 
separately.  
  The Tunisian case further illustrates that what was vital for cementing an 
agreement on the constitution among the major political parties of the anti-
authoritarian coalition was that they were able to adjust the text according to at least 
some of their preferences. At the end of the constitution-making process, everyone 
found a part of their vision included in the text and could claim the constitution as 
theirs. The strong agreement on the text of the constitution, even when that meant 
seeds were planted that paved the way for different possible interpretations of the text 
in the future, was especially crucial for secularists. Despite their initial electoral 
weakness and their fragmentation compared to Ennahda, they obtained guarantees in 
the form of the civil, that is not religious, nature of the state and limited role for Islam 
in the constitution, while also restricting Ennahda’s control over the government. The 
question is, were secularists able to gradually win these concessions due to inclusive 
constitution-making design? Chapter 6, which assesses the formal and substantive 
inclusiveness of constitution-making design, will examine this question. Before that, 
the next section probes constitutional disagreement that developed in Egypt not long 
after the 25 January 2011 Revolution.     
 
5.2 Constitutional Disagreement in Egypt 
Unlike Tunisia, the outcome of the five months of negotiations about the new 
constitution in Egypt’s Constituent Assembly was disagreement on the document put 
up for the final vote. On 29 November 2012, CA deputies with predominantly Islamist 
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backgrounds, as others had withdrawn from the Assembly earlier that month, 
approved each article by a majority of votes. While the FJP and the Nour Party and its 
allies in the CA supported the constitution, non-Islamists of the anti-Mubarak 
coalition, now united in the National Salvation Front, dismissed it. The NSF refused 
to recognize the final draft, arguing that it did not “represent the Egyptian people”.174 
The coalition encouraged their supporters to vote “no” in the upcoming constitutional 
referendum and called for protests.175 Demonstrations were held in Cairo and other 
cities in the days following. On 1 December, Al-Jazeera reported that tens of 
thousands had rallied in the capital’s downtown, chanting “Down with the Constituent 
Assembly!”176  
Despite the controversies, 63.8 % of voters decided to approve the draft in a 
referendum with the first round being held two weeks after the CA finished the voting 
process. The referendum was marred by a low voter turnout, as only 32.9 % of 
registered voters cast ballots, 8 % less than in the previous referendum organized by 
the SCAF in March 2011.177 This might have, however, reflected the electoral fatigue 
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of voters, who had already cast votes in another referendum, elected two chambers of 
parliament and a president in two electoral rounds, and not just the ambivalence that 
surrounded the document. Nevertheless, the context of the constitution’s adoption 
deepened the existing gap between the increasingly coherent camps organized along 
the religious cleavage line. The NSF continued to decline President Morsi’s invitations 
for dialogue and offers of seats in the government, demanding that the President 
appoint a national unity government and take steps to amend the contested constitution 
(Dunne and Hamzawi, 2017, pp. 20-1).178 As the head of the liberal FEP explained: 
“We were not collaborating with them in any way. The constitution was just a simple 
confirmation that the MB are not into any sort of inclusion, that they want to rule alone 
and that they want to exclude us.”179  
The absence of dialogue between the FJP-led government and the secularist 
opposition continued for another half a year, until summer 2013 (Dunne and Hamzawi, 
2017, pp. 20-1). On 3 July 2013, when General Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, who served as 
Minister of Defence in Morsi’s cabinet, cut the president’s term short and announced 
that the 2012 Constitution was suspended, he enjoyed NSF members’ support for his 
actions.180 The Egyptian constitution change process manifested signs of “deep and 
continuous confrontation” with “no sign of accommodation” between the political 
parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition, and signified the lack of constitutional 
agreement. This overall disagreement reflected disaccord over a series of issues 
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between the political parties relating to the text of the constitution, the constitution-
making process, and wider political conflicts. I discuss these issues in more detail 
below.  
 
5.2.1 Disagreement in the Making   
This section examines the disagreement on the constitution from December 2012. It 
explores whether this outcome reflected non-Islamists’ disapproval of the text of the 
constitution or whether other problems played a part. It also considers the nature of 
the text-related disputes. To do this, I inquire into the motivations of the deputies who 
withdrew from the CA in November 2012, weeks before the CA voted on the 
constitution, based on their comments to the media. I also consult media reports on 
the debates in the CA between August and November 2012, and original qualitative 
interviews with members of the secularist camp, some of whom acted as CA deputies. 
A crucial input into the analysis of what were the most divisive issues during the 
constitutional debate were the reflections of constitutional specialists with local 
expertize.  
 The analysis shows that major splits that developed during the process of 
negotiating and drafting the constitution, pertaining to the question of religion-state 
relationships, the status and definition of Islamic sharia, and to a lesser extent to rights 
and freedoms, did not divide the major Islamist party, FJP, from the non-Islamist 
opposition. Instead, key contentions emerged, especially between secular-leaning 
parties on the one hand, and conservative Islamists of the Salafi persuasion, on the 
other. What did divide the FJP and secularists were conflicts about the procedural side 
of the constitution-making process. Further, constitutional disagreement was 
exacerbated by the wider political context.  
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Understanding Non-Islamists Walkouts from November 2012  
The CA faced considerable criticism and a plethora of resignations throughout its 
term. It registered the most serious wave of walkouts, involving around one third of 
the deputies, in mid-November 2012. Their motivations, as captured by media 
coverage at the time, related primarily to the constitution-making process and its 
design. Non-Islamists demanded that the CA’s vote on the final draft should be 
postponed from 19 November, as envisaged by the CA President, for three more 
months, in order to allow for further discussion of the contentious articles. They 
criticized the CA’s composition, demanding that several of its members were replaced 
to make the drafting body “more representative”.181 They also disagreed with the 
narrow margin required for the approval of the constitution. Finally, non-Islamists, 
who left the CA in November, were dissatisfied with the way in which the debates 
were managed. This involved, especially, the controversial role of the Drafting 
Committee that was responsible for combining and adjusting the consecutive drafts, 
which they saw as controlled by people close to the FJP. Also criticized was the minor 
role played by the ad-hoc, Advisory Committee, composed of experts from outside 
the CA, whose role non-Islamists of the anti-Mubarak coalition wanted to see 
strengthened.182    
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This does not mean, however, that what divided those drafting the constitution 
were only procedural considerations. Content-wise, two contradictory narratives 
emerged regarding the breadth of agreement on key articles of the constitution that 
had been reached by the time the number of withdrawals reached its height. After one 
of the meetings between political parties organized by the President, Morsi’s cabinet 
reportedly claimed that the political groups had managed to agree on about 90 % of 
the draft constitution.183 Two deputies coming from non-Islamist parties presented a 
similar perspective in my interviews. According to Mohamed Abdel Alim Dawoud, a 
deputy for the Wafd Party, by November 2012 there were no controversial issues 
related to the content of the constitution which could not be bridged.184 Mohamed 
Mohi El-Din who represented the Ghad Al-Thawra (Revolution’s Tomorrow) Party, 
argued that by mid-November 2012, “99 % of problems were already solved”.185 
Others, however, remained more sceptical. In a statement cited by the Ahram Online 
newspaper, the group of deputies that had withdrawn complained that “they lost any 
hope that the draft constitution gains consensus of all political forces or reflects 
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Egypt’s aspirations for building a functioning civilian democracy”.186   
Based on the analysis of debates in the CA as represented in the media, 
supplemented by interviews with several CA deputies, it is possible to conclude that, 
as in Tunisia, divisions between those drafting the constitution centred on religion-
related articles. Still, it initially seemed as if the debate about the incorporation of 
sharia in the constitution’s text had not stirred much emotion. Egyptian society was 
seen as more conservative than the Tunisian one, and the 1971 Constitution mirrored 
this tendency (Masoud, 2014, pp. 133-42). Under President Sadat in 1980, an 
amendment to Article 2 of the constitution replaced milder wording that principles of 
sharia were “a main source of legislation” with “the main source of legislation,” giving 
sharia’s principles, at least on paper, a more important role. Matters of personal status, 
including issues such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance were very much shaped by 
principles of sharia (Brown, 2012a). As a liberal politician, Amr Hamzawy, put it, 
prior to the revolution, the “unspoken consensus” on Article 2 was that it was not an 
important political problem for either the MB or secularists.187 Reviewing the 2011 
electoral platforms of non-Islamist parties, Masoud (2014, p. 140) showed that the 
Wafd Party, FEP, and even the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party (known as 
Tagammu) embraced the wording of Article 2 of the 1980 Constitution. This indicates 
that early into the transition, the consensus was still holding.  
Nevertheless, cracks in this position began to appear after the January 2011 
revolution. On the one hand, some among the liberals and leftists sought to diminish 
the role of sharia. Salafists, on the other, wanted to tweak the previously vague 
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wording of Article 2 or to add to it, hoping to stop the practice whereby the legislative 
accord with sharia was guaranteed by the constitution but the application of this 
principle was limited by its interpretation by the courts (Al-Ali, 2012; Lombardi and 
Brown, 2012; Brown, 2012a).188 The pressure exerted, especially by Salafists, 
suggested that the status quo on Article 2 was increasingly difficult to maintain: “We 
collectively invented that debate [on sharia]”, commented Hamzawy and “…once you 
invent it, you’ve got to position yourself, and the positioning led to radical arguments. 
And, so, the Article 2 was no longer out of discussion… [The] unspoken consensus 
on ‘let the Article 2 be as it is’ was shattered away”.189  
According to experts on constitutional law and Egyptian politics, Lombardi 
and Brown (2012), the newly added Article 219 which stirred controversy, as it 
specified what the principles of sharia meant, emerged as a by-product of the previous 
unsuccessful efforts by Salafists and non-Islamists to amend the wording of Article 2. 
The authors saw the final outcome as an “odd compromise” between Salafists and 
non-Islamists. It consisted of keeping Article 2 unchanged and adding Article 219. In 
addition, another article gave the scholars from Al-Azhar, the state-controlled 
religious authority, a vaguely defined role in interpreting “matters related to Islamic 
Sharia”. Salafists, unhappy with the interpretation of sharia by courts, were content 
that Article 2 was defined. Non-Islamists, meanwhile, “had to content themselves that 
if the Islamic Sharia’s principles were being defined, at least they were not being 
handed to Salafis” in terms of following their preferred interpretation (Lombardi and 
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Brown, 2012). In line with this narrative, a deputy for the secular-leaning Wafd Party 
told me that non-Islamists and even delegates representing the Church in the CA 
agreed with the solution, which remained problematic especially for Salafists.190 In 
contrast, Amr Hamzawy who had previously withdrawn from the Assembly argued 
that non-Islamists were “trying up to the very end to get the Article 219 out, but it was 
too late”, adding that “once you get 219, there was no consensus anymore, and so the 
process exploded”.191 The extent to which these articles were problematic to different 
parties and individual politicians coming from the heterogeneous non-Islamist camp, 
therefore, remains an open question.  
In either case, it appears that in the disagreement about the role, and 
interpretation, of sharia, which simmered especially between non-Islamists and 
Salafist deputies, the FJP played a marginal role. The party initially sided with non-
Islamists, preferring to retain the wording of Article 2 as stipulated in the old 
constitution and did not wish to add to it.192 Information that we have about the 
negotiations in the CA, and from qualitative interviews, leave us with the impression 
that the FJP was keen to compromise on the text of the constitution. It is also clear that 
it was willing to mediate between the antagonistic camps of the Salafists and non-
Islamists.193  
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The FJP’s pragmatism was most probably driven by the motivation to have the 
constitution adopted as soon as possible in order to minimize the period of uncertainty 
during transition. The party initially promised that the constitution would be finalized 
before the presidential elections to prevent the scenario, feared by their opponents, 
that a new president would be elected without clearly-defined boundaries to his 
powers. They also had to take into consideration the interim constitutional framework 
defined by the Constitutional Declaration that the SCAF had fashioned in March 2011, 
which required the constitution to be adopted within six months following the CA’s 
selection.194 Perhaps the most pressing issue for the FJP was the need to respond to 
the legal controversy that over shadowed the very existence of the CA. The Supreme 
Administrative Court, which had continued to postpone its final verdict since June 
2012, could have decided, at any time, to cut the Assembly’s term short. The same 
court had suspended the first Constituent Assembly in April 2012, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 6. This haste is apparent in President Morsi’s statement from November 2012: 
“We don’t have a parliament now… We don’t have a constitution now. That [situation 
is] urging us, pushing people to finish this but in some sort of stable climate and 
situation so people can go and vote on the constitution. We want to finish it”.195 
Leading FJP’s members maintained that remaining differences could be settled by the 
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new parliament once the constitution was formally adopted.196 As Lombardi and 
Brown (2012) aptly put it: “Brotherhood members in the Constituent Assembly 
focused… on simply getting a text – any text – in front of the voters.” 
Apart from religion-related articles, divisions revolved particularly around 
rights and freedoms, and women’s rights which non-Islamists wanted to see 
strengthened.197 The fact that these elements of the constitution were not adjusted to 
accommodate the preferences of non-Islamists figured in their justifications of their 
withdrawal from the CA in November 2012, and their disapproval of the constitution 
overall.  
In contrast, articles pertaining to the form of the government seem to have 
proved less problematic. According to experts, available media coverage, and 
qualitative interviews, the forces of the anti-Mubarak coalition converged on curbing 
the powers of the president and establishing a semi-presidential system (Auf, 2012; 
Al-Ali, 2012).198 For example, writing in September 2012, two months before the 
adoption of the constitution, Egyptian constitutional expert, Auf (2012), was 
perplexed by the consensus among Egyptian politicians, including the CA members, 
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to “implement a mixed presidential-parliamentarian system of government”, which 
he, an opponent of a mixed system, saw as misguided. While there remained 
differences among individual members of the political parties on the concrete 
stipulations, such as the president’s prerogative to appoint judges, these issues were 
not identified by the deputies as being motivating factors for leaving the body tasked 
with drafting the constitution (Revkin and Auf, 2012, pp.5-6).199  
 
Final Rupture: Constitutional Declaration  
While the November withdrawals provided a backdrop to disruption, the actual 
“torpedo” that, as one of my interviewees expressed it, undermined the agreement on 
the constitution was the controversial Constitutional Declaration produced by 
President Morsi on 22 November 2012.200 The declaration was, more than likely, a 
reaction to the political situation in which the boycott by the non-Islamists of the CA, 
combined with the anticipated court ruling against the drafting body, posed a serious 
threat to its existence.201 The document allowed Morsi to replace the public prosecutor, 
widely criticized for failing to win cases against Hosni Mubarak and his cronies, and 
to order their retrials. More importantly, it postponed by two months the deadline by 
which the CA should come up with a completed constitution, as demanded by the 
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deputies who had withdrawn.202 The real sticking point from its critic’s perspective, 
however, was that it immunized the constitutional process from judicial review, in 
effect granting the president, who already possessed both legislative and executive 
prerogatives, powers over the courts (Brown, 2013a, p. 9).203 
FJP’s secular opponents in the anti-authoritarian coalition viewed the 
declaration as “totalitarian”, arguing its release represented a turning point in the 
production of the constitution and ultimately the transition process.204 Had Morsi not 
issued the controversial declaration, claimed a deputy for the liberal Wafd Party, his, 
and other parties, might have returned to the CA. However, it was impossible to ignore 
because the document “gave all powers to the president”, undermining “any efforts to 
establish democracy”.205 The declaration provided the fiercer critics among the FJP’s 
opponents with an excuse “to interrupt all the constitutional process” where Islamists 
controlled the majority.206 It was also an opportunity to resolve to an open 
confrontation with the ruling party and its unpopular president ahead of the 
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parliamentary elections that were supposed to follow the adoption of the constitution. 
As the leader of the liberal FEP, the party that withdrew from the CA early on, put it: 
“I think the decree helped us a lot. (…) You can’t just boycott them for no reason.”207  
The declaration was the final straw that definitively ended all prospects for a 
continuation of constitutional negotiations and, ultimately, for agreement. Wary of the 
potential ruling against the CA and motivated not to prolong the transition any further, 
the FJP moved to finish the constitution in spite of the absence of non-Islamists. 
Neither the fact that Morsi quickly renounced the declaration after being confronted 
with large popular protests, nor the promise to adjust the text of the constitution after 
its approval, appeased the FJP’s adversaries (Dunne and Hamzawi, 2017, pp. 20-1). 
Non-Islamists of the anti-Mubarak coalition took Morsi’s declaration as final proof 
that it was impossible to negotiate with the FJP,208 and used the occasion to 
delegitimize the controversial constitution-making process as well as its product. 
However, while “one ‘last straw’ may be necessary to break a camel’s back”, it might 
not “contribute as much to the outcome as the bales of straw that preceded it” (George 
and Bennett, 2004, p. 27). We should, therefore, not overstate the impact that the 
declaration, of itself, had on producing the overall disagreement, which also came 
about because of procedural and content-related conflicts between parties of the anti-
Mubarak coalition.   
 
5.2.2 Summary 
Analysis revealed how the overall constitutional disagreement in Egypt, which 
manifested itself most tangibly during the popular referendum on the constitution in 
                                               
 
207 Author Interview with Ahmed Said, 12 August 2014, Cairo.  
208 Author Interview with Ahmed Said, 12 August 2014, Cairo. 
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December 2012, came into being. The major differences between those drafting the 
constitution from across parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition did not stem from 
different views as to the form of new macro-political institutions but, rather, as in 
Tunisia, revolved around the role of religion in the constitutional order and the 
principles of sharia and its interpretation, as well as around rights and freedoms, and 
women’s rights. These issues opened a schism, not so much between the FJP and non-
Islamist parties of the coalition, but by putting non-Islamist parties and conservative 
Islamists of the Salafi current, whose preferences for the constitution were more 
diametrically opposed, at odds with each other. While there were, certainly, 
differences between the FJP and non-Islamists, it seems that these were not 
insurmountable, thanks partially to FJP pragmatism.  
What, however, did divide the FJP and secularists was the design of the 
constitution-making process. Among the motivations identified by deputies who 
resigned their CA membership in November 2012 were serious complaints about the 
CA’s composition, which was seen as unrepresentative because of the Islamists 
majority. Non-Islamists also disputed the narrow margin needed to approve the 
constitution, the role of the special committees, and the CA’s tight deadline for 
finalizing the constitution. These issues might have been resolved were it not for the 
political context. The combination of the first CA and the lower chamber of Parliament 
both having been recently dissolved, the possibility that the Supreme Administrative 
Court would dissolve the second CA, an action that it was actively considering, 
and SCAF’s continuing direct involvement in politics, all likely led to a situation in 
which the FJP concluded that its best course was to conclude the constitution-making 
process as speedily as possible. This, in turn, meant ignoring their opponents’ 
demands. Despite, perhaps, not being politically sophisticated, it is against this 
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backdrop that the release of Morsi’s controversial Constitutional Declaration, which 
undermined the prospects for constitutional agreement, should be understood.  
 
5.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has probed the two different outcomes of constitution change processes 
that were underway in Egypt and Tunisia following the popular protests that ousted 
Presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali in 2011. In Tunisia, on the one hand, the constitution-
making process that began with the popular election of the National Constituent 
Assembly in October 2011, concluded in January 2014 with agreement on the new 
constitution by parties across the anti-Ben Ali coalition, both secularist and Islamist. 
On the other hand, when the Constituent Assembly approved the new charter in Egypt 
in November 2012, five months after the process started in June of the same year, it 
faced vigorous opposition from non-Islamist parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition who 
had previously left the drafting body in protest. The approach taken by this thesis is 
that we should understand these overall (dis)agreements not as one-off moments, but 
as composed of the individual contentious issues.    
 The empirical analysis demonstrated that, in both cases, the elements of the 
constitutions that proved most difficult upon which to reach a consensus related to 
religion-state relationships and the status, and in Egypt also the interpretation, of 
Islamic sharia. Another difficult aspect of the new charters were articles pertaining to 
rights and freedoms, and women’s rights in particular. It is difficult to assess whether 
divisions on these issues were more prevalent in Egypt. Even though protagonists of 
constitutional change tackled similar problems, their understanding of these issues 
differed simply because negotiations about them developed within different cultural, 
political, and historical contexts. This point could be seen in the debate about sharia, 
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where those drafting in the two countries faced different starting points. In Egypt, 
sharia was already part of the constitutional order before the revolution and secularists 
and Islamists initially agreed it should remain so. In contrast, sharia was not 
specifically mentioned in the previous Tunisian charter, and when some of Ennahda’s 
deputies sought to change the status quo, they faced outrage from non-Islamist parties 
and civil society in general. What can be said is that these issues were among the most 
important and, at the same time, proved difficult to negotiate in both the countries. In 
addition, while in Tunisia drafters also struggled to agree on the configuration of 
executive-legislative relations, this issue caused surprisingly little trouble in Egypt. 
Contrary to the democratization literature that anticipates the development of 
conflicts, especially regarding the design of macro-political institutions of the new 
regime, this chapter shows that in countries divided along a religious line, identity and 
religion-related aspects of the constitution can lead to as many, if not more, conflicts. 
 In Egypt, as in Tunisia, struggles over the content of the constitution, along 
with other problems, led non-Islamist parties to leave the main constitution-making 
bodies. However, in Tunisia, smaller secularist parties returned to the NCA in autumn 
2013 as they were given more say over the text, and they were able to increasingly 
amend it to reflect their preferences. Their counterparts in Egypt were less successful 
in this regard. This was partially because of the wider political context, and partially 
because conservative Salafist parties were able to polarize the discussions about the 
constitution, while conservative Islamist forces in the Tunisian NCA remained 
marginal players in the process.  
 Finally, this chapter shows that constitution-making processes and 
constitutional agreement cannot be seen in isolation. The wide nature of the approval 
of the constitution by the Tunisian NCA was interlinked with the package of deals that 
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involved the resignation of the Ennahda-led government, the timing and the sequence 
of the subsequent legislative and presidential polls, and election of members to the 
independent election-monitoring committee. In Egypt, constitution-making process 
that developed in the CA was affected by the controversial Constitutional Declaration 
produced by President Morsi in November 2012. These examples remind us that 
constitution-making is only one area of contest between rival political parties during 
democratization, and that constitutional change progresses against a backdrop of wider 
struggles over political power. 
The next chapter, Chapter 6, explores constitution-making design and its 
inclusivity. It addresses the question of whether inclusive design can foster 
constitutional agreement, and whether it can help to explain the different outcomes 






Constitution-making Design and Inclusiveness 
 
How inclusive were the constitution-making designs that guided the writing of the 
new constitutions in Tunisia and Egypt after the 2010/11 uprisings? Did the processes 
guarantee that all the important political parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions 
were present at the negotiation table? What influence did parties across the coalition 
have on shaping the text of the constitution? Did the design of the constitution-making 
processes facilitate the sharing and spread of power of an individual party over the 
content or, conversely, did it make it easy for the stronger Islamist parties to have 
things their own way? In Chapter 1, I showed that the principle of inclusiveness has 
featured among the “best practices” recommended globally in constitution-making by 
international organizations involved in the promotion of democracy and peace-
building. It has also received attention by observers of constitution change processes 
in Egypt and Tunisia, and by local politicians, who saw inclusiveness as a key to the 
adoption of widely accepted constitutions after the revolutions that ousted 
authoritarian Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak. We have seen in the previous chapter 
(Chapter 5) that while the charter approved by the Tunisian National Constituent 
Assembly in January 2014 was embraced by both Ennahda and secular-leaning 
opposition parties, the document adopted by the Egyptian Constituent Assembly in 
November 2012 only exacerbated polarization along religious lines. This chapter 
assesses the design of constitution-making processes in Egypt and Tunisia, and asks 




The chapter first identifies the main formal and informal channels where 
constitutional negotiations took place. It measures their formal and substantive 
inclusivity across three stages of constitution-making: convening, debating, and 
approval. In contrast to formal inclusiveness, which accounts merely for the party’s 
membership in the constitution-making channel, the degree of substantive 
inclusiveness depends on the party’s capacity to impact on the constitution. Of course, 
not all parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition were in the same position to shape the 
text. Some of them attracted more electoral support than others. Constitution-making 
design might not guarantee that all parties would shape the constitution to an equal 
extent. However, a design that promotes substantive inclusion would aspire to protect 
the interests of even weaker players, and to prevent a situation in which a “temporary 
majority” could push through its preferred text against the agreement of a minority 
(see Chapter 3).  
 In considering the convening stage of constitution-making process, the 
question is asked within this chapter whether the number of seats that parties were 
assigned in the constitution-making channels was proportional to their electoral 
popularity, and whether or not smaller parties were significantly underrepresented, or 
conversely the larger parties overrepresented. Moving on to the debating stage, it 
investigates the internal organization of the constituent assemblies, assessing whether 
it helped to strengthen the voice of smaller parties in negotiations, or suppressed their 
influence. Finally, at the approval stage, I ask and answer the question whether the 
size of the majority required for passing the entire constitution was larger than a simple 
majority, 50% plus one, and whether weaker parties could rely on safeguarding 
mechanisms such as a referendum. In addition, gauging perceived inclusivity, the 
chapter investigates how parties themselves viewed constitution-making design.  
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The chapter begins with discussion of the Tunisian case followed by that of 
Egypt, and closes by drawing comparisons. It finds that while the designs put in place 
in Egypt and Tunisia were formally inclusive, bringing all the important parties of the 
anti-authoritarian coalitions to the negotiation table, they differed in the extent to 
which they promoted substantive inclusion. The Tunisians began the process not only 
with a considerable substantively inclusive design, but they also altered the design 
during the last phase of the process, granting smaller parties a significant influence 
over the text. In contrast, in Egypt, the ability of smaller parties to shape the 
constitution was hindered, primarily by the low majority necessary to adopt the 
constitution. These differences in inclusiveness encouraged compromise in Tunisia, 
while making it easier for stronger Islamist parties in Egypt to approve the new charter 
against the will of weaker non-Islamists. Finally, the chapter shows that although 
formal inclusion can potentially have a positive impact on the process of agreeing on 
the new constitution, what parties really seek, and what their conflicts are about, is the 
ability to influence the text.     
 
6.1 Increasingly Inclusive Constitution-making Design in Tunisia   
The constitution-making design followed by those drafting the document in Tunisia 
was formally and substantively inclusive, and changes to the design later in the 
processes further boosted the ability of smaller, secularist parties to shape the 
constitution. Below, I outline the main constitution-making channels, which creates a 
basis for a more detailed analysis of constitution-making design inclusiveness, which 
I undertake next. The NCA was elected in popular polls in October 2011. This was 
nine months after President Ben Ali flew to Saudi Arabia following mounting public 
unrest that had been sparked in December 2010 by the death of Tarak Bouazizi, a 
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street vendor from the country’s impoverished interior. The debates on the constitution 
were then launched in February 2012, after NCA deputies adopted rules of procedure 
which organized their work. A closer look reveals that even though the NCA 
maintained a tight grip over the production of the constitution, negotiations proceeded 
through a variety of formal and informal channels that emerged both from within and 
outside of the Assembly’s scope.  
 
6.1.1 Main Constitution-making Channels  
This section tracks those constitution-making channels throughout the constitution 
change process that developed between 2011 and 2014, and explains their role and the 
context in which they emerged. It also highlights what key individual agreements, 
which I identified in Chapter 5 as building blocks of the overall constitutional 
agreement, were reached in these venues. The analysis draws on qualitative 
interviews, reports on the constitution-making process produced by international 
organizations, especially the Carter Center and the UNDP, and secondary literature.  
 
Constituent Commissions 
The major arena for constitutional negotiations between February 2012 and April 
2013, established from within the NCA, were constituent commissions. It was there 
that the deputies from different parties discussed the details of constitutional 
provisions, consulted experts, dealt with disagreements, and voted to pass the wording 
of articles that the majority of the members of the commission favoured. Each of the 
six commissions covered one of the core sections of the constitution: (1) rights and 
freedoms; (2) legislative and executive powers and the relationship between them; (3) 
preamble, fundamental principles and constitutional review; (4) regional and local 
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public authorities; (5) constitutional bodies; and, finally, (6) judicial, administrative, 
financial and constitutional justice.209 The plan was that the individual sections 
produced by the commissions would then be combined into one draft by a coordinating 
body, the Joint Drafting Committee (JDC), before being presented to the whole 
Assembly for additional changes and ultimate approval. The membership of the 22-
member commissions was allocated to parliamentary blocs and independents in 
proportion to their share of NCA seats.210 The only exception to this rule seems, on 
first inspection, to be Aridha Chaabia, which with 12 % of seats in the NCA claimed 
only 4.5 % of members in each commission. However, by this point the party had 
started to crumble and its members were crossing the floor to join other parties or 
blocs, or sitting as independents. This drain led to the marginalization of the party 
(Chapter 4). The leadership of each commission was assigned based on relative 
weighting of each bloc.211 This meant that Ennahda, who had been the victors in the 
2011 elections, maintained a leading position at the commission level (see Table 4).  
 
 
                                               
 
209 See Marsad, “L’Assemblée”, Al-Bawsala, available at: 
https://majles.marsad.tn/fr/assemblee/commissions [accessed 23 August 2018].  
210 See Article 42 of the NCA Rules of Procedure. ConstitutionNet, “The Tunisian National 
Constituent Assembly. Rules of Procedure”, International IDEA, 16 December 2011, available at: 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/constituent_assemblys_rules_of_procedure_-
_english-final.pdf [accessed 27 August 2018].   
211 The leadership positions in the six commissions included: Chair, Vice-Chair, Rapporteur, and two 
Assistant Rapporteurs. For instance, Ennahda nominated three of the Chairs of the 22-member 
commissions, the same number as the CPR, Ettakatol, and the opposition Democratic Bloc combined. 
See Bsili, A., “Beginning and organization of the work of the constituent committees”, UNDP, 
Constitution in Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016, available at: 
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/Compendium%20English/Part%202/12%20Ad
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Numbers           % 
Ennahda 89 41 9 40.9 7 43.8 5+1** 26 
Democratic 
Bloc 
30 13.8 3 13.6 2 12.5 3 13 
CPR 29 13.4 3 13.6 4 25 2 8.7 
Ettakatol  22 9.2 2 9.1 2 12.5 2+1*** 13 
Freedom and 
democracy 
13 5.9 1 4.5 - - - - 
Freedom and 
dignity 
12 5.5 1 4.5 - - 2 8.7 
Aridha 
Chaabia 
26 12 1**** 4.5 - - 1 4.3 
Independents 
(no bloc) 
11 5 1 4.5 1 6.25 1 4.3 
Al-Wafa - - - - - - 1 4.3 
PF - - - - - - 1 4.3 
Democratic 
Alliance 
- - - - - - 1 4.3 
Nidaa Tounes - - - - - - 1 4.3 
Movement for 
the Republic 
- - - - - - 1 4.3 
Total 217  22  16  23  
 
Table 4. Distribution of seats in the main constitution-making channels in 
Tunisia*  
Source: Brownlee et al. (2015, pp. 140-1); Carter Center (2014, pp. 32-3, p.47); Marsad 
(n.d.).    
* The distribution of seats among parties at constituent commissions is accurate as for the 
time of the commissions’ creation – since some of their members changed their party 
allegiance, the picture might have changed slightly.   
** In addition to 5 Ennahda members, the CC included the General Rapporteur of the 
constitution, Ennahda’s Habib Khedher. The percentage in the next column is calculated 
with taking Khedher into account.  
*** Apart from 2 Ettakatol members, the CC was headed by the NCA President, Mustapha 
Ben Jaafar from Ettakatol. The percentage in the next column is counted with taking Ben 
Jaafar into account.   
**** After a number of resignations took place in November 2011 and hence before the 
constituent commissions were formed, Aridha Chaabia’s number of deputies went down 




Spring 2013 Phase of the National Dialogue 
In April 2013, one year and a half after the elections, pressures were mounting on the 
NCA to conclude its work. While the Assembly was not legally bound to produce the 
constitution by a specific date, Ennahda’s opponents lost no opportunity to remind the 
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government about a “gentlemen’s agreement” among political parties from September 
2011, in which they agreed to restrict the lifespan of the NCA to one year.212 The head 
of the opposition Democratic Bloc, Mohammed Al-Hamdi, expressed the view that, 
“The legitimacy of the Assembly was challenged once the first year of its term had 
ended.”213 Behind this statement lay the fear felt by some opponents of the government 
that the interim period would be gradually prolonged, with the government unwilling 
to cede power.214 That the political divide between Islamists and their secular 
opponents was growing was exemplified in the formation of Nidaa Tounes, a party 
project which sought to unite secular forces to counterbalance Ennahda.  
The worsening security situation added to the overall complexity of the 
negotiations. The second half of 2012 saw an activist from Nidaa Tounes killed during 
a clash with followers of the League for the Protection of the Revolution (LPR) and 
the latter’s conflict with members of the Tunisian labour union, UGTT.215 LPR 
members formed increasingly militant neighbourhood organizations during the 
revolution to fill the security vacuum, and which were generally suspected by the 
opposition to have links to Ennahda (Gobe and Chouikha, 2014, p. 2). Tensions 
                                               
 
212 Essebsi, B.C. “Tunisie. Béji Caïd Essebsi monte au créneau et appele á rectifier le tir”, Global Net, 
26 January 2012, available at: http://www.gnet.tn/temps-fort/tunisie-beji-caid-essebsi-monte-au-
creneau-et-appelle-a-rectifier-le-tir/id-menu-325.html [accessed 27 August 2018].   
213 See El-Hamdi, M., “Dissolving tensions between the groups and resuming the work of the 
Constituent Assembly. The Transitional experiment in Tunisia: between conflict and agreement”, 
UNDP, Constitution in Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016, available at: 
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/Compendium%20English/Part%202/24%20Mo
hamed%20El%20Hamdi%20EN.pdf [accessed 27 August 2018].  
214 Author Interview with Mohamed Fadhel Mahfoudh, head of the Tunisian Order of Lawyers. Tunis, 
15 December 2016.  
215 Reuters Staff, “Secular politician killed in southern Tunisia clashes”, Reuters, 18 October 2012, 
available at: https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E8LIN9E20121018 [accessed 27 
August 2018].  
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reached a peak when a vocal leftist figure, Chokri Belaid, was assassinated by 
unknown assailants in February 2013.216 Faced with protests and criticism, Ennahda 
and its coalition partners reshuffled the cabinet and offered several key ministerial 
positions to non-partisans (Gobe and Chouikha, 2014, pp. 3-5), although this was 
deemed insufficient by the opposition who demanded that a technocrat government 
replace the Troika. The new Prime Minister, Ennahda’s Ali Larayedh, then promised 
to hold parliamentary elections before the end of 2013 (Carter Center, 2014, p. 27). 
The announcement created a tight deadline for the completion of the constitution-
making process which had to precede the national vote.  
To speed things up, and to prevent the political crisis from escalating further, 
informal deliberations, so called national dialogues, took place outside the NCA. With 
regard to the text of the constitution, the most important of these dialogues was the 
one mediated by President Marzouki between April and May 2013. The negotiation 
involved all government partners, Ennahda, CPR, and Ettakatol, but only some of the 
opposition parties. While Al-Jomhouri and Democratic Alliance participated, the PF 
and Al-Massar decided not to join, and Nidaa Tounes withdrew after the first session 
(Gobe and Chouikha, 2014, p. 7). Nevertheless, the negotiations presented 
breakthroughs on several disputed issues, particularly concerning the political system. 
It was during this dialogue that participants, including Ennahda, agreed to assign 
substantial powers to the president (see Chapter 5). Despite the fact that it run 
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externally to the NCA, the agreements struck during this dialogue made its way into 
the draft constitution prepared by the JDC.217        
 
Joint Drafting Committee  
Parallel to the spring 2013 phase of the National Dialogue, the CA’s Joint Drafting 
Committee worked on assembling the individual chapters of the constitution that had 
been produced by the constituent commissions. The JDC was supposed to review 
them, in conjunction with experts, before presenting the whole document to the NCA 
for the final discussion and voting. However, because the commissions were, at that 
time, still caught up in debates over a number of contentious points, articles still the 
subject of disagreement were left out entirely or included but with ambiguous or 
competing sections. To enhance the JDC’s capacity to harmonize the drafts produced 
by six different constituent commissions that employed various drafting styles, the 
NCA enacted changes to its by-laws. The new formulation charged the JDC with 
preparing the final draft of the constitution “based on the work of the commissions” 
(Carter Center 2014, p. 37, emphasis added by the author). While this might have been 
necessary to give the JDC effective tools to pull the numerous sections into one 
coherent document, the ambiguous wording foreshadowed future conflicts about the 
JDC’s role in shaping the text. In particular, it was unclear to what extent the 
committee had the authority to modify the drafts submitted to it.218 This was 
problematic because the JDC membership followed a different principle to the 
                                               
 
217 Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, NCA deputy who represented Ettakatol in the spring phase of 
the national dialogue, 8 October 2015, Tunis.  
218 Bsili, A., “Beginning and organization of the work of the constituent committees”, UNDP, 
Constitution in Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016. 
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constituent commissions in assigning seats. Bringing together top NCA figures in 
charge of the constitution, including the General Rapporteur, the NCA President, and 
the heads of each of the constituent commissions, resulted in the make up being 
favourable to the government forces (see Table 4).  
When the JDC released the fourth, and final, draft of the constitution on 1 June 
2013 and presented it to the NCA for discussion, it stirred up controversy. Many of 
the opposition deputies, but also the Ettakatol and CPR members, rejected it, arguing 
that it was not an accurate reflection of the work they had done at the commission 
level.219 They accused the JDC, and especially the constitution’s General Rapporteur, 
Ennahda’s Habib Khedher, of overstepping their prerogatives and manipulating the 
content. An opposition deputy complained that the JDC was a “black box” to other 
deputies, who “did not know what went on there”.220 The case went as far as 70 
deputies filing a lawsuit against the JDC actions at the Administrative Tribunal, which, 
however, refused to examine the case due to its lack of jurisdiction (Carter Center, 
2014, p. 38).  
 
Consensus Commission and the Quartet-led National Dialogue 
To diffuse the tensions, the NCA’s President announced the formation of an ad-hoc 
body composed of NCA deputies, the Consensus Commission (CC). Mustafa Ben 
                                               
 
219 Author Interview with Salma Baccar, deputy for Al-Massar (30 June 2016, Tunis), and with Ikbel 
Msadaa, from CPR (9 November 2016, Tunis).  
220 This view was expressed by Rym Mahjoub, a NCA deputy representing Afek Tounes, in her 
contribution to the UNDP report on the Tunisian constitution-making process. Mahjoub, R., “From 
division to consensus: The role and the contribution of the Consensus Committee”, UNDP, 
Constitution of Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016, available at: 
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/Compendium%20English/Part%202/25%20Ry
m%20Mahjoub%20EN.pdf [accessed 28 August 2018].  
213 
 
Jaafar explained that this step was meant to accelerate the constitutional process and 
“resolve the contentious questions revealed by the opposition in relation to the 1 June 
project” (Geisser, 2014, p. 173). The composition of the CC more faithfully reflected 
the NCA’s outlook one year and a half into its existence, with an array of new or 
transformed political forces, and was consequently fit for purpose. Ennahda retained 
the strongest voice in the new body, but given its share of seats in the NCA and other 
constituent commissions, it was in fact underrepresented (Table 4).  
However, as another breaking event hit, the on-going conflicts about the length 
of the NCA’s term, the controversial constitutional draft, and the resignation of the 
Troika government, culminated in a fully-fledged crisis. This event was an 
assassination of a member of the left wing Popular Front coalition and an NCA deputy, 
Mohamed Brahmi, who was killed in front of his home in Tunis on 25 July, 
approximately six months after Belaid’s assassination.221 The incident resulted in an 
even greater degree of polarization between Islamists and their secular-leaning 
opponents. The crisis developed shortly after people in nearby Egypt took to the streets 
in large numbers to protest the FJP’s political leadership. The protests, which were 
followed by a military intervention and the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi, 
further stirred the political climate in Tunisia, where some of Ennahda’s critics argued 
that it was also time for the Tunisian Islamist party to leave power.222    
 Crucially, Brahmi’s death put the long-contested question of the NCA’s 
legitimacy squarely on the agenda. In its aftermath, around 60 disenchanted opposition 
                                               
 
221 BBC, “Tunisian politician Mohamed Brahmi assassinated”, 25 July 2013, available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23452979 [accessed 28 August 2018].   
222 Weslaty, L., “Destitution de Morsi en Égypt: réactions mitigées en Tunisie”, Counterpoints, 6 July 
2013, available at: https://www.contrepoints.org/2013/07/06/130072-destitution-morsi-reactions-
tunisie [accessed 28 August 2018].  
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deputies withdrew from the body and, backed by civil society, launched a sit-in in 
front of its headquarters in the Bardo neighbourhood of Tunis (see Chapter 5). 
Additional protests erupted elsewhere in Tunis and other cities. The opposition called 
for the Ennahda-led government, which they saw as responsible for the worsening 
security situation, to step down. However, some of Ennahda’s opponents went even 
further. The newly formed National Salvation Front coalition that united Nidaa 
Tounes with Al-Massar and the Popular Front demanded the scrapping of the NCA, 
whose mandate they saw as having expired a long time previously.223 As a member of 
Nidaa Tounes told me, “I thought it lasted more than a year and had no more 
legitimacy in that context. We would have to find a way to organize elections as soon 
as possible.”224  
On the other side stood Ennahda, defending the NCA’s legitimacy on the basis 
of a popular vote and mobilizing its followers to protect it (Gobe and Chouikha, 2014, 
pp. 9-11). Members of the other two government parties remained in the NCA, 
together with some independent MPs. Despite the fact that the possibility of a military 
intervention was generally seen as unrealistic, the fear that Tunisia could follow the 
Egyptian model, in the sense that the confrontation between the two camps could end 
in violence, was a sentiment shared by most of my interviewees.225 It was in that 
                                               
 
223 See Tunisia Live, “NCA member Mohamed Brahmi Assassinated”, 25 July 2013, available at: 
http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/25/nca-member-mohamed-brahmi-assassinated/ [accessed 12 
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224 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 6 June 2014, Tunis.  
225 Author Interviews with Mahmoud Ben Romdhanne (Nidaa Tounes, 8 December 2016, Tunis); 
Samir Taïb (Al-Massar, 2 October 2015, Tunis); and Mohamed Fadhel Mahfoudh (Tunisian Order of 
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atmosphere, on 6 August, that the NCA’s President and Ettakatol’s leader Ben Jaafar 
completely suspended the Assembly’s work. The coming months were characterized 
by unceasing popular mobilization and a suspension of constitution-related talks 
(Geisser, 2014, p. 181).   
While protestors repeatedly occupied the Bardo square throughout the summer 
of 2013, various negotiators sought to bring the antagonistic parties to the negotiating 
table. Most successful of these was the Quartet, formed of the heads of four national 
civil society organizations, each with historical significance and representative of 
different societal interests. Those were the workers syndicate (UGTT), the Tunisian 
Human Rights League, also known as LTDH, the bar association, that is the Tunisian 
Order of Lawyers, and the trade association advocating for employers, through the 
Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts, known as UTICA. It was 
by coming together that these organizations could be accepted as non-partial mediators 
by all sides (Haugbølle et al., 2017, p. 31).  
During this phase of the national dialogue, political forces tackled three 
problematic issues. They set the timeframe for the ending of the Troika government 
and discussed the cabinet that would replace it, established the calendar for the coming 
presidential and legislative elections, debated electoral law and the composition of the 
ISIE, and planned the constitution-making process. Ultimately, in October 2013, 
parties agreed that the constitution would be finalized from within the NCA.226 The 
ensuing roadmap was thus based on a compromise between the opposition that 
demanded that the Ennahda government stepped down, as well as Ennahda itself, 
                                               
 
226 See English translation of the Roadmap (Haugbølle et al. 2017: 43-5).  
216 
 
whose members rejected the NCA’s dissolution as a red line that could not be 
crossed.227  
Following the successful agreement on the roadmap, the Quartet-led National 
Dialogue continued with regular meetings between October 2013 and January 2014 
during which parties discussed details pertaining to the October deal. These talks 
brought together most of the major political forces in a highly inclusive setting. 
Participation in the dialogue was not assigned on the basis of parliamentary blocs, as 
in the case of the constituent commissions and the CC, but to individual parties. This 
meant that as many as 23 political parties with NCA representation228 participated and, 
significantly, were all granted an equal voice in decision-making. This format 
enhanced the voice of opposition parties while diminishing that of Ennahda. It also 
provided an opportunity for the Nidaa Tounes, an increasingly important secularist 
force that had only a few deputies in the NCA and who had joined the newly formed 
party after leaving their original groups, to exert its political influence through a 
recognized negotiation channel. However, four political parties with considerable 
representation in the NCA, the CPR, Aridha Chaabia, Wafa Movement, and the 
Democratic Current,229 were not involved in the negotiations as they chose not to 
participate (Haugbølle et al., 2017, p. 36).230 
                                               
 
227 Interview with Habib Khedher, Ennahda, 25 November 2016, Tunis.  
228 Due to the fluctuations in the party political landscape, the figure often differs from one source to 
another.  
229 The Democratic Current (Attayar Dimokrati) was created by former CPR deputy, Mohamed 
Abbou.  
230 However, a CPR deputy, Omar Chetoui, complained that while his party initially did reject any 
participation in the dialogue or the signing of the roadmap, it was then barred from joining the talks at 
the later stages, by which time they had changed their position (M’rad, 2015, p. 50).  
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The participants in the dialogue occasionally dealt with individual issues 
related to the substance of the constitution, but it was the CC, which resumed its work 
in December 2013, that was primarily responsible for resolving the remaining 
contentious issues in the draft. As one CC member put it, while the dialogue provided 
a general political direction, its members did not discuss “the [constitution’s] content 
and the formulations. The CC played a primary role”.231 The Quartet-led National 
Dialogue formed a new framework in which the CC operated. While the NCA, where 
Ennahda controlled most seats, continued as the main channel through which the 
constitution was negotiated, it was no longer the only, or even the most important, 
entity where political decisions were made. As progress in the dialogue negotiations 
and the work on the constitution in the NCA were closely interlinked, so also was the 
distribution of power during the dialogue relevant for the constitutional talks at the 
NCA. The distribution of power at the National Dialogue was more favourable to non-
Islamist parties than in the NCA, and even in the CC. This factor was also seen on 
those occasions when opposition deputies sought to push through their preferred 
wording to contentious articles through the CC by threatening Ennahda that they 
would raise those points at the National Dialogue level. As a deputy for the opposition 
Al-Massar party told me:  
 
When we couldn’t advance anymore [in the CC], we went to the 
dialogue. We would pass a word to the head of our party and the 
Quartet, and there were also constitutional experts who were very 
progressive and democratic, and who defended those issues even 
more. In the dialogue, the balance of power was better than here [in 
                                               
 
231 Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, NCA deputy from Ettakatol and CC member, 8 October 
2015. For a similar account, see M’rad (2015, pp. 86-7).  
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the NCA]. Here there was a situation of majority-minority, but 
there, each party, whatever number of deputies, had the same 
importance.232  
 
Otherwise, disputes over the constitution only rarely reached the National Dialogue.  
The CC continued to play the role of the major constitution-making channel 
until almost the end of the process.233 It served as an important channel for conflict 
resolution and for striking compromises wherever there appeared to be an 
insurmountable problem on individual articles of the constitution, which were 
presented to the plenary assembly for vote. It was in the CC that non-Islamist 
opposition parties managed to increase the power of any future president, tone down 
the overall religious language of the constitution, remove the controversial 
“unamendable principle” that positioned Islam as the religion of state and, instead, 
made sure that Articles 1 and 2, which guaranteed the civil nature of the state, could 
not be amended in the future (see Chapter 5). However, given its informal status, one 
of the most controversial questions the NCA had to tackle was how to ensure that all 
deputies, dispersed as they were, among the many political blocs and parties, voted in 
favour of the amendments proposed by the CC. Finally, deputies amended the NCA 
by-laws, which then stipulated that the amendments emanating from the CC were 
binding on all the political blocs (Carter Center, 2014, p. 42). While the wording was 
interpreted in various ways by the deputies, the Carter Center (2014, p. 44) report 
                                               
 
232 Author Interview with Salma Baccar, 30 June 2016, Tunis.  
233 The CC’s role began to diminish only towards the very end of the constitution-making process, 
when a similar responsibility was then taken on by the coordination meetings of the heads of the 
parliamentary blocs. Those meetings brought together representatives of all the major forces, along 
with the NCA President and the General Rapporteur (Carter Center, 2014, p. 45). 
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claims that they generally voted in line with its guidelines, which confirms the 
importance of the commission in securing the adoption of the constitution by widely 
disparate groups.234  
The analysis shows that there were three key channels through which the 
majority of the constitutional negotiations developed which were; (1) the six 
constituent commissions of the NCA that produced the first drafts of the individual 
chapters of the constitution; (2) the Joint Drafting Committee which assembled these 
drafts while at the same time amending the wording on some occasions; and (3) the 
Consensus Commission, which was responsible for resolving any remaining 
disagreements about constitutional articles that had arisen during the last phrase of the 
process.   
 
6.1.2 Formal, Substantive, and Perceived Inclusiveness   
I now turn to an evaluation of how inclusive, both formally and substantially, the 
constitution-making design was. I further account for the changes in substantive 
inclusiveness, by comparing the standing of the parties in the NCA’s constituent 
commissions to that in the new constitution-making channels created later in the 
process. The analysis demonstrates that constitution-making design was considerably 
inclusive to begin with, and that substantive inclusiveness progressively increased in 
the final year of the process with the introduction of the CC. To understand how 
protagonists of constitution change themselves evaluated inclusiveness, the final part 
                                               
 
234 This is not, however, to say that the deputies only rubber stamped the agreements reached at the 
CC. The voting on the articles led to several deadlocks, as some of the deputies refused to accept the 
pre-negotiated wording, or initiated new amendments (Carter Center, 2014, p. 44).  
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reviews their perceptions, demonstrating that what they cared for was, ultimately, 
shaping the text of the constitution.   
 
Formal Inclusiveness  
To assess formal inclusiveness, I ask whether all the major political parties of the anti-
Ben Ali coalition had members in the NCA, the main constitution-making body, or 
whether any of these parties was excluded from constitution-making by being denied 
membership. The NCA allowed for the inclusion of all the major political actors of 
the anti-Ben Ali coalition that I identified in Chapter 4, and was therefore formally 
inclusive. The only political players that were systematically excluded were figures 
from the former regime who had held government responsibility under Ben Ali or held 
positions within his ruling party, the RCD (Carter Center, 2011, p. 18). However, this 
is not of concern here.  
 
Substantive Inclusiveness 
Substantive inclusiveness, that is the influence that each political party had on shaping 
the constitution, depended on their electoral popularity, as well as on the constitution-
making design. To gauge this type of inclusiveness, I consider proportionality, internal 
organization of the NCA, the method by which the constitution was approved, and 
safeguarding mechanisms.  
Proportionality: To measure proportionality, I compare each party’s seat 
share in the NCA to the votes they won in the October 2011 polls. While exact 
proportionality is unlikely, I am interested especially in the question of whether or not 
smaller parties were significantly underrepresented, or the strongest party 
overrepresented. The NCA was popularly elected and proportionality was regulated 
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by the electoral system. Voters selected the 217 NCA deputies in one round by voting 
for closed lists in a proportional representation (PR) system where the distribution of 
seats was determined by the Hare Quota with Largest Reminders (HQLR). The 33 
electoral districts were medium sized, in most cases distributing 5 seats or more, with 
the maximum being 10 (Carey, 2013, p. 1, p. 4).  
 As a result of these electoral rules, while Ennahda, whose showing in the 2011 
elections was the strongest, claimed a seat bonus of 4 % above its vote share, it was 
not the largest such bonus (see Table 1). Carey (2013, p. 1) pointed out that the bonuses 
of smaller electoral alliances and parties were as large, or larger than, those won by 
Ennahda. This resulted in a situation where the most electorally popular party fell short 
of an overall majority in the NCA. Carey demonstrated that had a different 
proportional formula been used, the disproportionality of the electoral results would 
have been more significant. Using district-level data on the distribution of votes across 
lists, he simulated the election results using other commonly used techniques for 
converting votes into seats in proportional representation systems. If any of those 
techniques had been applied, Carey argued, Ennahda’s seat share would have been 
larger (2013, p. 1). The D’Hondt Divisor, which is a frequently used method, would 
have boosted Ennahda’s share to 69 % of seats, equipping the party with the two thirds 
majority necessary to pass the constitution (2013, p. 7).235 In contrast, the HLQR 
                                               
 
235 In most cases such election simulation should have been treated with caution, as with different 
electoral systems, the behaviour of voters, as well as parties seeking office, was prone to change. 
These caveats are less pressing in the Tunisian case. This is because, as Carey (2013) argued, the 
difference between the D’Hondt Divisor method used in the experiment and the applied Hare Quota 
with Largest Reminders, is difficult for voters as well as for parties to appreciate. More importantly, 
in the context of the first competitive elections that the country had experienced, it is more than likely 
that voters had not yet learned to factor in electoral systems into their electoral strategies.     
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method used for the 2011 NCA elections ensured that Ennahda received only 41 % of 
the seats in the Assembly, a highly proportional result.  
The number of deputies that each party had in the NCA would be irrelevant 
information unless we knew what they could do with their allocation. In other words, 
to assess substantive inclusiveness, we need to understand the NCA’s internal 
organization and the mechanisms for approving the constitution.  
Internal organization of the NCA: The six NCA constituent commissions 
oversaw the drafting of individual sections of the constitution and were, therefore, key 
to the production of the constitution until April 2013 when the JDC began to assemble 
the drafts they proposed. The membership in the 22-seat strong commissions was 
allocated to parliamentary blocs in proportion to their NCA seat share at the time of 
the commissions’ formation in February 2012.236 Leadership positions in the 
committees, too, were assigned to the blocs according to their overall NCA seat share. 
This, in turn, meant that most of those posts were in hands of the governing Troika 
coalition, and especially Ennahda. To enact decisions, for which a majority of 
members who were present was needed, Ennahda had to find the support of an 
additional three of the remaining 13 members,237 and thereby retained the upper hand 
at the commission level (Table 4). This was, however, a result of the party’s 
impressive showing in the 2011 elections, not because of any discrimination in its 
favour in the constitution-making rules. 
                                               
 
236 See Article 42 of the NCA Rules of Procedure. ConstitutionNet, “The Tunisian National 
Constituent Assembly. Rules of Procedure”, International IDEA, 16 December 2011. 
237 These figures are only relevant for the situation when all of the commission members were present 
at the session. 
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The only objection raised regarding the breakdown of the membership of the 
commissions was aimed against the composition of the JDC, a committee which was 
responsible for compiling the drafts of the constitution. This was because the 
governing Troika coalition was overrepresented on the committee. Ennahda controlled 
43.8 % of seats in the JDC, compared to 41 % in the NCA, and the bonuses of the 
CPR and Ettakatol were much more significant, with the CPR going from 13.4 % of 
seats in the NCA to 25 % in the JDC, and Ettakatol from 9.2 % to 12.5 % (Table 4).  
Approval mechanisms: Finally, substantive inclusiveness depends on the 
mechanisms used for the approval of the constitution. Deputies first voted on each 
article separately, and an absolute majority was needed for approval. Only then could 
the NCA vote on the entire draft, which required the support of a two thirds majority 
if it was to pass. In a situation where such a majority was not found, a second reading 
had to take place within one month, at the end of which a two thirds majority was once 
again required. If that level of majority was yet again not reached, a referendum was 
to follow. In such a case, the constitution then would have been adopted if it garnered 
the support of the majority of the voters.238 As projected, the referendum, at best, 
provided a weak safeguard for the smaller parties.   
In practice, each article had to be adopted by 109, and the whole constitution 
by 145 deputies out of the total of 217. The NCA was composed of a wide array of 
forces where political power was not concentrated in any single political party. Passing 
the constitution, therefore, required a coalition. Despite being the most electorally 
                                               
 
238 See Article 3 of the Provisional Organization of Public Authorities Law which served as an interim 
constitution. Guerfali, R., “Loi constitutionelle n°6-2011 du 16 décembre 2011, relative à 
l’organisation provisoire des pouvoirs publics”, Nawaat, 14 February 2013, available at: 
https://nawaat.org/portail/2013/02/14/traduction-fr-loi-constitutionnelle-n6-2011-du-16-decembre-
2011-relative-a-lorganisation-provisoire-des-pouvoirs-publics/ [accessed 28 August 2018].   
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popular, Ennahda, with 89 deputies, had to reach out to other parliamentary blocs to 
amend articles and to approve the constitution. In the latter case, the party was 57 seats 
short, a substantial margin of the necessary number to pass the constitution.  
 Considering proportionality, internal NCA organization and approval 
mechanisms, it is possible to conclude that before changes to the NCA design were 
introduced in June 2013 when the CC was established, the design was already 
substantively inclusive, in the sense that it promoted the dispersal and sharing of 
power, and maximized the required majority for passing the constitution. Even though 
Ennahda retained the strongest position in the constitution-making process, the party’s 
ability to pass the constitution it preferred was constrained, especially by the two thirds 
majority required for its approval. The only aspect of the design that limited 
substantive inclusiveness was the JDC, which saw the government overrepresented.   
Changes to substantive inclusiveness: The capacity of smaller, secularist 
parties to shape the constitution further increased in the last phase of the constitution-
making process thanks to the establishment of the Consensus Commission. Formed in 
June 2013 to diffuse political tensions that crystalized during the spring months, the 
CC reflected the changing distribution of seats in the NCA, and gave more weight to 
the opposition. Ennahda’s representation, consequently, decreased from the 41 % of 
seats it controlled in the NCA and the 40.9 % in other constituent commissions, to 26 
% in the CC (Table 4).  
 In addition to the changes in the constitution-making design, the influence of 
smaller, opposition parties further increased when the Quartet-led National Dialogue 
provided a new framework for the CC’s work. The distribution of seats in the NCA 
did not become irrelevant as the Assembly was still in charge of passing or rejecting 
the final draft. However, the fact that the efforts of the strongest party to push through 
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wording others opposed might have negatively affected the negotiations at the 
National Dialogue level, which dealt with the new government and the forthcoming 
elections, created a favourable set of circumstances for the secularist opposition. All 
parties had the same number of seats in the dialogue negotiations, and the smaller 
secularist parties could further benefit from having the weight of Nidaa Tounes behind 
them. As a result, during the last months of the constitution change process, the 
leverage of smaller parties over the text was almost on a par with that of Ennahda, 
despite their poorer showing in the 2011 elections.  
 
Parties’ Perceptions of Inclusiveness  
The above analysis revealed that the constitution-making design was both formally 
and substantively inclusive, and increasingly so as the process evolved. This section 
considers the perceptions of leading members of the major parties of the anti-Ben Ali 
coalition of inclusiveness. It reveals that not all of them viewed the design as inclusive 
from the very beginning. It also shows that the type of inclusiveness that they sought 
to develop was primarily substantive inclusiveness, in other words, their capacity to 
adjust the text.  
In my interviews, non-Islamists generally complained that prior to the summer 
2013 crisis and the introduction of the CC, constitution-making was guided by the 
“minority-majority approach”. Ennahda’s electoral popularity gave the Islamist and 
conservative factions, which comprised Ennahda as well as some other parties and 
individual deputies, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the strength to promote their 
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preferred constitutional vision.239 According to a secularist deputy from Ettakatol, 
Lobna Jeribi:  
 
…the debates in the constituent commissions brought results that 
in certain instances lacked balance, because the commissions 
represented the views of the majority conservative parties. That 
mathematical majority resulted in a text within which certain 
safeguards were omitted. We did not secure the concept of the civil 
nature of the state, or in my commission, acceptance of the 
universal declaration of human rights, and equality between men 
and women.  
 
She further maintained that the “language of representation, of legitimacy and 
numbers” ruled the day in the NCA before the foundation of the CC, and that 
constitution-making proceeded amid fears that the conservative stream would be able 
to impose their agenda on the minority, that is “left, the progressivists”.240  
 This “minority-majority approach” to constitution-making, according to 
Ennahda’s opponents, began to melt away following the creation of the CC. “There 
was a better [power] balance at the CC… We were aspired to consensus”, explained 
Jeribi.241 According to the NCA President, Mustafa Ben Jaafar, the CC’s originality 
lay in the fact that “the opposition was overrepresented so that the majority 
                                               
 
239 Author Interview with Lobna Jeribi (Ettakatol, 14 December 2016, Tunis); Selim Ben Abdessalam 
(Nidaa Tounes, 23 November 2016, Tunis); Samir Taïeb (Al-Massar, 2 October 2015, Tunis); 
Mohamed Gahbich (Democratic Alliance, 25 June 2014, Tunis); Salma Baccar (Al-Massar, 30 June 
2014, Tunis); and Mongi Rahoui (WATAD, 2 July 2014, Tunis).  
240 Author Interview with Lobna Jeribi, 14 December 2016, Tunis. The extensive usage of “majority 
principle” at the expense of a consensual approach was also criticized at the time by the UGTT (Gobe 
and Chouikha, 2014, p. 10).  
241 Author Interview, 14 December 2016, Tunis. 
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parliamentary blocs did not impose their hegemony and did not monopolize internal 
debates”.242 However, some of the opposition deputies stressed that even though the 
CC began its work in June 2013, the minority-majority approach was definitively 
ended only after the withdrawals from the NCA following Brahmi’s assassination in 
July. At that point, the parallel talks of the Quartet-led National Dialogue were 
underway, and the general ambience in the CC completely changed. This was, 
according to Ennahda’s opponents, when the party started to negotiate “without taking 
into consideration the respective weight of each camp”,243 and “when the climate of 
equilibrium” enabled the progressive camp to “really seize concessions”.244 
The aspiration of smaller, secularist parties to enhance their influence on the 
text of the constitution, and therefore substantive inclusion, is apparent from these 
interviews. This is not to say formal inclusiveness, that is formal membership of the 
constitution-making channels, was unimportant. Some of my interviewees pointed to 
the benefits of the regular interactions that they maintained over the course of 
constitution-making, be it because they sat in the same constituent commission, 
consumed lunch at the same table in the NCA cafeteria, or because they travelled 
together abroad or around Tunisia on NCA business.245 My interviews suggest that 
these interactions transformed some of the relationships between  deputies, enabled 
them to build personal ties across the Islamist-secularist divide, and to eliminate some 
of the prejudices they had held at the time they entered the Assembly.  
                                               
 
242 The quote comes from an interview with Ben Jaafar conducted by Geisser (2014, p. 173).  
243 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 23 November 2016, Tunis.  
244 Author Interview with Mongi Rahoui, 2 July 2014, Tunis. 
245 This information on the development of personal relationships comes from my interviews. See also 
Perez (2016) for existing ethnographic research on the NCA.  
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For instance, an opposition deputy for Afek Tounes wrote for the UNDP in 
2015, a year after the adoption of the constitution: 
 
I was very close with the other members of the democratic bloc, 
but I also got to know the other deputies on the Consensus 
Committee as the work and negotiations progressed. I remember 
mutual distrust that separated us at the beginning of the NCA’s 
mandate. That changed a lot over time. Accepting others is an 
integral part of any democracy. It is very important. I was able to 
get to know the people underneath the hard outer shells that some 
Assembly members presented. The conflicts and the ensuing 
reconciliations brought us closer together.246  
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by a deputy for the government party, CPR:  
 
We arrived [at the NCA] with differences and prejudices, but little 
by little a climate of confidence has been established… We realized 
that the political parties had a broad spectrum, and that there could 
be personal affinities. This could be seen during the work in the 
commissions, which brought us together.247   
 
These changes were mentioned not only by the secularists, but also by Ennahda 
deputies.248 They were also noticed by observers. A legal advisor to the NCA, Abdel 
                                               
 
246 See Mahjoub, R., “From division to consensus: The role and the contribution of the Consensus 
Committee”, UNDP, Constitution of Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016, p. 4. Rim Mahjoub spoke 
along these lines also during our interview conducted on 3 July 2014 in Tunis.  
247 Interview with Ikbel Msadaa, CPR, for the Tunisian newspaper Inkyfada. See Sbouai, S., “Ikbal 
Msadaa: Députée CPR, qui ne se répresente pas”, Inkdyfada, 15 October 2014, available at: 
http://inkyfada.com/2014/10/ikbal-msadaa-deputes-cpr-tnelec2014/ [accessed 28 August 2018].  
248 Author Interview with Sabhi Atigue, 15 November 2016, Tunis.  
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Bsili, noted of the constituent commissions that the “immediate effect was 
unexpected: a lot of prejudices were challenged, ideas were shaken, and in some case 
completely obliterated, and there was a feeling that the various participants were 
beginning to come closer together”.249  
These changes in inter-personal relationships clearly helped the negotiations, 
especially during the final months of the process when members of the CC sought to 
reach compromises on some of the most intractable points. The interviews suggest that 
deputies across the anti-Ben Ali coalition were less mistrustful of each other and that 
they also better appreciated each other’s positions, even when they personally 
disagreed with them.250 Another tangible benefit was the opportunity to get to know 
the opponents’ tactics. “We knew each other better, and we could distinguish when 
they stood by their position, played a comedy, or just wanted to slow things… And 
that made for less tensions,” explained Ikbel Msadaa from CPR.251 There were, 
nevertheless, limits to what these developments could achieve. As a deputy for Nidaa 
Tounes told me: 
  
When you make politics, you can respect your competitor, but that 
doesn’t mean it will be easier to find a compromise. The 
negotiations on the points of conflict were always very hard. The 1 
June draft was unacceptable to us… We did everything to try to 
block it, to make sure it would not be adopted.  
 
                                               
 
249 Bsili, A., “Beginning and organization of the work of the constituent committees”, UNDP, 
Constitution in Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016. 
250 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 23 November 2016, Tunis.  
251 Author Interview, 9 November 2016, Tunis.  
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When asked what his strategy was in the event that Ennahda tried to push the 
contentious draft forward, he explained:  
 
My position was that this Assembly had failed and it must be 
dissolved… There had to be new elections with the new Assembly 
in charge of finalizing the new constitution. But with better 
representation: weaker representation for Ennahda and stronger for 
the secular camp.252   
 
The benefits of formal inclusion in smoothing the negotiations, therefore, seem 
to be conditional on whether the parties won a degree of influence over the text that 
they judged as sufficient for their needs. While the NCA was formally inclusive from 
the beginning of the constitution-making process, as I have shown above, 
disenchanted deputies left the drafting body in July 2013 in protest at the controversial 
draft constitution and other issues, and even demanded its dissolution. At that point, 
according to a leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance, mistrust again returned 
to “record levels”, threatening to destroy “all the prior and fragile understandings that 
had been reached”.253 An essential ingredient of constitution-making design, in terms 
of inclusiveness, was, therefore, the ability to shape the constitution.  
 
6.1.3 Summary 
The constitution-making process adopted in Tunisia following the removal of Ben Ali 
has been widely praised for its inclusiveness, and rightly so. Analysis has confirmed 
                                               
 
252 Author Interview with Selim Ben Abdessalam, 24 November 2016, Tunis. 
253 See El-Hamdi, M., “Dissolving tensions between the groups and resuming the work of the 
Constituent Assembly. The Transitional experiment in Tunisia: between conflict and agreement”, 
UNDP, Constitution in Tunisia, Part 2, 26 September 2016.   
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that it was designed to promote both types of inclusion examined in this thesis, formal 
and substantive. The degree of substantive inclusiveness increased further in the last 
year of the process as constitutional negotiations moved to the CC, and the talks about 
a new government and elections were underway within the external platform of the 
Quartet-led National Dialogue. It was substantive inclusiveness that mattered most to 
the parties. The building of trust and interpersonal ties, which was facilitated by formal 
inclusion of all the important parties of the anti-Ben Ali coalition in the main 
constitution-making channels and which had some positive effects on the negotiations, 
seems only to have been possible in a situation when Ennahda and their non-Islamist 
opponents became capable of shaping the constitution to a similar extent. The second 
part of this chapter examines how inclusive the constitution-making design in Egypt 
was.  
 
6.2 Limits to Inclusiveness in the Constitution-making Design in Egypt  
The process of negotiating and writing the new constitution in Egypt was initiated 
following the first democratic elections after the ousting of President Mubarak in the 
eighteen days of revolution that shook the country in January 2011. The new 
parliament took on its final shape exactly a year later, in January 2012, when votes 
were finally counted and translated into parliamentary seats. The newly elected MPs 
then selected the 100 members of the Constituent Assembly, the body vested with the 
task of writing the charter. The process of establishing the criteria for selecting its 
deputies, however, was contested and, consequently, so was the composition of the 
CA. As a result of these conflicts, in April 2012, only a month after the first CA met, 
it was dissolved by a court. The new CA selected by political parties began its 
deliberations in mid-June 2012. Its members worked for approximately five months 
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before they approved the document on 29 November, and the constitution-making 
process drew to a close a month later, on 22 December, when voters approved the 
change in the constitution in a popular referendum.  
The analysis of the constitution-making process that I present below indicates 
the limits of both formal and substantive inclusiveness. Even though the CA, by 
design, was formally inclusive of all the major parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition, 
this aspiration did not materialize in practice as some of the non-Islamist parties 
refused to participate in the Assembly due to the disputes over its composition. 
Meanwhile, substantive inclusiveness was curtailed by the low majority necessary for 
the approval of the constitution. Both formal inclusion and the ability of the weaker, 
non-Islamist parties to affect the text then decreased following their withdrawal from 
the CA in November 2012. The remaining members of the Assembly approved the 
constitution despite their absence. I begin the investigation by introducing the main 
constitutional-making channels, in preparation for an assessment of how inclusive the 
constitution-making design was. 
 
6.2.1 Main Constitution-making Channels 
As in the Tunisian case study, the overview of the main constitution-making channels 
is contextualised within the wider political situation in which the constitutional change 
process played out, and to changes, over time, in the constitution-making design. The 
analysis relies on a systematic review of Egyptian online daily newspapers, Ahram 
Online and Egypt Independent, foreign media coverage, and qualitative interviews.  
 
First Constituent Assembly 
Unlike the Tunisian NCA, the Egyptian CA was not elected in a popular election, but 
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its members were selected by the parliament, where, as I explained in Chapter 4, 
Islamist parties were in the majority. It was immediately after the parliamentary 
elections that the controversies surfaced on the composition of the CA, which then 
engulfed the whole constitution-making process and featured among the reasons why 
non-Islamist deputies later resigned from that body (see Chapter 5). At the core of 
these conflicts was the question whether the CA should be composed of 
representatives from within or outside of parliament, the issue of the proportion of 
Islamist versus non-Islamist deputies, and the size of the majority required for the 
approval of the constitution. The FJP and Salafist parties, having emerged victorious 
from the recent elections, assumed that the popularly elected parliament had the 
authority to choose CA members from sitting MPs. Secular-leaning parties and 
revolutionaries argued that those tasked with drafting the constitution should not come 
from the pool of MPs but be selected from those outside of it to ensure that the 
Assembly would be representative of the whole of society. They also supported an 
equal ratio of Islamist and non-Islamist groups in the CA, and larger majorities for the 
approval of articles.254 
The first CA met on 28 March 2012, with half of the deputies coming from 
                                               
 
254 For heated debates about the principles on which selection of members of the CA were based , see 
Rashwan, N.H., “Political groups challenge legality of MPs’ inclusion in constituent assembly,” 
Ahram Online, 7 March 2012, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/36227/Egypt/Politics-/Political-groups-challenge-
legality-of-MPs-inclusi.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018]; Ahram Online, “Brotherhood increases MP 
ratio for constituent assembly ahead of Saturday vote,” 17 March 2012, available at:  
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/36977/Egypt/Politics-/Brotherhood-increases-MP-
ratio-for-constituent-ass.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018]; and Ahram Online, “Revolutionaries call 
for weekend protests against rules for drafting constitution,” 22 March 2012, available at:  
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/37421/Egypt/Politics-/Revolutionaries-call-for-
weekend-protests-against-.aspx [accessed on 28 August 2012].  
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one or other of the two houses of parliament. The other half of the seats went to figures 
from outside of parliament, some of whom were related to political parties and others 
who represented revolutionary groups, experts, state institutions, and civil society. 
This make-up was criticized by secular parties who demanded that the CA should have 
a lesser proportion of sitting MPs.255 Moreover, while the FJP argued that there were 
48 Islamists in the CA, their opponents complained the proportion was higher.256  
In protest to the body’s alleged Islamist dominance, most non-Islamist drafters, 
including leftists, liberals, revolutionaries, and the Coptic Church delegates, left the 
newly formed CA in the week following the nomination of its members.257 Echoing 
popular sentiment, a deputy from the leftist Socialist Popular Alliance explained he 
withdrew “because the composition [of the CA] wasn’t representative”.258 Multiple 
lawsuits were then filed by lawyers on behalf of the secular coalition, arguing that too 
                                               
 
255 For instance, the liberal FEP sought a proportion of 20 MPs to 80 non-MPs. Meanwhile, the FJP 
preferred the CA to comprise 40 MPs and 60 non-MPs. Salafi parties preferred an even higher 
proportion of parliamentarians, arguing for 60 or even 70 MPs. The FJP eventually backed a 50:50 
distribution as being the most likely to ensure a compromise between the two camps. See Rashwan, 
N.H., “Political groups challenge legality of MPs’ inclusion in constituent assembly,” Ahram Online, 
7 March 2012; and Ahram Online, “Brotherhood increases MP ratio for constituent assembly ahead 
of Saturday vote,” 17 March 2012.    
256 Fayed, S., “Liberals, Islamists tussle over Egypt constitution”, Reuters, 27 March 2012, available 
at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-constitution/liberals-islamists-tussle-over-egypt-
constitution-idUSBRE82Q0OA20120327 [accessed 28 August 2018]. 
257 Resignations began with those of a number of liberal and left wing individuals on 25 March 2012, 
and these were followed by those of revolutionaries and representatives of the Wafd Party and Al-
Azhar. See Ahram Online, “8 constituent assembly members resign to protest Islamist dominance,” 
25 March 2012, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/37652/Egypt/Politics-/-
constituent-assembly-members-resign-to-protest-Is.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018]; and Ahram 
Online, “Al Azhar withdraws from constituent assembly”, 29 March 2012, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/38022/Egypt/Politics-/AlAzhar-withdraws-from-
constituent-assembly-.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018].  
258 Author Interview with Mustafa Kamel El-Sayyid, Cairo, 7 August 2014.  
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many MPs were elected to the CA at the expense of people from outside of the 
parliament. As a result, the Supreme Administrative Court suspended the contested 
body in April 2012, after it had met only a few times in the short period of its 
existence.259 The decision was welcomed by many of the Islamists’ opponents, 
disenchanted with the Assembly’s outlook. “I thought they learned a lesson”, 
commented the leader of the FEP, an entity supported by many Coptic Christians that 
had previously decided to boycott the CA.260 
 
Second Constituent Assembly 
After nearly two months of deliberations, a deal to elect the new CA emerged in June 
2012. It was, at least at first, well-received across the political spectrum. Political 
forces agreed to reduce the proportion of drafters drawn from sitting MPs from 50 to 
39, and to set the ratio of Islamists to non-Islamists at 50:50 as demanded by leftists 
and liberals.261 While 39 seats were reserved for MPs from different parties, the 
remaining 61 seats went to people outside of the parliament, including judges, 
revolutionaries, churches and Al-Azhar representatives, national figures, delegates 
from state agencies and unions (see Table 5). However, as the political allegiance of 
these members to either the Islamist or secularist camps was less clear-cut, the deal 
                                               
 
259 Mourad, S., “Court ruling brings Egypt constitutional crisis to climax,” Ahram Online, 10 April 
2012, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/38983/Egypt/Politics-/Court-ruling-
brings-Egypts-constitutional-crisis-t.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018].  
260 Author Interview with Ahmed Said, Cairo, 12 August 2014. 
261 For a detailed description of the negotiations, see Abdul Majid, W., “al-qiṣṣa al-kamila limaʿrakat 
al-jamʿiyya al-taʾsysiyya (2-2)” (Full story of the Constituent Assembly Battle, 2-2), Al-Shorouk, 21 
June 2012, available at: 
http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=21062012&id=e0f322e9-e17c-42fa-89c0-
39057201e099 [accessed 28 August 2018].  
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begun to crumble as soon as the parliament came to vote on the names of those to be 
included. In particular, a leading ESDP member criticized the fact that as many as 22 
deputies from outside of parliament were to be included among the 50 seats non-
Islamists expected to control.262 Complaining that Islamists would once again 
dominate the drafting body, leftists, liberals, and revolutionaries boycotted the 
parliamentary session set aside to select the deputies, and some announced their 
complete withdrawal from the CA.263 As had been the case with the first, the 
legitimacy of the second Assembly, even from its inception, was called into question 
because of its composition, and due to the fact that its members had been selected by 





                                               
 
262 Ahram Online, “On verge of consensus, rifts reemerge over Egypt’s Constituent Assembly”, 11 
June 2012, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/44501/Egypt/Politics-/On-
verge-of-consensus,-rifts-reemerge-over-Egypts-.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018].   
263 Six political parties expressed their dissatisfaction by announcing their withdrawal from the second 
CA, and more than 50 MPs walked out in protest from a parliamentary session during which CA 
members were to be elected. Some of the deputies that withdrew, however, later returned. See El-
Gundy, Z., “Liberals, leftists stage 2nd walkout from Egypt’s Constituent Assembly,” Ahram Online, 
11 June 2012, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/44590/Egypt/Politics-
/Liberals,-leftists-stage-nd-walkout-from-Egypts-Co.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018]; Tarek, S. and 
H. Maher, “Egypt’s Constituent Assembly unveiled amid fears of Islamist dominance,” Ahram 
Online, 13 June 2012, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/44716/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Constituent-Assembly-
unveiled-amid-fears-ov.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018]; and MENA, “Moussa expects return of 
withdrawn Constituent Assembly members”, Egypt Independent, 28 June 2012, available at: 
https://www.egyptindependent.com/moussa-expects-return-withdrawn-constituent-assembly-
members/ [accessed 28 August 2018].  
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Represented party/group  CA seats 
Members from parliament 39 
FJP 16 
Nour Party 8 
Wafd Delegation  5 
FEP  2 
ESDP 2 
Wasat Party  1 
Karama Party 1 
Socialist Popular Alliance 1 
Reform and Development  1 
Building and Development  1 
Appointed members 61 
Judges  15 
Religious figures (Al-Azhar) 5 




Worker and farmer syndicates 7 
Professional syndicates 7 
State agencies (police, army, 
ministry of justice) 
 
3 
Public figures 10 
Revolutionary youth  10 
Total 100 
 
Table 5. Composition of the second CA in Egypt 
Source: Ahram Online (2012e). 
 
Despite on-going controversies, the negotiations over the text of the 
constitution began immediately after the release of the names of those selected to serve 
on the CA. The drafting was carried out by four committees, each of which was 
responsible for one of the chapters of the constitution. The themes were: (1) state and 
society; (2) rights and freedoms; (3) public authorities, which was sub divided into 
four sections dealing with the legislative, executive, judiciary, the armed forces and 
national security; and (4) independent authorities such as the electoral and anti-
corruption commissions.264 An additional fifth committee was responsible for public 
outreach and incorporation into the text of ideas gathered through this channel 
(Hulsman et al., 2013, p. 46). Next, members of the Drafting Committee (DC), 
                                               
 
264 Author Interview with Mohamed Mohi El-Din, member of the Ghad Al-Thawra Party and a CA 
deputy, Cairo, 10 August 2014. See also Hulsman et al. (2013, p. 46).  
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composed of legal experts from the CA and from outside of it, were responsible for 
reviewing the text and adjusting the wording of the articles from both linguistic and 
constitutional perspectives before submitting them to a plenary session for discussion 
(Hulsman et al., 2013, p. 46). Mohamed Mohi El-Din, who represented the liberal 
Ghad Al-Thawra Party at the CA, commended the fact that the DC “began to modify 
the work [done by the constituent committees], which was problematic”.265  
Both my interviews and available newspaper reports indicate that despite the 
controversies that surrounded its composition, the first months of the second 
Assembly’s term provided a period of intense discussions and exchange of ideas. 
According to a deputy from the liberal Wafd Party, the fact that the non-Islamists 
managed to stay in the CA for five months was “enormous evidence that there was a 
space for negotiation” and compromise.266 Mohamed Mohi El-Din added that at least 
at the beginning of the CA’s mandate, “there was a desire to give Egyptians the 
message that there weren’t unbridgeable differences among the political actors, and 
that there could be a dialogue and consensus”.267  
The situation, however, did not last, especially as conflicts over the 
                                               
 
265 Author Interview with Mohamed Mohi El-Din, Cairo, 10 August 2014. See also Ahram Online, 
“30 members of Egypt’s Constituent Assembly threaten to walkout”, 8 November 2012, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/57537/Egypt/0/-members-of-Egypts-Constituent-
Assembly-threaten-w.aspx [accessed 28 August 2018].  
266 Author Interview with Mohamed Abdel Alim Dawoud, Cairo, 17 August 2014.   
267 Author Interview, Mohamed Mohi El-Din, Cairo, 10 August 2014. See also Daily News Egypt, 
“Abdel-Maguid: “I believe we will have a constitution ready to put to a public referendum within six 
weeks to two months”, 30 July 2012, available at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/07/30/abdel-
maguid-i-believe-we-will-have-a-constitution-ready-to-be-put-to-a-public-referendum-within-six-
weeks-to-two-months/ [accessed 29 August 2018]; and El-Din, G.E., “Debate intensifies over 
fundamental rights and freedoms in Egypt new constitution”, Ahram Online, 1 September 2012, 
available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/51711/Egypt/Politics-/Debate-intensifies-
over-fundamental-rights-and-fre.aspx [accessed 21 August 2018].  
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constitution, and the process of determining it, intensified between September and 
October 2012. On 12 October, FJP’s critics filled the streets of Cairo on the occasion 
of President Morsi’s first one hundred days in office and to protest Islamist domination 
of the CA. They clashed with Morsi’s supporters, resulting, according to the New York 
Times, in “the bloodiest conflict between the two sides” since the beginning of the 
revolution.268 At the beginning of November, non-Islamists once again threatened to 
leave the constitution-drafting body.269    
 
New Constitution-making Channels 
Several initiatives emerged in this context to bridge differences. According to a deputy 
from the non-Islamist Ghad Al-Thawra Party, an informal, “problem-solving 
committee”, sometimes referred to as a “consensus committee”, emerged from within 
the CA and was composed of both deputies and leaders of political parties and civil 
society representatives not previously involved in the Assembly. The deputy described 
its work as “effective”, with the committee able to resolve “many problems easily”. 
The exception, he claimed, was the controversial issue of equality between men and 
women, and Article 219 of the constitution, which specified what principles of Islamic 
sharia were relevant to the constitutional order.270 However, it is unclear who exactly 
participated in this initiative. The “problem-solving committee” was accompanied by 
                                               
 
268 Kirkpatrick, D.D., “Opponents and Supporters of Egypt’s President Clash”, New York Times, 12 
October 2012, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/middleeast/mohamed-
morsis-critics-and-backers-clash-in-cairos-tahrir-square.html [accessed 29 August 2018].  
269 Ahram Online, “30 members of Egypt’s Constituent Assembly threaten to walkout”, 8 November 
2012.  
270 Author Interview, Mohamed Mohi El-Din, Cairo, 10 August 2014. See Chapter 5 for more detail 
on these discussions.   
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another body that emerged in October 2012, the Advisory Committee, which was 
composed solely of experts on constitutional law and university professors (Farouk, 
2013, p. 27).271 Its creation was welcomed by non-Islamists, who originally preferred 
some of its members to become CA deputies. However, complaining they were never 
actually consulted by the deputies, most of the experts soon resigned (2013, p. 27).  
In addition, informal deliberations took place outside of the CA’s remit in 
November. Among them, meetings with heads of political parties, including those that 
had left the Assembly earlier, were organized by both President Morsi and the CA 
leadership in order to encourage compromise on the constitution. Participants, 
however, diverged on how successful the meetings were in bridging differences, and 
what leverage they had on the text of the constitution officially drafted in the CA.272  
Despite these efforts, disagreement about the text continued, especially 
between non-Islamists and the Salafist parties. Eventually, as the FJP’s non-Islamist 
opponents grew increasingly dissatisfied, with never ending procedural and content-
related problems, approximately one third of them announced their withdrawal from 
the CA in mid-November.273 As they refused to return following the issuing of the 
                                               
 
271 Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Constituent Assembly wins back four liberal members”, 29 September 
2012, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/54204/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-
Constituent-Assembly-wins-back-four-liberal.aspx [accessed 29 August 2018].  
272 Ahram Online, “Morsi, political forces agree on 90% of the draft constitution: Spokesman”, 4 
November 2012, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsWorldCup/2018/57166.aspx [accessed 
21 August 2018]; Shukrallah, S., “Brotherhood scrambles for consensus with opposition on draft 
constitution”, Ahram Online, 6 November 2012, available at: 
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[accessed 29 August 2018]. See Chapter 5 for more information about the withdrawals and the 
reasons behind them.  
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controversial Constitutional Declaration by President Morsi on 22 November, some 
of the missing deputies were simply replaced by new people.274 Thus transformed, the 
CA adopted the constitution seven days later, on 29 November 2012. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I evaluate how formally and substantively inclusive the constitution-
making design was in Egypt, and how key protagonists themselves conceived 
inclusiveness.    
 
6.2.2 Formal, Substantive, and Perceived Inclusiveness  
To assess inclusiveness in the case of the constitutional change in Egypt after 2011, I 
focus primarily on the second CA. This is because the second Assembly continued to 
play the role of the main forum where the constitution was debated, and approved, 
throughout the process. In comparison, the first Assembly had little influence on the 
constitution as it was dissolved soon after its creation. The analysis that I present 
below reveals that the substantive inclusiveness of constitution-making design was 
undermined particularly by the low margin required for the passage of the constitution. 
In addition, both the involvement of parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition in 
constitution-making, and their capacity to modify the text of the constitution, was 
reduced, not by other aspects of the design, but especially by their withdrawal from 




                                               
 
274 See Mihaila, L., “The 85 people deciding the fate of Egypt”, Daily News Egypt, 4 December 2012, 
available at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/04/the-85-people-deciding-the-fate-of-egypt/ 
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Formal Inclusiveness  
Were all the major parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition granted membership in the 
main constitution-making body, in this case the second Constituent Assembly? 
Judging by the selection criteria settled on by the political parties, the constitution-
making design was meant to be formally inclusive (Table 5). This was ensured by the 
method used for the selection of the CA’s members, which did not rely on popular 
election results but on parliamentary appointment. This design, however, was never 
put in practice. In protest at the process through which those who were to draft the 
constitution were chosen, several non-Islamist parties resigned their CA membership 
in June 2012 before its very first session could take place.  
This first wave of the boycott involved three major non-Islamist parties of the 
anti-Mubarak coalition, the liberal FEP, the centre-left ESDP, and the leftist and Arab 
nationalist Karama Party. While together they controlled only 7.4 % of the seats in the 
People’s Assembly (PA) (Table 2), this was nearly half of the total seat share held by 
all secularist parties combined.275 Crucially, as many as 20.7 % of voters supported 
Hamdeen Sabahi, the leader of the Karama Party, in the first round of the 2012 
presidential ballots, giving an indication that the party’s popularity was potentially 
more significant than its seat share in the PA might suggest. This fact makes the party’s 
absence from the CA even more problematic. Following the withdrawal of these 
parties, apart from the liberal Wafd Party with its 7.6 % of seats in the PA, only 
individual personalities related to the non-Islamist bloc, and members of parties with 
less than 2 % of the PA seats remained in the CA.276 Neither were members from these 
                                               
 
275 Together, all the secularist parties controlled 18.6 % of seats in the PA. See Chapter 4 for details.  
276 See the breakdown of the composition of the CA, as of 12 June 2012. Ahram Online, “Official: 
The 100 members of Egypt’s revamped Constituent Assembly”, 12 June 2012, available at: 
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three parties among the figures nominated by parliament in October to replace the 
deputies who had withdrawn.277 The CA’s formal inclusiveness, already curtailed by 
these absences, suffered further after the second round of withdrawals began in 
November 2012. At that point, with very few exceptions, the remaining non-Islamists 
of the anti-Mubarak coalition resigned.278  
The fact that these parties were not present in the CA considerably decreased 
the degree of formal inclusiveness, even though it was not a result of exclusive 
constitution-making design, but of decisions made by the leadership of the parties 
under the particular political context that had evolved. The parties that withdrew were, 
nevertheless, involved in constitution-making through other channels. The Karama 
Party, ESDP and FEP representatives reportedly participated in meetings organized 
by President Morsi and the CA leadership in November 2012 with the aim of 
overcoming conflicts.279 The meetings, however, ceased as Morsi published his 
controversial Constitutional Declaration. After that date, non-Islamist parties of the 
anti-Mubarak coalition united in the NSF and moved to boycott all gatherings 
organized by the FJP, including those relevant to the constitution, as I pointed out in 
Chapter 5.   
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The term substantive inclusiveness relates to the actual influence that political parties 
had on the shaping of the text of the constitution. This degree of influence depends on 
the party’s electoral popularity as well as on the constitution-making design. The 
criteria that I laid down in Chapter 3, and employed in the Tunisian case study to 
assess whether a constitution-making design promoted substantive inclusion, were: 
proportionality, internal organization of a constituent assembly, and approval 
mechanisms. I had to alter these criteria slightly to make them applicable to the 
Egyptian case.  
This concerns, first of all, the measurement of (dis)proportionality, which in 
the case of Egypt refers to the difference between the parties’ seat share in the 2011/12 
elections to the People’s Assembly and the number of seats they were assigned in the 
CA. This approach is, however, complicated by the nature of Egypt’s main 
constitution-making body. The CA brought together political party members as well 
as actors with less clearly delineated ideological affiliations. Assessing proportionality 
with the first, partisan, component of the CA is straightforward. With regard to non-
partisan members, while we may sometimes be able to guess their background, from 
such indicators as whether they were known for having ties to the Islamist or secularist 
camp, the problem with this kind of labelling is that the information upon which the 
labelling has been based may be inaccurate. Even if non-partisan members were 
indeed closer to one camp than another, this might not have influenced their decisions 
to any significant extent. This is because unlike in the case of partisans, no 
organization could enforce a certain voting pattern on them. Bearing these limitations 
in mind, I include a limited assessment of the relationship of these members to the 
Islamist or non-Islamist camp in order to provide a general guide to their potential 
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attitudes but such conclusions should, nonetheless, be read with caution. The second 
adjustment to the criteria relates to the internal organization of the CA, which I was 
unable to assess accurately due to the lack of available information on this 
constitution-making body, combined with the limited number of qualitative interviews 
that I was able to undertake in Egypt. This criterion is, therefore, excluded from the 
empirical assessment in this case.  
Proportionality: At the time when the parties settled on the criteria to guide 
the selection of CA deputies, the Assembly’s make-up was such that there were more 
Islamists than their secular-leaning opponents. Together, the FJP, the Nour Party, a 
political wing of the Islamic Group, the Building and Development Party, and the 
Wasat Party were allocated 66.7 % of the seats reserved for MPs (Table 5). Liberal 
and leftist parties were given 33.3 % of these seats. This breakdown, however, does 
not reflect a constitution-making design that discriminated in favour of Islamist 
parties. They were simply far more popular than secularists among the Egyptian 
electorate at the time. Alone, the FJP claimed 45 % of the seats in the PA. If we add 
the gains by the electoral alliance led by the Salafi Nour Party, as well as the Wasat 
Party and the Islamic Labour Party, the total secured by Islamist-leaning parties 
reaches 71.9 % of the PA seats (Table 2), and this percentage was even higher in the 
upper chamber. The limited support for non-Islamists during the elections to the PA, 
where their seat share was only 18.6 %, translated into a very limited number of seats 
on the CA, at least when considering its partisan component. 
The remaining 61 seats reserved for non-MPs went to a wide range of social 
and political groups: representatives of political parties, judges, public figures, young 
revolutionaries, syndicates and state representatives, including the army, police, and 
the Ministry of Justice, and representatives of the Christian churches and the Islamic 
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religious authority, Al-Azhar (Table 5). Among them were people aligned both to the 
Islamist or secularist camps, as well as many others whose affiliations cannot be 
reduced to the binary distinction between Islamists and secularists. Some estimates 
are, nevertheless, available but for the reasons indicated above should be treated with 
caution. Drawing on publically available information about the CA deputies and on 
interviews with two CA members, one from the Islamist and one from the non-Islamist 
camp, the report produced by the Arab-West Report think-tank close to the Coptic 
religious minority, enabled an identification of the 100 chosen to draft the constitution 
as either Islamist or non-Islamist leaning (Hulsman et al., 2013).280 Their estimate is 
not based on the selection criteria agreed in June 2012, but on the full list of drafters 
as nominated by parliament. In other words, people who resigned in the first wave did 
not figure on the list with which they worked. 
According to their report, 35 deputies were members either of the MB, FJP or 
Salafist parties, while an additional 18 were “independent Islamists.” The Islamist 
camp thus controlled 53 % of the CA or, alternatively, 60 % if we accept the 
calculation of a deputy from the liberal Wafd Party, George Messiha, who identified 
seven additional deputies as having a “clearly Islamist orientation” (Hulsman et al., 
2013, pp. 40-5). It is unlikely the report would underestimate the Islamist component 
due to the background of the think-tank that produced it, and because the general 
sentiment among the liberal, non-Islamist forces at the time was that the CA was 
dominated by Islamists. If their assessment is correct, it contradicts the notion that 
Islamist control of the Assembly was absolute. The Islamists’ pre-eminent position in 
                                               
 
280 The information about the background of the Arab West Report comes from two different sources 
who have done their internship there. See also their website, Arab West Report, “Mission statement”, 
available at: https://www.arabwestreport.info/en/mission-statement-0 [accessed 29 August 2018].  
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the CA reflected their electoral popularity, and it can be argued that they were actually 
underrepresented compared to their electoral showing. This is even more telling 
because the figure comes from the period after the first wave of withdrawals from the 
Assembly in June 2012, leading to a reduction in the ranks of the non-Islamists.   
However, the picture becomes more opaque if we focus exclusively on 
substantive inclusion of parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition, as their withdrawals 
decreased their control over the wording of the constitution. After June 2012, this was 
the case for the FEP, ESDP, and the Karama Party. Both President Morsi and the CA 
leadership sought to make up for their absence by organizing ad-hoc meetings to 
negotiate constitutional provisions outside the CA’s brief during November, as I 
explained above. Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent these channels 
affected the work undertaken in the CA and, ultimately, the constitution itself. 
Crucially, the influence of non-Islamists on the constitutional negotiations diminished 
almost completely in mid-November 2012, when most of the remaining deputies from 
this camp decided to leave the CA. Around a half of the deputies that withdrew were 
then replaced by other individuals, mostly Islamist-leaning, while other seats were left 
vacant. At the point the Assembly voted on the constitution, it consisted of 85, not 100 
members, and the non-Islamist element of the anti-Mubarak coalition was almost 
entirely absent (Hulsman et al., 2013, p. 44).281  
Approval Mechanisms: The capacity of political parties to shape the 
constitution further depends on the mechanisms that are in use for approving the final 
negotiated text. The CA’s internal rules envisaged that the constitution would be 
                                               
 
281 The only members of the non-Islamist element of the anti-Mubarak coalition consisted of one 
deputy from the Wafd Party, and three members of the Ghad Al-Thawra Party. See Mihaila, L., “The 
85 people deciding the fate of Egypt”, Daily News Egypt, 4 December 2012. 
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approved by a “gradual majority”. This meant that each article had to be passed by a 
two-thirds majority (67 %) in the first round of voting. If the article was not accepted 
in the first round, drafters were given an extra 48 hours to negotiate, after which its 
approval hinged on a simple majority plus seven votes (57 %).282 If we take seriously 
the estimate of the distribution of seats in the CA between the Islamist and non-
Islamist camps presented above, it can be seen that the Islamist parties were very close 
to passing the constitution on their own. The modest size of the majority required for 
the approval, half of the CA plus seven votes, made it difficult for any smaller party 
to influence the wording of the constitution or to block articles to which it was 
diametrically opposed.  
 In addition, as I have argued in Chapter 3, smaller parties may be able to use 
other safeguarding mechanisms to prevent a situation in which a document so 
important to the functioning of a democratic political system, such as a constitution, 
is written by a temporary majority. In Egypt, following the Assembly’s approval of 
each of the constitution’s articles, the whole document was submitted to a popular 
referendum where a simple majority of voters was required for the ratification of the 
constitution. This made it a blunt instrument for smaller parties disenchanted with the 
text of the constitution. 
 Having reviewed two critical components that shape the extent to which a 
constitution-making design promotes substantive inclusion, proportionality and 
approval mechanisms, it is possible to conclude that there were considerable limits to 
inclusiveness in the case of Egypt. Available evidence suggests that the Islamist 
faction was not overrepresented but actually underrepresented in the CA compared to 
                                               
 
282 Daily News Egypt, “Abdel-Maguid: “I believe we will have a constitution ready to put to a public 
referendum within six weeks to two months”, 30 July 2012.  
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the percentage of votes gained by the relevant parties in the PA 2011/12 elections. 
However, the low margin needed for the approval of the constitution made it difficult 
for any smaller party to meaningfully contribute to the constitutional debate, and did 
not allow for the sharing, dispersal, and limitations on power that characterizes 
inclusive constitution-making design. Before I close this chapter with a comparison of 
the constitution-making designs used in Egypt and Tunisia, I consider the perceptions 
the leading members of the key Egyptian parties had of inclusiveness.   
 
Parties’ Perceptions of Inclusiveness 
Given the above analysis, it comes as no surprise that the political parties of the anti-
Mubarak coalition held different, and often conflicting, views on the ideal design of 
constitution-making. In particular, their opinions varied on the question of how much 
influence over the constitution a political tendency should enjoy in relation to its 
popular support. The whole confrontation about the first and second CA was, 
essentially, a dispute about substantive inclusiveness.  
The FJP, having emerged victorious from the recent elections, favoured a 
majoritarian approach to constitution-making. This is, perhaps, best illustrated by the 
arguments of the FJP’s original presidential candidate, Khairat El-Shater,283 who at 
the time of the controversies around the first CA’s composition noted that: 
                                               
 
283 Shater, one of the most influential members of the Muslim Brotherhood, had previously been 
disqualified from the 2012 presidential election by the electoral commission. See Fadel, L., 
“Disqualified Egyptian candidate says military rules don’t intent to cede power”, Washington Post, 18 
April 2012, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-disqualified-
presidential-candidate-says-military-rulers-have-no-intention-of-handing-over-
rule/2012/04/18/gIQAt95UQT_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3feb2f05bbd1 [accessed 29 




…the FJP has more than a 50 % majority in the People’s Assembly 
and the Shura Council [upper parliament’s chamber], and there, if it 
was about forming an electoral list, the Brotherhood could select 100 
members [of the CA] overnight and no one would be able to do 
anything about [it], not in terms of voting and electing. Nevertheless, 
the FJP is the one that chose a lot of liberals and leftists for the lists, 
including Wahid Abdel Maguid, Amr El-Shobaki, and Amr 
Hamzawy… The existence of these figures [in the CA] proves that the 
FJP believes in involving the largest possible range of views.284 
 
Meanwhile, less electorally popular non-Islamists called for a more inclusive 
method, which would have guaranteed them more leverage over the constitution. The 
fact that they criticized the CA for its “Islamist monopoly” would suggest that they 
saw the drafting body as not being proportionate to the popular support won by the 
various political forces. However, their view is contrary to the findings presented in 
this chapter which indicate that Islamists were underrepresented in the CA rather than 
the converse.285 In a similar vein, when we follow the media representation of the 
discussion of the CA selection criteria, we learn that liberals and leftists supported an 
equal ratio of Islamist and non-Islamist deputies in the CA, seeking to strengthen their 
                                               
 
284 Al-Ahram Daily, “Interview with Khairat El-Shater”, Ahram Online, 7 April, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/39511/Egypt/0/Interview-with-Khairat-
ElShater.aspx [accessed 15 August 2017].      
285 I should, however, note that apart from criticizing the alleged Islamist monopoly in the CA, non-
Islamist political parties and civil society groups also criticized the lack of representation of women 
and the young. See e.g. El-Gundy, Z., “Liberals, leftists stage 2nd walkout from Egypt’s Constituent 
Assembly,” Ahram Online, 11 June 2012; Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Constituent Assembly wins back 
four liberal members”, 29 September 2012; and Shukrallah, S., “Brotherhood scrambles for consensus 
with opposition on draft constitution”, Ahram Online, 6 November 2012.   
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position to a point well above that which would have been a truer reflection of their 
electoral popularity. When they were not granted such control over the constitution, 
they decided to boycott the Assembly.  
As Ahmed Said, the leader of the FEP, which left the CA in June 2012, expressed 
it:  
 
When it comes to the constitution, there are basic points that we all 
agree upon. And the points of difference were very well known from 
the beginning. So, if you have a majority, then you know very well 
that you’re going to get what you want. And that’s why we disagreed 
with the selection criteria. It wasn’t about [content-related] 
disagreements. We just saved the time, instead of going inside [the 
CA] like Amr Moussa, struggling for two to three months and after 
this time finding out that they [the Islamists] are doing what they want. 
We had more of a vision when we decided: let’s get out [of the CA], 
it’s not going to continue like that.286  
 
However, according to liberal politician Amr Hamzawy, the real aim of the FJP’s 
opponents during negotiations about the CA selection criteria was not to control as 
many seats as Islamists but, rather, to make sure there would be a like-minded one 
third of deputies who could, together, block articles relating to state identity and the 
relationship between religion and the state. As he put it:  
 
It was not that we wanted 50 [seats] and we were unhappy about the 
50 [seats] being divided [between non-Islamist parties and non-
partisan representatives]. It was about a blocking third… We were 
going to have a blocking third with the churches, Al Azhar 
                                               
 
286 Author Interview with Ahmed Said, Cairo, 12 August 2014. 
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representation, state institutions representation, should – and this was 
our reading back then – Salafists [seek to] extrapolate the Article 2 
into additional articles and run around making everyone crazy. What 
happened was that Ikhwan [the MB] overruled the special majority 
rule for agreeing on articles – it was not there. It was a simple majority 
vote at the end of the day… The focus on the criteria on the secular 
side was very much related to the fact that we needed to make sure 
that we were not going to be outmanoeuvred.287  
 
Indeed, as I have argued above, given the low margin necessary for the approval of 
the constitution, controlling even a third of the CA was rendered meaningless. If we 
follow this logic, asking for an equal number of Islamists and secularists in the CA 
could have been a negotiation tactic, rather than a serious demand.  
 
6.2.3 Summary  
The evaluation of the constitution-making design that guided the processes of 
producing the constitution in Egypt, initiated by the popular uprising in 2011, revealed 
the limits to both formal and substantive inclusiveness. Not all of these limitations 
reflected a deficiency on the design side. The stronger presence of the Islamists in the 
CA compared to secularists, at first, only reflected the electoral fortunes of the 
Islamists. The Islamist tendency was represented in the CA not only by the FJP but 
also by various strands of Salafist parties, the size of whose voter base surprised 
observers after the 2011/12 PA elections. In comparison, non-Islamists of the anti-
Mubarak coalition were feeble and fragmented, and the low number of voters they 
mobilized for the PA elections translated into their limited membership in the CA. 
                                               
 
287 Author Interview with Amr Hamzawy, Prague, 8 October 2017. 
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Non-Islamist involvement in the process and their ability to shape the constitution was 
then reduced by their withdrawal from the CA. While June 2012 saw walkouts by 
members of three important parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition, the FEP, ESDP, and 
the Karama Party, in protest at the CA selection criteria, the remaining non-Islamists 
left the drafting body in response to President Morsi’s controversial declaration in 
November of the same year, leaving the Assembly almost entirely in the hands of 
Islamists.   
 The criticism and boycott that the Islamists’ opponents directed towards the 
CA were, however, not unfounded. I have found that the constitution-making design 
did indeed considerably hinder the ability of smaller parties to amend the text of the 
constitution or to block articles that they opposed, such as Article 219 which specified 
how sharia would be interpreted. However, contrary to the views expressed by the 
CA’s critics, the problem does not seem to lie in the lack of proportionality. Instead, 
substantive inclusiveness was negatively affected by the low proportion of votes 
necessary in the CA to approve the constitution. This situation made it easy for the 
temporary majority to approve the wording it preferred. Had non-Islamists controlled 
more seats in the drafting body, even that might not have given them enough numbers 
to block contentious provisions, as that required the support of as many as 43 % of CA 
deputies, a figure that was beyond their reach given electoral reality. 
 
6.3 Conclusion: Inclusiveness of Constitution-making Design and Constitutional 
(Dis)Agreement in Tunisia and Egypt   
This chapter has explored the rules and mechanisms that guided how protagonists of 
constitutional change were selected, and how they debated and approved the new 
charters in Tunisia and Egypt after bottom-up protests removed their long-standing 
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dictators in January and February 2011. The chapter has illustrated how the design of 
constitution-making processes in both cases allowed for formal inclusion in the sense 
that all the major parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions were members of the main 
constitution-making channels. The designs, however, varied in the degree to which 
they promoted substantive inclusion. The difference concerned specifically the 
mechanisms that regulated what proportion of the constituent assemblies was 
sufficient to pass the constitution. Unlike Tunisia, where the whole text had to win the 
support of two thirds of the NCA, making it difficult for any party to push through its 
own constitutional vision without consulting parties that might not share that political 
perspective, smaller parties in Egypt could only prevent the majority political 
tendency from passing their preferred text if they together controlled 43 % of the CA. 
The constitution-making design in Tunisia promoted sharing, dispersal, and 
limitations to power, and was therefore inclusive. The design adopted in Egypt failed 
to achieve that level of inclusivity. I have also concluded that while the weaker, non-
Islamist parties in Tunisia gained more leverage over the text in the last phase of the 
process, the leverage of their counterparts in Egypt decreased at that point. Did the 
differences in the constitution-making design influence the different outcomes of the 
constitution change processes?  
The analysis of the Tunisian case clearly reveals that two elements of the 
design in particular constrained the capacity of any political faction or bloc to fashion 
its own constitution. This was achieved, on the one hand, by the use of a proportional 
representation electoral system and the HQLR, which led to a situation whereby the 
vote share won by each party in the 2011 elections was translated into their NCA seats 
in a highly proportional manner, and smaller parties were, therefore, not 
underrepresented in relation to their electoral popularity. On the other hand, the fact 
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that the NCA could enact the constitution only if two thirds of its members voted in 
favour meant that no party could push through its own constitutional agenda alone. A 
new constitution could only be adopted if a coalition composed of multiple parties 
supported it. Even though the electorally popular Ennahda maintained the upper hand 
in the constitution-making process, smaller parties were not unimportant thanks to the 
constitution-making design, as one third of them could block a problematic draft. In 
contrast, the low level of margin required for the approval of the constitution in Egypt 
gave the stronger, Islamist bloc little incentive to compromise and reach out to 
opponents. I, therefore, argue that the inclusive design encouraged agreement on the 
new constitution in the Tunisian case. The framework implemented in Egypt, which 
provided for limited substantive inclusiveness, could not play this same role. Instead, 
the conflict over the constitution-making design only exacerbated the tensions 
between the Islamists and their non-Islamist rivals.  
However, on its own, the inclusive design does not explain why broad 
agreement on the constitution evolved in Tunisia. As we have seen, the constitution 
change process entered a phase of impasse after what was intended to be the final draft 
sparked outrage among many deputies and, ultimately, when non-Islamists left the 
Assembly after the death of one of the deputies in July 2013. Furthermore, despite the 
highly inclusive design, secularists criticized what they saw as the majoritarian logic 
adopted by the NCA where Ennahda, along with other conservative deputies, retained 
a more influential voice than others. The agreement on the constitution was secured 
after non-Islamist parties were given almost equal leverage over the text of the 
constitution as Ennahda itself did. This situation, however, was only partially a result 
of the constitution-making design and the changes made to it.  
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The new constitution-making body that was introduced in Tunisia in June 
2013, the Consensus Commission, certainly increased the ability of the weaker 
secularist parties to shape the text by allowing them an overrepresentation, while 
underrepresenting Ennahda. It was the framework of the Quartet-led National 
Dialogue, where the distribution of power between the forces was even more 
favourable to the secularist opposition, that enabled this political wing to force even 
more concessions. The question remains as to what factors ultimately led to the 
situation in which the secularist opposition parties, who had fared much worse in the 
2011 polls than Ennahda, managed to enhance their negotiating position to the extent 
they did. It can be argued the CC, whose name suggests it was established to promote 
compromise, was an outcome of these other factors, an instrument that enabled parties 
to negotiate on points of conflict, rather than actively constraining Ennahda and hence 
shaping the agreement. I revisit these issues in Chapters 7 and 8.  
Neither can the lack of substantive inclusion in Egypt fully account for the 
constitutional disagreement that was so clearly confirmed during the December 2012 
referendum, when the constitution was opposed by a coalition of non-Islamist parties. 
I have argued in Chapter 5 that the FJP was, nevertheless, inclined to develop 
compromises on some of the most contentious issues which divided Salafist and non-
Islamist parties, such as religion-state relations and to the incorporation of sharia into 
the constitutional framework. In addition, the FJP worked towards involving non-
Islamists in the constitution-making process through ad-hoc created negotiation 
channels and bodies upon their withdrawal from the CA. These efforts proved in vein 
as President Morsi issued the Constitutional Declaration, which interrupted the 
constitution-making process. The decision of the FJP to rush the constitution forward, 
in spite of opposition to the document voiced by non-Islamists, was then more than 
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likely woven together by a number of diverse factors which are beyond the scope of 
this investigation, including the complicated context of transition (see Chapters 4 and 
5). That the party could act in such a way, however, was partially because the 
constitution-making design effectively lacked any barriers that would have protected 
the minority positions.  
This chapter, therefore, shows that while inclusive constitution-making design 
can encourage constitutional agreement, it cannot, on its own, guarantee such a 
positive outcome. Finally, the analysis highlights the importance of substantive 
inclusiveness, which speaks to the capacity of each party to influence the text of the 
constitution. The other type of inclusiveness, formal, which ensures that all the major 
parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions are involved in constitutional debates can 
facilitate negotiations, as it did in the Tunisian case. This positive function of formal 
inclusion is, however, dependent on substantive inclusion. In Egypt, formal inclusion 
could have provided little benefit as non-Islamists, disenchanted with their very 
limited opportunities to shape the text of the constitution through the CA, withdrew 
from the drafting body before the talks had even started.  
I argued at the beginning of this thesis in Chapter 1 that inclusiveness of 
constitution-making design should not be used as an explanation but rather itself be 
explained. In Chapter 7, I do exactly that when I inquire into the origins of the different 






Origins of Constitution-making Design 
  
After the popular uprisings swept through Tunisia and Egypt, unseating the long-
standing dictators, both societies embarked upon dismantling the constitutions that the 
years of authoritarianism had left behind and writing new, democratic ones. Only in 
Tunisia, however, did the constitutional change process produce a document that was 
embraced across the religious divide that, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, pitted loose 
alliances of Islamist and secularist parties against one another. The preceding chapter, 
Chapter 6, provided evidence that the constitution-making process followed in Tunisia 
was designed to promote both formal and substantive inclusion. It constrained stronger 
Islamist groups, Ennahda in particular, from pushing through their constitutional 
vision, while giving secularist parties, despite their electoral weakness, considerable 
sway over the shaping of the text. This finding suggests that the constitution-making 
design, and the way it ensured the inclusion of parties across the anti-Ben Ali coalition, 
played a role in fostering the broad constitutional agreement which culminated in 
January 2014, when the National Constituent Assembly deputies almost unanimously 
approved the document. The design implemented in Egypt included a major flaw in 
that it required only a small majority to secure the passage of the constitution. This 
allowed the electorally more popular Islamists to adopt their constitution despite the 
objections of the much weaker non-Islamists, thus undermining prospects for 
constitutional agreement. The question is: Why was the constitution-making design 
highly inclusive in Tunisia and not Egypt?  
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This chapter explores the origins of constitution-making designs in the two 
countries. This is, on the one hand, to enhance our understanding of how procedures 
that guide constitutional change emerge during democratization, and why some 
countries adopt designs more suitable for accommodating conflicting preferences for 
constitutional texts across significant political divides. On the other hand, this 
exploration is also a necessary step in the confirmation or refutation of the argument 
put forward in Chapter 6. That argument, which is in line with existing theoretical 
scholarship, hypothesised that the constitution-making design adopted in Tunisia 
constrained Islamist and conservative groups from unilaterally fashioning their 
preferred constitution. If the parties, whose actions the inclusive design was intended 
to constrain, were at the same time the ones responsible for determining these 
procedures, the constraining function of the rules and mechanisms that framed 
constitution-making might, in effect, be considerably reduced. In such a case, rather 
than assuming the explanation for constitutional agreement lay in the constitution-
making design itself, the answer should be sought among factors that led the parties 
to establish that specific design in the first place.  
This chapter considers three factors that I identified in Chapter 2 for their 
potential impact on the constitution-making design adopted during democratization 
and its inclusiveness. These are: (1) the availability of different types of design; (2) 
the distribution of power between parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition; and (3) 
the normative value the strongest parties placed on consensus and inclusion. First, 
parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition might not control how constitution-making 
unfolds and who gets to participate in the process, as these issues might be handled by 
interim governments, where they would have a little or no say. In addition, 
constitution-making design can also come about randomly in the unruly context of 
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transition. To probe availability, I sought answers to the following questions: Who 
made the decisions about the procedures that framed the constitution change 
processes? Were parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions involved in the decision-
making? And if so, were different types of procedural choices available to them?  
Secondly, I considered if parties were in charge of setting the constitution-
making design, what determined their decisions? In Chapter 2, I argued, following 
Lijphart (1977, pp. 55-61), that the existence of a multiple power balance among the 
parties, as opposed to a hegemonic situation or a dual balance of power where two 
groups were approximately equal in size, was more likely to generate an inclusive 
constitution-making process. I build on the findings of Chapter 4, where I assessed the 
distribution of power among the parties of the anti-Ben Ali and anti-Mubarak 
coalitions based on the electoral success of individual parties in the first democratic 
elections. I also assessed subsequent changes in that distribution as evidenced by the 
results of later elections and by electoral opinion polls. However, the constitution-
making design and its inclusiveness may have been determined before the founding 
elections revealed the real standing of each of the parties. If that was the case, the 
parties’ ability to tailor how constitution-making would proceed might have been 
restricted by the forums in which those decisions took place (Birch and Millard, 2002, 
p. 20). I explore this possibility. Third, and finally, an inclusive constitution-making 
process remains viable, even when an existing power configuration does not favour 
its emergence, if the parties that have most influence over the decisions place a 
normative value on consensus and inclusiveness. Normative motivations are, 
however, difficult to discern from strategic calculations and, as I argued in Chapter 3, 
partisans can always dress interests in the clothes of the “general good”. I, therefore, 
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consider whether other than normative considerations were in play in cases where my 
interviews suggest the value-based explanation.  
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that normative 
considerations were, in fact, not the factor that best explains the difference in the 
inclusiveness of the constitution-making designs adopted in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Instead, it suggests that decisions regarding the organization of the transition process 
and constitution-making, which were made soon after the revolutions, were more 
critical in setting the countries on different paths. In Tunisia, the Higher Authority for 
the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic 
Transition, where the choice of the electoral system to the NCA was shaped by a 
situation of a multiple balance of power, was the essential ingredient for establishing 
an inclusive constitution-making process. Meanwhile in Egypt, the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces entrusted the tasks of selecting members of the forthcoming 
Constituent Assembly and deciding on the CA’s internal working mechanisms, to the 
parliamentary majority, thus reducing the prospects for an inclusive design emerging. 
In addition, the chapter reveals the endogenous nature of constitution-making design 
in both countries and argues that this condition reduces the power of the design-based 
explanation to account for constitutional (dis)agreements. The chapter starts with an 
inquiry into the origins of the highly inclusive design adopted in Tunisia, which is 
followed by an exploration of the case of Egypt where inclusiveness was limited.   
 
7.1 Explaining the Origins of Inclusive Constitution-making Design in Tunisia 
This section explores the origins of the inclusive constitution-making design followed 
in Tunisia. I start the inquiry with a consideration of the decision to elect the NCA by 
popular election, and then move to the two aspects of constitution-making design that 
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I identified in Chapter 6 as most important in guaranteeing the inclusive process. These 
were, first of all, the employment of the proportional representation electoral system, 
and the Hare Quota with Largest Remainders in particular, which regulated the NCA 
elections, translating votes into seats in a highly proportional manner. The other 
crucial element of the constitution-making design was the decision that the 
constitution could only be enacted if a majority of two thirds voted in favour of its 
adoption. Next, I investigate the rationale behind the alternation in the constitution-
making design and its degree of inclusivity which occurred during the final months of 
the process. In Chapters 5 and 6, I argued that the constitutional agreement only 
materialized after the secularist parties were given almost the same say on the text of 
the constitution as Ennahda, a situation that was, in part, an outcome of changes in 
constitution-making design, and specifically the introduction of the Consensus 
Commission. I, therefore, ask the question: Why was the CC installed? To reconstruct 
the myriad choices, motivations, and other factors that eventually played a part in the 
choice of constitution-making design, I build on a range of primary and secondary 
sources, including qualitative interviews.  
 
7.1.1 Deciding to Elect the National Constituent Assembly 
The fact that Tunisians elected the NCA through a popular vote and tasked it with 
writing the constitution was a product of various processes that were set in motion as 
soon as Ben Ali fled the country on the eve of 14 January 2011. Two institutional 
paths found their supporters at the time, one of institutional continuity and another, a 
more radical break with the past. The former option, and one that was initially invoked, 
comprised keeping the 1959 Constitution, along with holding presidential elections as 
speedily as possible. It was supported by proponents of the outgoing regime who took 
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over the government following the ousting of Ben Ali (see Chapter 4), as well as a few 
of his opponents, most notably the PDP.288 It was, however, the second vision that was 
eventually implemented, and was one that included elections to a constituent 
assembly.  
Accounts that I gathered indicate that the idea of electing a constituent 
assembly emerged, early on, from the proposals of a group of academics, especially 
law professors, who were meeting at the time to find a means of deconstructing the 
old constitutional system.289 It was based on the country’s previous experience with 
writing its post-independence charter, although the 1950s process did not involve 
popular ballots.290 This vision was supported by most of the opposition parties,291 and 
by the labour union, the UGTT (Hmed, 2016, pp. 77-8). However, considering the 
grip the old regime elites had on government, this roadmap might not have been put 
into practice if it had not been for protesters who pushed the demand through during 
a major demonstration in front of the seat of government in the second half of February 
2011.292 Having conducted ethnographic research during what was known as the 
                                               
 
288 The PDP’s Secretary General, Maya Jribi, quoted by the International Crisis Group in February 
2011, defended the continuity scenario. She argued: “What happened is more than an intifada but less 
than a revolution, and puts us in a delicate intermediate phase through which we are forced in part to 
build on what came before… That means continuity, with a transition at the institutional level.” See 
ICG (2011, pp. 15-6). However, it was an open secret in Tunisia at the time that the PDP flag-bearer, 
Ahmed Najib Chebbi, had serious presidential aspirations, and the party probably supported the 
continuity path for this reason.    
289 Author interviews with Chafiq Sarsar, law professor and member of the expert committee of the 
HA (3 November 2016, Tunis); and law professor and HA Spokesperson Ghazi Gherairi (9 
November 2011, Tunis). 
290 Author Interview, Ghazi Gherairi, 9 November 2016, Tunis.  
291 Author Interview, Chafiq Sarsar, 3 November 2016, Tunis. 
292 Author Interview with Ghazi Gherairi, 9 November 2016, Tunis. See also an interview with an 
influential jurist, Yadh Ben Achour, for Le Monde. Mandraud, I., “La Tunisie va connaître de vraies 
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second Kasbah sit-in, Hmed (2016, p. 83, pp. 86-7) demonstrated that the demand for 
the establishment of a constituent assembly was universal among the protesters. Under 
pressure, on 23 March, Interim President Fouad Mebazza, who had served as president 
of the lower chamber in the parliament under Ben Ali between 1997 and 2010, issued 
a decree that dissolved parliament and heralded the election for the NCA.293  
 
7.1.2 Setting the Electoral System and Approval Mechanisms 
The decisions that crucially shaped the inclusiveness of the constitution-making 
process, about the electoral system on the one hand, and the internal mechanisms that 
guided the NCA’s work on the other, were made by two different bodies. The electoral 
system for the NCA was determined by the Higher Authority. The HA was an 
appointed body which acted as a parliament in the period between March 2011 and 
organization of the first democratic elections in October. It eventually grew to 155 
members who were drawn not only from parties that previously opposed Ben Ali’s 
regime, but also from national personalities, civil society organizations, the family 
members of martyrs, representatives of the regions, different occupations, academics 
and even those of the French diaspora.294 The HA’s expert committee, which included 
                                               
 
élections libres”, Le Monde, 20 April 2011, available at: 
https://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2011/04/20/la-tunisie-va-connaitre-de-vraies-elections-
libres_1510254_1466522.html [accessed 12 September 2018].    
293 Decree-law n° 2011-14, dated 23 March 2011 relating to the provisional organization of the public 
authorities. See Legislation.tn, “Décret-loi n° 2011-14 du 23 Mars 2011, portant organisation 
provisoire des pouvoirs publics”, 23 March 2011, available at: 
http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/fraction-journal-officiel/2011/2011F/020/TF2011142.pdf 
[accessed 12 September 2018].   
294 For a full list of the HA members, see Leaders, “La liste complète des membres du Conseil de 




law scholars and political scientists, was in charge of drafting the electoral system and 
prepared two versions with different modes of scrutiny.  One suggested a majority two 
round system and the other a proportional representation system using the highest 
average formula. According to one member of the expert committee, political science 
professor Asma Nouira, there was “a need for it [the as yet unelected NCA] to be 
representative and at the same time to make it impossible for one party to impose itself 
on others”. Consequently, the experts preferred the implementation of a PR system.295 
It was, however, not up to them but to the regular HA members to make the decision.  
Based on different accounts, there was a general preference for a PR system 
among HA’s members. Building on transcripts of sessions that concerned the electoral 
law, Gobe (2016, p. 73) argued that most HA deputies associated the majority system 
with cronyism, corruption, vote-buying, and regionalism. Divisions, nevertheless, 
appeared on the type of PR system to be implemented. While Ennahda, at the time 
already leading in the polls,296 preferred the highest average formula suggested by 
experts, additionally accompanied by a 5 % threshold for entry to the NCA, smaller 
parties favoured the Hare Quota with Largest Remainders (Gobe, 2016, p. 74). It was 
this method that the majority of HA members eventually voted for rather than the first 
option, a choice that affected positively the inclusive nature of the NCA. As Carey 
(2013) has shown, had the most commonly used highest average formula, the d’Hondt 
                                               
 
instance-pour-la-realisation-des-objectifs-de-la-revolution [accessed 3 September 2018]. For more 
information on the HA, see Chapter 4. 
295 Authors Interview, 27 June 2014, Tunis.  
296 While there were considerable fluctuations in the results of the early polls provided by different 
companies, Ennahda was always at the top. See e.g. L’Obs, “Sondage : les Tunisiens méfiants mais 
optimistes”, 14 June 2011, available at: 
https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20110614.OBS5103/sondage-les-tunisiens-mefiants-mais-
optimistes.html [accessed 12 September 2018].    
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Divisor, which was the alternative suggested by Ennahda, been applied, Ennahda’s 
NCA seat share would have been significantly greater, possibly giving the party an 
overall majority in the NCA.297 In addition, since only four parties won more than  5 
% of national support (Ennahda, CPR, Aridha Chaabia, and Ettakatol, see Table 1), if 
the 5 % threshold had been adopted as proposed by Ennahda, it is unlikely that we 
would have witnessed such a diversity of parties in the Assembly. 
Available evidence suggests that the representatives of political parties in the 
HA were aware of how the different rules would affect them, and could, therefore, 
make informed decisions. Gobe’s (2016, p. 74) review of relevant transcripts led him 
to argue that partisans from the radical left and other secular-leaning parties preferred 
the HQLR divisor because they knew it would benefit smaller parties. Interviews with 
the leading members of political parties, civil society actors and experts in the HA, 
conducted by Carey and colleagues (Carey et al., 2015) point in the same direction. 
Their reasoning, supported by the evidence they gained from the interviews they 
conducted, paints Ennahda as a self-interested actor seeking a method it knew would 
favour the party, and backtracking only because of the opposition from the remainder 
of the HA. The authors reached a preliminary conclusion that the selection of the 
particular electoral system was an outcome of the balance of power between the 
different political forces. That Ennahda was unable to push through its preferred 
system was because it was not strong enough. They argued that the party was 
                                               
 
297 By running an experiment using competing electoral formulas, Carey (2013, p. 7) found that the 
d’Hondt Divisor would have given Ennahda  69 % of the NCA seats rather than the 41 % it 
eventually won. See Chapter 6 for more detail on the role of the electoral system and the method of 
translating votes into seats, in particular, on the overall inclusiveness of the constitution-making 
design.   
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outmanoeuvred by “the healthy representation of smaller parties and of civil society 
actors” in the HA (2015, p. 23).  
There are two caveats to this explanation. The first one relates to Ennahda’s 
motivations, where calculations, other than simple short-term power-seeking, might 
have played a role. According to constitutional law expert and HA member Ghazi 
Gherairi, the choice of electoral system was not the most important consideration for 
Ennahda. The party already had a lead in the polls and “so all the systems were good 
for them”. What he thought Ennahda really cared about was that “the elections really 
take place, and that they are honest and transparent”.298 In this sense, Ennahda, which 
had been excluded from competing for political power for more than two decades, was 
ready to compromise because it understood that elections, as such, were more 
important than the number of seats it would win. This conclusion is also consistent 
with the previous findings of this thesis. In Chapter 5, based on interviews with 
Ennahda’s leading members, I stressed that during the constitutional negotiations, 
some of the concessions they made were motivated by longer-term considerations, and 
especially by a desire to prevent the return to government of the old regime. It is a 
reasonable conclusion that ill-advised efforts at pushing through electoral rules that 
others vehemently opposed could have antagonized even further non-Islamists who 
were already wary of Ennahda and, consequently, put their longer-term aspirations in 
danger.   
The second caveat relates to the structure through which decisions about the 
electoral system were made. Notwithstanding their popularity, which was to be 
officially judged only by the forthcoming elections, political parties controlled an 
                                               
 
298 Author Interview with Ghazi Gherairi, 9 November 2016, Tunis. 
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equal number of seats in the HA, and their voices were further balanced by the 
presence of non-partisans. In such a setting, even if Ennahda wanted to ignore the 
smaller parties and impose its preferred electoral system, it was unable to do so. The 
existence of a situation of a multiple balance of power was not simply a result of 
Ennahda’s weakness, but of the transition path that Tunisia took after Ben Ali’s 
removal, and which led to the formation of the HA.   
A different context surrounded the debates about the internal organization of 
the NCA, and about mechanisms for approving the national charter in particular. These 
issues were fixed by the newly elected NCA where the distribution of power was 
determined by voters and Ennahda won most seats. On 10 December 2011, deputies 
adopted a law, officially entitled the Provisional Organization of Public Authorities 
but generally known under the French acronym OPPP, which served as an interim 
constitution. Apart from organizing the legislative and executive power for the period 
until the NCA approved a finalized constitution, the document regulated the size of 
majority required for passing the constitution, determining that a vote in favour by two 
thirds of the Assembly’s deputies was needed to enact the text.299 The remainder of 
the Assembly’s agenda was guided by the NCA’s Rules of Procedure, adopted a month 
later, which regulated the conduct of constituent commissions including specifying 
that their membership should be determined “in proportion to the membership of the 
parliamentary groups and of independent members” in the NCA.300 As we have seen 
                                               
 
299 See Article 3 of the OPPP. Guerfali, R., “Loi constitutionelle n°6-2011 du 16 décembre 2011, 
relative à l’organisation provisoire des pouvoirs publics”, Nawaat, 14 February 2013, available at: 
https://nawaat.org/portail/2013/02/14/traduction-fr-loi-constitutionnelle-n6-2011-du-16-decembre-
2011-relative-a-lorganisation-provisoire-des-pouvoirs-publics/ [accessed 28 August 2018].   
300 See Article 42 of the Rules of Procedure. ConstitutionNet, “The Tunisian National Constituent 
Assembly. Rules of Procedure”, International IDEA, 16 December 2011, available at: 
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in Chapter 6, the decision to approve the constitution by a two thirds majority was 
especially important for limiting and dispersing power over the text of the constitution, 
features that characterize an inclusive constitution-making design.     
 There are very few reliable accounts of these early debates. This is because 
these decisions were made before civil society organizations began to regularly 
monitor the NCA’s sessions. My interviewees acknowledged they had little 
recollection of these events. What we do know, however, is that the OPPP, which 
regulated constitution approval mechanisms, was voted by 141 of 217 deputies. This 
figure is close to two thirds of the Assembly and shows that only 37 deputies voted 
against the proposal.301 The controversial parts of the law, as noted by journalists who 
followed the debates, related to the powers of the president, not to the procedures for 
adopting the new constitution.302 The intentions of the party that fared best in the 2011 
elections, Ennahda, in relation to the criteria to be used for the adoption of the 
constitution are not known. Yet even if Ennahda wished to choose a different method 
involving a lower margin, it could not do it. Not having a majority in the NCA, as it 
controlled only 41 % of seats, Ennahda needed partners to pass the OPPP. Meanwhile, 
the rest of the NCA was composed of smaller parties, each of them controlling below 
15 % of the NCA seats. Again, there was a situation of a multiple balance of power in 
the NCA.  
                                               
 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/constituent_assemblys_rules_of_procedure_-
_english-final.pdf [accessed 27 August 2018].   
301 See Business News, “La Tunisie dotée d‘une ‘mini constitution’”, 11 December 2011, available at: 
http://www.businessnews.com.tn/La-Tunisie-dotée-d’une-«-mini-constitution-»,520,28124,1 
[accessed 8 September 2018].    
302 Thomson, D., “Tunisie: Assemblée constituante adopte la loi d’organisation des pouvoirs publics”, 
RFI Afrique, 11 December 2011, available at: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20111211-tunisie-assemblee-
constituante-adopte-loi-organisation-pouvoirs-publics [accessed 8 September 2018].   
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Parties adjusted the constitution-making design during the last stage of 
constitutional change process when they created the CC, giving smaller parties yet 
more influence over the text. What stimulated these changes? 
 
7.1.3 Changes in Inclusiveness: Consensus Commission 
The Consensus Commission was created following the controversy that erupted 
around the fourth draft of the constitution published on 1 June 2013. According to the 
Carter Center (2014, p. 39), there was no doubt that the draft was supposed to be the 
final one. After the NCA President and General Rapporteur officially signed it during 
a press conference, deputies moved to a general discussion of its contents at the 
plenary sitting, a step preceding the article-by-article vote. Igniting heated controversy 
for not accurately reflecting the work of the constituent commissions, the draft was 
rejected by opposition deputies, and even some of the government deputies from 
Ettakatol and the CPR.303 
The critical reaction to the 1 June draft coincided with other pressures on 
Ennahda and the Assembly. As soon as one year had passed after the NCA election, 
the legitimacy of the drafting body was constantly called into question by its critics, 
most notably the leader of Nidaa Tounes, Beji Caid Essebsi, whose popularity was 
growing quickly.304 The Ennahda-led government faced additional criticism for the 
deteriorating economic and security situation (Gobe and Chouikha, 2014). This was 
reinforced after the death of a left-wing politician, Chokri Belaid, in February 2013, 
resulting in a cabinet reshuffle and more intense calls for the NCA to conclude the 
                                               
 
303 I discuss the critical reaction to the draft in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
304 For the changes in the balance of power throughout the constitution-making process, see Chapter 
4. I explain why the legitimacy of the NCA was undermined one year after its election in Chapter 6.    
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constitution change process (Gobe and Chouikha, 2014, pp. 3-5). A few months before 
the launching of the CC, in spring 2013, these growing tensions lead Prezident 
Marzouki to initiate talks between rival political parties and civil society, one of the 
first national dialogues. The intention was to discuss the constitution in a different, 
and perhaps more inclusive, setting than that provided by the constituent commissions. 
Although this did not materialize as some of the parties decided not to participate, the 
dialogue saw Ennahda compromising on several controversial points, including the 
relationship between legislature and executive.305  
In June, tensions between government and opposition were further exacerbated 
by the situation in Egypt, where the Freedom and Justice Party was facing mounting 
opposition in the form of the Tamarod, or Rebel, movement, which gathered 
signatures for a petition aimed at removing President Morsi from office.306 That 
similar voices were gaining momentum in Tunisia is demonstrated by the launching 
of a Tamarod inspired protest movement, which, following Morsi’s removal in Egypt 
at the beginning of July, called for the dissolution of the Tunisian NCA.307 Mehrezia 
Labidi, an influential Ennahda figure and the NCA Vice President, conceded that “the 
impact of Egypt was quite important”, although she spoke mainly about its influence 
                                               
 
305 For more details on the negotiations at the Marzouki-led National Dialogue and its outcomes, see 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
306 Kingsley, P., “Tamarod campaign gathers momentum among Egypt’s opposition”, Guardian, 27 
June 2013, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/tamarod-egypt-morsi-
campaign-oppsition-resignation [accessed 8 September 2018].  
307 Agence France Presse, “Tunisia ‘Tamarod’ movement aims to dissolve parliament”, 4 July 2013, 
The Daily Star Lebanon, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jul-
04/222546-tunisia-ruling-islamist-party-dismisses-egypt-scenario.ashx [accessed 8 September 2018]. 
See also Weslaty, L., “Destitution de Morsi en Égypt: réactions mitigées en Tunisie”, Counterpoints, 
6 July 2013. Ennahda controlled six seats in the CC if we add the constitution’s general rapporteur 
who was also a member of a Ennahda. See Table 4.  
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on Ennahda’s decision to leave the government. Yet she also expressed the opinion 
that the party had learned a broader lesson from the events in Egypt, which was that 
“transition phases are very particular – electoral legitimacy is not enough. We were 
aware we needed consensus, and the widest possible”.308  
In common with the earlier Marzouki-led National Dialogue, the creation of 
the CC on 29 June can, therefore, be seen as a reaction to the intensification of political 
tensions. The move was initiated by NCA President and Ettakatol leader, Mustafa Ben 
Jaafar (Geisser, 2014, p. 173). Qualitative interviews shed light on the negotiations 
behind the launching of the CC. According to an Ettakatol deputy, Mouldi Riahi, what 
his party fought for with regard to the CC was to achieve a different composition 
compared to the constituent commissions, one in which each party would be 
represented by two deputies. However, he claimed Ennahda did not accept the deal. 
The agreement that parties eventually settled on was to grant Ennahda five seats, while 
the opposition Democratic Bloc received three.309 This evidence suggests that while 
Ennahda was willing, under pressure, to concede more influence to smaller, non-
Islamist parties in this ad-hoc commission aimed at tackling the remaining dividing 
points of the constitution, it was not prepared to let its leading position in constitutional 
negotiations go completely.  
 
 
                                               
 
308 Author Interview, 10 July 2014, Tunis.   
309 Author Interview with Mouldi Riahi, deputy for Ettakatol, 28 November 2016, Tunis. On the same 
question, a CPR deputy and CC member Ikbel Msadaa told me: “We couldn’t tell the majority party 
that they would be represented by the same numbers as others. We tried to combine the 
proportionality with political representation, so that we had all points of view around the table.” 
Author Interview, 9 November 2016, Tunis. 
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7.1.4 Availability, Values, and Distribution of Power 
The analysis shows that none of the parties of the anti-Ben Ali coalition had entirely 
free hands in setting the rules and procedures that guided how constitutional change 
unfolded. Following Ben Ali’s removal in January 2011, remnants of the outgoing 
regime, who controlled the government, were responsible for choosing between 
amending the old constitution and a scenario involving a more complete constitutional 
change, as well as determining how it would proceed. The path that they eventually 
selected, which consisted of popular elections to the NCA, did not, however, reflect 
their own preference, but that of protesters, whose pressure proved instrumental in 
securing this roadmap in practice. It, therefore, appears from the Tunisian case that 
the pallet of options for constitution-making design that parties could pick from was 
bound by both by the actions of the interim government and the transition context. 
While these early choices narrowed the range of possible options for 
constitution-making design, it in no way restricted the inclusivity of the process. The 
aspects of constitution-making design which were most critical in shaping 
inclusiveness, the electoral system for the NCA, the mechanisms for the approval of 
the constitution, and the formation of the CC, were determined by the HA and the 
NCA, two institutions where the political parties had the greatest say. Available 
evidence suggests that even though normative considerations might have shaped some 
of the parties’ decisions, these key design choices were influenced, primarily, by other 
factors. When selecting the electoral system, rather than thinking purely about future 
compromises, the parties sought rules that they thought would favour them. That 
Ennahda was not able to push through the electoral rules it preferred was a result of 
the structure through which this issue was settled. The key body was the HA, where 
each political party had an equal voice. The HA was a forum in which there was a 
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multiple balance of power, which I have identified as a favourable condition for the 
implementation of inclusive constitution-making design.   
A similar situation framed the debates around the mechanisms for the approval 
of the constitution. Whether Ennahda, being the strongest party in the NCA, wished 
to lower the margin necessary for the approval of the constitution or not is a moot 
point. We simply do not have that information. The party controlled only 41 % of the 
seats in the NCA and, so, could not pass the relevant law on its own. The remainder 
of the NCA, however, was composed of smaller parties. It is unlikely that these parties 
would willingly have undermined their influence over the constitution by supporting 
a proposal for approving the constitution by less than the required two thirds of the 
membership of the NCA. Once again, the situation in which a multiple balance of 
power existed contributed to the adoption of mechanisms for approval that made it 
difficult for any temporary majority to pass any partisan constitution. Nevertheless, I 
would argue that the key decision was the HA’s previous choice of a PR electoral 
system in combination with the HQLR. This is because, as I argued in Chapter 6, based 
on Carey’s (2013) simulation of the results of the NCA elections under various 
electoral rules, if the NCA elections had been conducted under another system, 
Ennahda would have ended up with more seats in the Assembly. This, in turn, could 
have given the party enough leverage to unilaterally set the approval margin for the 
constitution. I, therefore, conclude that the body which framed the decisions about the 
electoral system, the HA, and the configuration of power between parties that it 
maintained, was the essential factor that enabled the implementation of a constitution-
making design which promoted inclusiveness in Tunisia.    
Inquiry into the evolution of constitution-making design in Tunisia further 
demonstrates that the rules and procedures that guided the production of the 
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constitution were fluid, as parties altered them in response to broader political 
tensions. Economic and security problems that the Ennahda-led governing coalition 
faced coupled with, in 2013, unexpected political assassinations and outside pressures 
in the form of military intervention against the ruling Islamist party in nearby Egypt. 
Aiming to resolve controversies surrounding the penultimate draft of the constitution 
in June 2013, the Consensus Commission, which further strengthened the capacity of 
smaller, non-Islamist parties to shape the constitution, and hence increased substantive 
inclusiveness, was formed with these pressures as a backdrop. Ennahda’s openness to 
continuing constitutional talks in this commission, which provided a forum more 
favourable to its opponents, demonstrates the point that the party did not adamantly 
cling to a majoritarian strategy. However, whether Ennahda valued consensus and 
inclusion, or not, it only conceded to the alteration of the constitution-making design 
and the creation of the CC when subjected to significant pressure. It is, of course, 
impossible to be certain about the motivation of any actors, especially when analysing 
them in retrospect. Nevertheless, the analysis indicates that factors other than strictly 
normative considerations influenced the implementation of the inclusive constitution-
making design in Tunisia.   
 
7.2 Explaining Limits to Inclusive Constitution-making Design in Egypt  
The constitution-making design implemented in Egypt was clearly less inclusive than 
in Tunisia (see Chapter 6). The aspect which undermined its overall inclusiveness 
most critically was the fact that a small majority made up of 57 % of members of the 
Constituent Assembly could pass the constitution. Could another type of process have 
been selected in Egypt? Or, was the capacity of parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition 
in terms of applying rules and procedures that would have enhanced inclusiveness 
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restricted by the decisions made by the SCAF at the start of the transition process? 
Alternatively, if parties did have oversight of these decisions, was the limited 
inclusiveness an outcome of the distribution of power between the various groups 
which was not favourable to the adoption of an inclusive process?  Or, were there other 
factors that played their part in the decision-making process? This section probes these 
questions by inquiring into the origins of the design which guided the process of 
producing the new constitution in Egypt after the 2011 revolution. I first revisit the 
decisions by which the SCAF narrowed options for constitution-making design during 
the first half of 2011, and highlight the conflicts regarding the constitution-making 
procedures that these choices sparked in the anti-Mubarak coalition. Next, I review 
the debates about the composition of the CA. The exploration draws primarily on 
available newspaper coverage of both local and international media outlets, and 
qualitative interviews.     
 
7.2.1 Early Debates about Constitution-making Design and the 30 March 
Constitutional Declaration  
Following Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011, the SCAF acquired executive and 
legislative power, and was further responsible for making decisions regarding the 
scope and the form of constitutional change. The path that the generals propounded 
envisaged amendments to the 1971 Constitution rather than a more thorough root and 
branch reform. In terms of putting this scenario into practice, they went as far as the 
appointment of a small committee of experts who were given the remit of proposing 
amendments and organizing a referendum on these recommendations. Voters 
overwhelmingly supported those changes to the existing constitution on 19 March 
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2011.310 The lead up to the referendum revealed, even more starkly than previously, 
the conflicting preferences for the organization of the democratic transition and the 
constitution-making process held by parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition.  
Many left wing politicians, liberals, and revolutionaries insisted on a complete 
break with the old constitution and dismissed the constitutional amendments out of 
hand.311 Among them, the April 6 Movement, one of the leading organizations uniting 
young revolutionaries, proposed an incremental process that involved drafting an 
interim constitution by an appointed, inclusive, body before presidential and 
parliamentary ballots went ahead.312 This timeline, advocating constitution before 
elections, later became central to non-Islamist demands for the timing of the changes 
to the constitution. On the other hand, Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafi leaders favored a swift move to presidential and parliamentary elections with 
the constitution written subsequently.313 While their opponents ascribed this to their 
ambition for power, another valid explanation is that Islamists, many of whom had 
                                               
 
310 Kirkpatrick, D. and K. Fahim, “In Egypt, a panel of jurists is given the task of revising the 
country’s constitution”, New York Times, 15 February 2011, available at: 
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[accessed 3 September 2018]. See Chapter 4 for details.  
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2011, available at: 
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September 2018]. 
312 See the statement by the April 6 Movement, “Egyptians urged to vote ‘no’ in the referendum”, A 
world to win, available at: http://aworldtowin.net/frontline/April6.html [accessed 12 September 
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amendments,” Ahram Online, 17 March 2011, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/7971/Egypt/0/Egyptian-Islamists,-along-with-NDP,-
campaign-hard-.aspx [accessed 3 September 2018].  
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been subjected to restricted access to political competition or repression,314 wanted to 
avoid extending the interim period during which the military council governed the 
country (Sallam, 2013, pp. 102-3). 
 The SCAF eventually discarded the amendments endorsed by voters and on 30 
March issued its own Constitutional Declaration, which was to serve as an interim 
constitution instead of the existing one with its contentious changes. The document 
narrowed the range of available options for constitution-making design. It stipulated 
that a 100-member Constituent Assembly, selected by deputies of a bicameral 
parliament, would draft a new constitution in a six month period, after which the text 
would be submitted to voters in another referendum.315 The emerging roadmap, 
however, once more failed to satisfy all sides and, as the parliamentary elections drew 
closer, demands for changing it from the opponents of the Islamists grew in intensity. 
Two initiatives gained notoriety at the time, the “constitution first” campaign and one 
calling for detailing of what were described as supra-constitutional principles. The 
idea of writing the new constitution before elections reflected the concerns of many 
secularists that the Muslim Brotherhood would dominate the elections and, 
consequently, write the constitution. Yet postponing the vote was vigorously opposed 
by the MB, who saw it as a failure to respect the results of the 19 March referendum, 
                                               
 
314 See Kassem (2004), and Ashour (2009).  
315 See Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration. ConstitutionNet, “The 2011 Constitutional 
Declaration”, International IDEA, available at: 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/march_2011-_egypt_interim_constitution-
english.pdf [accessed 21 August 2018].  
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and argued that the new constitution could only be legitimate if it emanated from the 
results of a popular election (Dunne, 2011).316 
 To reconcile the two camps, multiple proposals were proposed outlining 
general constitutional principles that all sides could agree on before the writing of the 
constitution commenced.317 The political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the FJP, 
held an ambivalent position, supporting initiatives rhetorically, yet carefully ensuring 
that the choices of the future CA were not restricted. The FJP Secretary General, Saad 
El-Katatni, was quoted as saying that they had “no problem with the proposed bill of 
rights as long as the will of the majority of Egyptians – who want elections before the 
drafting of the constitution – is respected”.318 This initiative did not produce a 
breakthrough either. After an attempt by the interim government to push through its 
own set of principles that included a privileged status for the armed forces,319 protests 
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led to the shelving the whole idea of pre-constitutional principles in November 2011 
(Hamad, 2012, p. 56). The parliamentary elections, consequently, went ahead before 
a resolution to the controversy about the sequencing of elections and constitutional 
change could be reached.  
 Two conclusions can be drawn from these debates about the choice of 
constitution-making design. Firstly, early into the transition process, political parties 
of the anti-Mubarak coalition were not the main players involved in selecting the 
procedures for the adoption of the constitution. Generals of the SCAF shaped the 
scope, timing, as well as the procedures of constitutional change. The Constitutional 
Declaration which the SCAF fashioned in March 2011 did not preclude the role of 
parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition from deciding how inclusive the constitution-
making process would be. Nevertheless, by vesting the capacity to choose members 
of the drafting body to parliament without specifying the internal working mechanisms 
of the CA, the declaration made for a situation where the winners of the upcoming 
parliamentary elections, if they emerged strong enough from the polls, could choose 
how the constitution would be produced and, crucially, who would make decisions 
about the content of the final document. This scenario became a reality when Islamist 
parties secured 71.9 % of the seats in the lower chamber, the PA. Secondly, what 
emerges clearly from the conflicts about the timing of the constitution-making process 
is how much the FJP, aware of its popularity among voters which exceeded that of 
non-Islamist parties, clung on to the idea of electoral legitimacy. As we will see in the 
next section, which highlights the discussions about the criteria for selecting members 
of the CA, this tendency then surfaced even more directly with the FJP defending its 
greater say in the drafting of the constitution by pointing to the support the party had 
among the electorate.   
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7.2.2 Determining the Selection Criteria for the Constituent Assembly   
Once voters had elected their representatives to the two chambers of parliament, which 
acquired its definitive shape in January 2011 and in which Islamists obtained a 
majority, discussions about the criteria by which the sitting MPs would select the 100 
members of the CA were initiated and put Islamist and non-Islamist parties at odds. 
To recapitulate what I concluded in Chapter 6, divisions emerged around three core 
issues: (1) whether the CA would be composed of representatives from within or 
outside of the parliament; (2) what the proportion of Islamist and non-Islamist deputies 
in the CA would be; and (3) what size majority would be sufficient to pass the entire 
constitution. I have argued previously that the issue that turned out as the most 
problematic feature of the constitution-making design, in terms of restricting the 
inclusiveness of the process, was not the overrepresentation of Islamists in the second 
CA as, in fact, they were rather underrepresented, but the mechanism used for 
approving the charter. This design element allowed a narrow majority of 57 % of the 
CA to pass the constitution, decreasing the chances of the weaker, non-Islamist parties 
being able to shape its text. Non-Islamists found this element difficult to accept, as I 
argued in Chapter 6.320 How did this feature of the constitution-making design come 
into being?  
 At this point, political parties, not the SCAF, led the way. At first, the debate 
                                               
 
320 According to a liberal politician and CA Spokesperson, Wahid Abdul Majid, securing the two 
thirds majority necessary to approve the constitution was the key demand of the FEP and ESDP 
throughout the negotiations about the CA selection criteria. See Abdul Majid, W., “al-qiṣṣa al-kamila 
limaʿrakat al-jamʿiyya al-taʾsysiyya (2-2)” (Full story of the Constituent Assembly Battle, 2-2), Al-
Shorouk, 21 June 2012, available at: 
http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=21062012&id=e0f322e9-e17c-42fa-89c0-
39057201e099 [accessed 28 August 2018]. 
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about the criteria for appointing the CA was tackled by the newly elected bicameral 
parliament, during joint meetings of its two chambers. As the task increasingly 
generated conflict, multiple initiatives aimed at solving the deadlock crystalized 
between April and June 2012 both from within and outside parliament. The resulting 
talks about the criteria involved a broad range of political parties coming together from 
across the anti-Mubarak coalition and even involved members of civil society.321 The 
SCAF was not involved in the decision-making, but retained its overseeing role, 
making sure that a deal would emerge in good time. In June, the SCAF imposed a 
deadline by which agreement had to be reached, arguing that such an outcome was 
already long overdue.322 Even though my interviewees characterized the negotiations 
about the CA selection criteria using phrases such as “real dialogue” and “consensus 
based process”,323 the issues of how many seats Islamists would control, and related 
to it, by what proportion of members would the CA pass the constitution, were 
recurring concerns and   were never resolved to the satisfaction of non-Islamists. 
 What emerges from the available information about these talks is that while 
                                               
 
321 See the account of the negotiations by Wahid Abdul Majid.   
Abdul Majid, W., “al-qiṣṣa al-kamila limaʿrakat al-jamʿiyya al-taʾsysiyya (1-2)” (Full story of the 
Constituent Assembly Battle, 1-2), Al-Shorouk, 20 June 2012, available at:  
http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=21062012&id=3a6452e6-5c5f-4856-8300-
ff8241b63569 [accessed 28 August 2018]; and Abdul Majid, W., “al-qiṣṣa al-kamila limaʿrakat al-
jamʿiyya al-taʾsysiyya (2-2)” (Full story of the Constituent Assembly Battle, 2-2), Al-Shorouk, 21 
June 2012. 
322 Author Interview with Mohamed Mohi El-Din (Ghad Al-Thawra Party, 10 August 2014, Cairo); 
and Mohamed Abdel Alim Dawoud (Wafd Party, 17 August 2014, Cairo). See also Ahram Online, 
“Broad satisfaction over Egypt’s Constituent Assembly’s deal”, Ahram Online, 10 June 2012, 
available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/44342/Egypt/Politics-/Broad-satisfaction-
over-Egypts-Constituent-Assembl.aspx [accessed 15 August 2017].   
323 Author Interview with liberal politician Amr Hamzawy (Prague, 8 October 2017); and Mohamed 
Mohi El-Din (10 August 2014, Cairo).  
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the FJP, along with the Salafi Nour Party, was willing to include a more significant 
proportion of non-Islamists in the CA, it stood its ground on the size of the majority 
necessary for the approval of the constitution which it wanted to be below the two 
thirds demanded by non-Islamists. In fact, the FJP initially preferred that the 
constitution would be approved by simple majority, 50 % plus one, and only later 
conceded to enlarge it to 57 %.324 Despite the party’s pledges early in the transition 
process that it wished to “participate, not to dominate” in post-revolution politics,325 
once its dominant position was cemented through popular elections, the party did not 
want to diminish that control. As a leading member of the MB phrased it: 
 
We in the Brotherhood and the FJP believe in consensus. But 
everyone must know that complete consensus is impossible. What 
if 90 per cent of the Egyptian people wanted the political system to 
be presidential or parliamentary and only 10 per cent wanted a 
mixed system? What if everyone insisted on their opinion? We 
have to go with what the majority of the people want, not with what 
the majority of the Brotherhood or the FJP want.326   
 
This evidence leads to the conclusion that the FJP retained its commitment to 
                                               
 
324 Abdul Majid, W., “al-qiṣṣa al-kamila limaʿrakat al-jamʿiyya al-taʾsysiyya (2-2)” (Full story of the 
Constituent Assembly Battle, 2-2), Al-Shorouk, 21 June 2012. 
325 CNN Wire Staff, “Muslim Brotherhood: ‘We are not seeking power’”, CNN, 10 February 2011, 
available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/09/egypt.muslim.brotherhood/index.html 
[accessed 3 September 2018]. See also Ahram Online, “MB official says constitution won’t be set by 
parliament majority but via consensus”, 26 December 2011, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/30258/Egypt/Politics-/MB-official-says-constitution-
wont-be-set-by-parli.aspx [accessed 12 September 2018].  
326 Al-Ahram Daily, “Interview with Khairat El-Shater”, Ahram Online, 7 April, available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/39511/Egypt/0/Interview-with-Khairat-
ElShater.aspx [accessed 15 August 2017].      
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the majoritarian model of constitution-making. The final decision about this crucial 
element of the constitution-making design was left to parliament where elections 
generated a hegemonic situation, which, as I hypothesized, was not prone to the 
promotion of an inclusive process. This circumstance, therefore, meant that forces 
with an Islamist inclination, who generally preferred keeping the threshold for 
approving the constitution low, could have it their way.    
 
7.2.3 Availability, Values, and Distribution of Power  
The inquiry into the origins of constitution-making design in Egypt reveals that, as in 
the Tunisian case, parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition were not completely free 
to determine how constitution-making would proceed, and that the available paths 
were restricted by the activity of the military generals who took over governing the 
country after the popular protests removed Mubarak in February 2011. The 
Constitutional Declaration issued by the SCAF did, as I have indicated, shape the 
timing and the type of the constitutional change process. The declaration did not, 
however, directly tackle design elements responsible for regulating inclusiveness. 
Nevertheless, the sequence that it prescribed decreased the prospects for inclusive 
design by giving the key decisions about the method of convening the constitution-
making body and its internal working mechanisms to the majority in the parliamentary 
elections.  
Further, parliament was characterized by a hegemonic situation with power 
monopolized by the forces of one political inclination, in this case the Islamist parties, 
rather than being dispersed among a number of forces. Consequently, parliament did 
not present a favourable setting for the adoption of an inclusive constitution-making 
design. Whether the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the FJP, was power-
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seeking or aimed primarily at ensuring that the constitutional change process was not 
unduly prolonged,327 which could have been the outcome of granting the minority 
more say over the text, it clearly did not value inclusion and consensus enough to alter 
its strategy. Neither did it have any reason to do so. The decisive factor was that the 
transition sequence that evolved under the SCAF’s leadership placed the FJP and its 
Islamist allies in a position to choose the constitution-making design that they 
preferred.  
 
7.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has shed light on the origins of constitution-making design in the context 
of democratization in general, and addressed the question of why a more inclusive 
design came to be implemented in Tunisia following the 2010/11 uprising than in 
Egypt. Specifically, it investigated whether, and how, the options for inclusive design 
from which the parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions could choose were restricted, 
and whether their design choices, whenever those were in their hands, were 
determined by the configuration of power between the groups or by normative values.  
I found that even though the decisions about the aspects of constitution-making 
design that touched upon inclusiveness were mostly left to the parties to determine, 
interim rulers and the context of transition, nevertheless, reduced the number of the 
available options. This generated a situation more favourable to the application of an 
inclusive constitution-making design in Tunisia than in Egypt. In Tunisia, the 
framework in which the parties made the key choice to elect the NCA through the PR 
system, in combination with the HQLR, the Higher Authority, imposed a multiple 
                                               
 
327 I explore this motivation in more detail in Chapter 5, where I unpick the constitutional 
disagreement.   
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balance of power scenario which gave each party an equal voice and, therefore, 
prevented stronger Ennahda from pushing through its own proposal which would have 
likely generated a less proportional outcome. In contrast, the SCAF’s decision to let 
the new parliament decide the composition and the internal working mechanisms of 
the Constituent Assembly inevitably vested these key choices in the parliamentary 
majority. These differences that occurred early in the transition set the constitution-
making processes in Egypt and Tunisia on their different paths. I did not find support 
for the assumption that the difference in inclusiveness of the constitution-making 
design in the two countries came about because Tunisia’s Ennahda Party was more 
pro-consensus than its counterpart in Egypt, the FJP. 
The chapter further exposed the endogenous nature of constitution-making 
rules and procedures. This could, most clearly, be seen in Egypt. With the key aspects 
of the constitution-making design being set by parliament, the design was the product 
of the existing configuration of power, which favoured the Islamist parties, and, 
therefore, it was unlikely to play a role as a factor shaping the Islamists behaviour 
during constitution-making. In Tunisia, this was the case in the later changes in the 
constitution-making design, and specifically in the formation of the Consensus 
Commission. There, the foundation of the CC was firmly in the hands of parties who 
held accurate information about their relative strength, based on their showing in the 
2011 elections. We, therefore, cannot argue that the CC, which was an essential forum 
for reaching compromises on the remaining points of conflict between Islamist and 
secularist parties towards the end of the constitution-making process, tamed the more 
popular Islamist forces in the NCA. It is more likely that the factors, which I identified 
as leading to the creation of the CC, that is both domestic and outside pressures on the 
Assembly and the ruling Ennahda, pushed the party towards accepting the need to 
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make further concessions. These findings highlight the limitations of the constitution-
making design and its inclusiveness as an explanatory factor in bringing about 








“The most dangerous risk would be to write a constitution which part of 
society says it is not theirs, a constitution which they feel no part.”  
Habib Khedher (Ennahda), National Constituent Assembly General 
Rapporteur.328 
   
“I saw really that the Constituent Assembly was divided into two, with 
people living very different lives. We had two very different concepts of 
the constitution. I wondered how were we going to come closer together, 
but we managed, and the proof is the explosion of joy when we voted the 
constitution by 200 votes.” 
Salma Baccar (Al-Massar), NCA deputy and Tunisian film director and 
producer.329 
 
When a dictatorship is brought down, the adoption of a new constitution that attracts 
broad support across the political spectrum is an important step towards the 
implementation of democracy. In January 2014, three years after the revolutionary tide 
which unseated autocratic President Ben Ali, Tunisia’s National Constituent 
Assembly, representing a wide range of societal interests, approved the new 
constitution by near unanimous consensus. The charter was welcomed by both the 
Islamist Ennahda party, as well as the party’s secular opponents. The country’s score 
                                               
 
328 Author Interview, 25 November 2016, Tunis.  
329 Author Interview, 30 June 2014, Tunis.  
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in the Freedom House ranking consequently jumped to “free”.330 Tunisia also 
appeared as The Economist country of the year, with its editors praising the moderation 
and pragmatism of Tunisians, as well as the adoption of an “enlightened constitution” 
which “nurtured hope in a wretched region and a troubled world”.331  
 In contrast, the constitution produced in Egypt in November 2012 only 
fostered disagreement, and led to a deepening of the political polarization along 
religious lines. The division between the Freedom and Justice Party and non-Islamist 
parties grouped in the National Salvation Front grew to such extent that when the 
military stepped into politics in July 2013 to oust Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, 
and suspend the contentious constitution, it enjoyed the approval of most of the 
secularists. The failure to settle on the new constitution after the removal of Mubarak 
in Egypt in February 2011 seems, indeed, to have signalled “the beginning of the 
failure of its democratic experience” (El-Shobaki, 2014, p. 95). 
 The context of the Arab Spring led to the re-writing of authoritarian 
constitutions in Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, and less radically amended in 
Morocco. The debates that emerged from the transitions, about which constitution-
making procedures would be most conducive to the accommodation of competing 
constitutional visions of parties, and to democracy, were particularly vibrant. One 
aspect of constitution-making design that prescribes that all important political 
factions are involved in the negotiations for, and the adoption of, the constitution, 
received special attention from local politicians and observers (Moustafa, 2012; DRI, 
                                               
 
330 Freedom House, “Freedom in the world 2015: Tunisia”, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/tunisia [accessed 22 July 2016]. 
331 Economist, “Our country of the year. Hope springs”, 17 December 2014, available at: 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2014/12/17/hope-springs [accessed 10 August 2018]. 
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2011; Carey and Reynolds, 2011; Revkin and Auf, 2012; Brown, 2011a). That this 
agenda became so prominent is less surprising when we zoom out from the region and 
consider the wider international context. International actors involved in the 
promotion of democracy and peace-keeping today care about the processes of how 
constitutions are produced to an extent that was not the norm 20 years ago. At that 
time, the greater focus of any assistance provided was on the text of the constitution. 
Examples of “best practices” that have since been promoted globally, recommending 
that constitution-making processes are representative, participatory, transparent, and 
inclusive, could be found in some of the Middle Eastern and North African countries 
where popular protests initiated efforts at democratic and constitutional change after 
2010. These developments also engaged scholars, who sought to determine whether 
different constitution-making designs are conducive to democracy, reduction of 
violence, the longevity of a constitution, as well as other outcomes (e.g. Ginsburg et 
al., 2009; Carey, 2009; Eisenstadt et al., 2015; 2017; Widner, 2005; 2008; Elkins and 
Ginsburg, 2013; Saati, 2015).  
Linking processes to outcomes, as Chapter 2 demonstrated, has, however, 
proven difficult. It has been complicated by the diverse nature of constitution-making 
processes, which combine different bodies, rules and practices, as well as actors, 
timing, and contexts. Despite an increasing number of studies that have considered 
constitution-making and its design as the main object of analysis, I found that little 
systematic evidence has been gathered. The context of democratization and the 
inclusion of competing political parties has been understudied and light remains to be 
shed on the origins of constitution-making designs. Focusing on the inclusion of 
parties of the anti-authoritarian coalition as enabled by the rules and practices that 
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framed how parties convened, debated, and approved constitutions following the 
opportunity afforded by a move to democracy, this thesis addresses these deficiencies.  
Comparing the experience of two similar cases where constitutional change 
was intertwined with democratization following the uprisings that swept through the 
Middle East and North Africa, Egypt and Tunisia in 2010 and 2011 respectively, the 
thesis has sought to answer the question: Does inclusive constitution-making design 
help to foster agreement on a constitution during democratization and, if so, how? I 
further explored two sub-questions: (1) Does the difference in constitution-making 
design help to explain why political parties in the anti-authoritarian coalitions 
disagreed on the constitution in Egypt, while they reached agreement in Tunisia?; (2) 
Why do some countries adopt a design that is inclusive, while others do not? The thesis 
has combined the knowledge gathered in the scholarly literature on democratization, 
constitution-making, and institutional design with the insights of practitioners to build 
a theoretical framework that helps to understand how the inclusion of political parties 
in constitution-making works, and what factors are most conducive to the facilitation 
of inclusive design in the midst of democratic change.  
This final chapter ties the key findings together, highlighting how they enhance 
our knowledge of the questions addressed, and their significance vis-à-vis the relevant 
literature on constitution-making and democratization. It also acknowledges the 
limitations of this research, points to potential avenues for future academic inquiry, 
and outlines policy implications. While the answer to the question reached in this 
thesis as to whether inclusive constitution-making design can foster agreement on a 
constitution is in the affirmative, its main contribution lies in illuminating how this 
happens, and in exposing the qualifications and caveats that surround this explanation. 
The thesis provides evidence that even a highly inclusive design, which ensures that 
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all important political parties are at the table, and where the power of the strongest 
party to pass the constitution by itself is considerably restricted, cannot ensure the 
constitution will be broadly embraced. Another limitation stems from the fact that, as 
this research has revealed, only some transition processes might provide a favourable 
context for the implementation of an inclusive constitution-making design after the 
removal of an autocrat. Finally, drawing on evidence from the Egyptian and Tunisian 
case studies, I underline the endogenous nature of constitution-making rules and 
procedures, which further curbs the power of the design-based explanation. These 
findings contribute to the debate about constitution-making procedures by moderating 
the claim that their modalities matter, while providing a solid basis for future 
exploration of the role of inclusiveness and the ways in which constitution-making 
designs are introduced during democratization.   
 
8.1 Inclusive Design and Constitutional (Dis)Agreement in Tunisia and Egypt 
Inclusiveness has been a widely promoted ideal, one to which constitution-making 
should aspire. Yet as it is such a vague term, it has been assigned a plurality of 
meanings by practitioners, scholars, and participants themselves, as I pointed out in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Scholars discussing inclusiveness have most often paid attention to 
its vertical aspect and focused on public participation in constitutional change 
processes. In contrast, this thesis has concentrated on the role of the inclusion of 
political parties across the anti-authoritarian coalition, former opposition parties and 
newcomers, with no ties to the outgoing regime. As the classical transition literature 
has indicated, even as these forces share the objective of ending the authoritarian era, 
they are likely to be divided on other issues. Indeed, I found that in the two cases 
explored here, the secularist and Islamist political forces, although far from 
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homogenous groups themselves, promoted conflicting political visions, and held 
diverging preferences for the post-revolution constitutional order. They disagreed on 
a number of elements of the constitution, most importantly the role of religion in the 
state, the formulations regarding rights and freedoms, and in Tunisia, also, on the form 
of government. Their competing political agendas were coupled with mutual mistrust 
promoted by the divide-and-rule tactics employed by outgoing regimes, as well as the 
strong degree of popularity that Islamists managed to achieve in both countries. The 
Islamist-secularist divide made for a situation where finding constitutional agreement 
became an especially delicate enterprise.    
Focusing on the divided parties of the anti-authoritarian coalitions, this thesis 
has developed a distinction between two forms of inclusiveness, which were 
previously only broadly outlined by theoretical accounts of constitution-making and 
policy-oriented literature. First, equivalent to the notion of being at the negotiating 
table, formal inclusion refers simply to membership of the main constitution-making 
bodies. Second, substantive inclusion can be seen as the ability of an individual party 
to shape the constitution. That, in turn, depends on the constitution-making design and 
especially the mechanisms used for the selection of members of the main constitution-
making bodies, internal organization of the constituent assembly, and constitution 
approval, as much as on the party’s electoral popularity. The conceptualization of 
substantively inclusive design, which I put forward in this thesis, was inspired by the 
overarching principle behind Lijphart’s (2012, p. 2) consensus model of democracy. 
This is the idea that majority rule is only a minimum requirement and that the 
aspiration is to “share, disperse, and limit” power. A design that promotes inclusion, 
therefore, boosts the leverage that weaker parties can exercise, although that would 
not necessarily guarantee that all parties could impact the text to the same extent. A 
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design that is highly inclusive guards against any overrepresentation of the majority 
party in the main constitution-making channels and against marginalizing the voices 
of smaller parties in the internal organization of the constituent body. It further 
maximizes the size of the majority required for the adoption of a constitution and, 
ideally, also puts in place additional mechanisms that smaller parties can fall back on 
if the majority is aggressive enough to push through the constitution against their will.   
To understand how inclusion works, not only on paper but also in practice, I 
have considered the interplay between formal and less formal constitution-making 
channels throughout the three stages of the convening constituent bodies, debating the 
constitution, and approving the final text of the document. In addition, I sought out the 
perspectives of insider participants in the process. I found that while formal 
inclusiveness was achieved in both countries, the constitution-making design was less 
substantively inclusive in Egypt than in Tunisia, and that what mattered to the various 
parties involved was the capacity to adjust substantially the content of the constitution. 
I summarize these findings, and my answers to the question as to how this difference 
in the design influenced constitutional (dis)agreement, in the sections below.   
 
8.1.1 Different Designs, Different Outcomes  
Empirical analysis has shown that the constitution-making design adopted in Tunisia 
after 2011 was substantially and formally inclusive across all of the stages observed, 
and that its degree of inclusiveness was enhanced in the last year of the process. The 
main constitution-making body, the NCA, was popularly elected, and the votes were 
translated into seats in a highly proportionate manner. Although Ennahda won a 
dominant position in the NCA as well as in the constituent commissions, this outcome 
was not a product of constitution-making rules that discriminated in its favour. The 
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party simply fared far better than any other group in the first democratic elections. Yet 
Ennahda’s domination was not absolute. The two thirds majority required for the 
approval of the constitution prevented it from writing its own constitution. In practice, 
the party controlled 89 seats in the NCA, 57 seats short of the number necessary to 
pass the constitution on its own. This was a substantial deficit and, therefore, Ennahda 
had to look for partners among other political groups and independent delegates.  
This level of inclusivity was, however, not sufficient to guarantee that 
constitutional agreement among the parties of anti-Ben Ali coalition would emerge. 
Qualitative interviews with NCA deputies from the secular parties, both in opposition 
and in government, revealed their complaints about the “majority approach”, 
maintained by Ennahda, to producing the constitution. In a situation in which Ennahda 
consistently relied on its numerical superiority in the NCA, consolidated by the party’s 
impressive showing in the 2011 polls, secularists feared the worst. They were 
concerned that proponents of a religiously conservative vision of the constitution, who 
in the NCA came from Ennahda, as well as other parties and independent deputies, 
would be able to impose the constitution on them. When opposition parties withdrew 
from the NCA in July 2013 in protest at the political assassination of a left-wing 
opposition leader, their actions were additionally motivated by disagreement with the 
penultimate draft of the constitution. In that draft, religion was given a more prominent 
role than in the draft that was eventually accepted as the new constitution half a year 
later.    
I demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the capacity of non-Islamists to modify the 
text of the constitution was reinforced between June 2013 and its adoption in January 
2014. This change was partially an outcome of the introduction of a new constitution-
making body, the Consensus Commission. The CC was, initially, an informal 
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committee created from within the NCA that presented a different configuration of 
power than that of the other commissions. It gave more leverage to the opposition, 
while limiting Ennahda’s voice. However, that situation became even more favourable 
for the secularists later in the process. By the end they had achieved almost a 
comparable level of influence on the text of the constitution as that enjoyed by 
Ennahda, despite their much poorer electoral showing. Only at that point were 
secularists able to further mould the constitution from within the CC into the shape 
that they preferred, which ultimately secured their agreement. 
 The story was very different in Egypt. Like Ennahda, the FJP secured a leading 
position in the Constituent Assembly, the main body where the constitution was 
produced. In addition, Islamists of the more conservative, Salafist inclination did well 
in the 2011/12 legislative elections, which strengthened the overall standing of 
Islamists in the CA. Still, these parties were not overrepresented in the Assembly in 
comparison to their electoral success. What, however, did impact negatively on 
substantive inclusiveness was the low margin required to secure the passage of the 
constitution. In contrast to the two thirds of deputies needed in Tunisia, the approval 
of the constitution in Egypt required only the support of 57 % of the CA deputies. This 
situation made it extremely difficult for secularists to block the wording of an article 
even if they fundamentally opposed it. While a popular referendum was called to 
validate the constitution, the fact that just a simple majority of the vote in its favour 
was sufficient to ratify it, only underlines the conclusion that constitution-making 
design in Egypt followed a majoritarian logic. The involvement of Egyptian non-
Islamists in the process, and their ability to shape the constitution, further diminished 
as they walked out of the CA. While the overall disagreement on the constitution was 
linked by various factors, I show that contention over the constitution-making design 
297 
 
further antagonized parties of the anti-Mubarak coalition, and figured amongst the 
justifications cited by secularist parties for their withdrawal from the CA and their 
subsequent rejection of the entire constitution. 
Considering these findings, the question arises as to whether it makes sense to 
argue that inclusive constitution-making design helped to foster constitutional 
agreement in Tunisia while the lack of such inclusiveness resulted in disagreement in 
Egypt? The case of constitutional change in Tunisia shows that inclusive design 
prevented the party that won the first elections from unilaterally fashioning the 
constitution, pushing it to take the views of its partners into consideration. In Egypt, 
the design did nothing to boost the influence of smaller parties, while it made it easier 
for the stronger, Islamist forces to adopt their preferred text. Only such constitution-
making rules and practices that promote substantive inclusion, it can be concluded, 
encourage agreement. Being at the negotiating table may help constitution-making 
protagonists shake off some of the prejudices about their opponents and develop 
personal ties, as interviews with individual members of Tunisian NCA referred to in 
Chapter 6 confirm. Yet, these products of formal inclusion can only facilitate 
negotiations between adversaries if the weaker parties’ leverage over the text is 
maximized. Both in Egypt and Tunisia, all the parties of the anti-authoritarian 
coalitions had formal membership in the main constitution-making bodies. However, 
this situation did not prevent them from eventually withdrawing from their constituent 
assemblies. Finally, it was substantive, not formal, inclusion that was at the centre of 
disputes between political opponents in Egypt, and that secularists complained they 
lacked in Tunisia prior to the launching of the Consensus Commission. These 
observations indicate that constitution-making design, and one that promotes 
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substantive inclusiveness, can encourage constitutional agreement by providing a 
safeguard against the adoption of a partisan constitution.  
There are, however, two caveats in relation to the reliance on constitution-
making design as an explanation for constitutional (dis)agreement which this thesis 
brings to the fore: the first one stems from the endogenous nature of constitution-
making designs that I explored in Chapter 7; secondly, the evidence from the Tunisian 
case, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, revealed that extensive constitutional agreement 
only materialized when weaker secularist parties became almost equal partners with 
the electorally more popular Ennahda. I have argued that this situation resulted only 
partially from the introduction of the Consensus Commission, and thereby from the 
modification of the constitution-making design. The fact that secularists became 
capable of exerting more leverage on the text of the constitution between 2013 and 
2014 cannot, therefore, be satisfactorily explained simply by pointing to the changes 
in constitution-making design. The next section revisits the issue of the origins of 
constitution-making designs. Based on the empirical evidence that I presented in 
Chapters 4 – 7, I then evaluate the relevance of alternative explanations of 
constitutional agreement reached in Tunisia.  
 
8.1.2 Limited Design Choices and the Problem of Endogeneity   
This thesis has identified the lack of attention that existing literature has paid to the 
question of how constitution-making procedures come into being. I have argued that 
this deficiency has clouded our assessment of whether, and how, constitution-making 
rules and practices matter. This research shows that there are, indeed, good reasons to 
consider the origins of design. On the one hand, the analysis of the Egyptian and 
Tunisian case studies confirmed my expectation that how a transition from 
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authoritarianism proceeds, and who controls it, determines which pathways are 
available for producing a constitution from which parties can choose. In Egypt, the 
steps taken by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which took over power after 
Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011, undermined the prospects for an inclusive 
process. When it vested the responsibility for choosing those who would draft the 
constitution, and the mechanisms through which the constitution would be adopted, to 
a parliamentary majority, it in effect diminished the possibility of a truly substantially 
inclusive process coming to the fore. After Ben Ali flew to Saudi Arabia in January 
that same year, Tunisians witnessed a transition process in which an appointed interim 
parliament composed of parties and civil society, the Higher Authority, could choose 
the electoral system for election to the NCA. Each political party was given the same 
weight in the HA, a circumstance which bode well for the implementation of inclusive 
constitution-making design in Tunisia. These findings indicate that countries might be 
sent off on different tracks not because they followed different constitution-making 
designs, but because of factors that initiated their adoption in the first place during the 
democratization process.  
On the other hand, the concerns about the endogenous nature of constitution-
making designs, and the consequences this circumstance might have for the causal 
link between inclusive design and constitutional agreement have proven to be well-
founded. Constituent assemblies, where the substance of the new charters was 
discussed in Egypt and Tunisia, on the surface appeared almost like ordinary 
legislatures. In fact, the Tunisian NCA played a double role, approving laws and 
writing the constitution. This circumstance might deceive us into thinking that the 
constitution-making bodies and their design can structure political competition in what 
is comparable to national parliaments. Yet unlike parliaments in consolidated 
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democracies, constitution-making bodies are set up for the one-off task of producing 
a constitution, and their ability to produce “stable, valued and recurring patterns of 
behaviour” which characterizes political institutions is, therefore, restricted 
(Huntington, 1968, cit. Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p. 3). As the situations from 
which these designs emerge are often so close, temporarily, to the situations in which 
constitutions are approved, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the problem of endogeneity is 
intrinsic to the study of constitution-making design. The warning formulated by 
Kitschelt and colleagues (1999, pp. 11-2) which I highlighted in Chapter 2, that new 
political institutions implemented during democratization cannot be seen as “primary 
or exclusive forces that shape” political processes because they depend on present 
power configuration, has been confirmed by this research. The authors argued that 
unless political actors put in place institutions that work against their interests 
unintentionally, political institutions become exogenous to power configurations only 
if they endure even when power relations change.  
These conditions were not met in Egypt. The level of inclusiveness promoted 
by the constitution-making design was a product of the distribution of power in the 
parliament, where Islamist parties had a significant majority. In comparison, the 
constitution-making procedures adopted in Tunisia did not suffer from endogeneity to 
the same extent. This was because some of its key aspects were determined by the 
Higher Authority, where there was a different configuration of power than that which 
existed in the NCA, and the design could, therefore, play a role in fostering agreement 
by constraining the stronger Islamist groups. The conditions formulated by Kitschelt 
et al. (1999) for institutions to become exogenous on power configurations do not, 
however, apply to the later modification of the design with the introduction of the CC, 
a body which turned out to be critical in enabling the overall constitutional agreement. 
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As it was implemented by the same parties whose behaviour it was supposed to 
structure, we should not expect the body to have played a role in bringing about 
constitutional agreement. Instead, constitution-making rules and practices became 
simply tools, albeit important ones, that helped parties to negotiate compromises when 
other factors pushed them into doing so. These findings undermine the weight 
attributed to the design-based explanation in accounting for the different outcomes 
which the countries experienced not long after their citizens ousted Ben Ali and 
Mubarak; broad constitutional agreement in Tunisia but a lack thereof in Egypt. We 
have to look elsewhere to find a more cogent answer to the question why the 
constitutional agreement materialized in Tunisia and not in Egypt.  
 
8.1.3 Alternative Explanations of Constitutional Agreement  
In Chapter 2, I outlined a number of alternative explanations that account for 
constitutional agreement and which are relevant to Tunisia. Most of them build on the 
conviction that Tunisian political parties, and the major Islamist actor, Ennahda, in 
particular, was somehow special. To begin with, Ennahda’s leadership has been 
described as progressively minded. Authors have also stressed the experience with 
cross-ideological negotiations that Islamists and secularists engaged in prior to the 
revolution (Stepan, 2012; Stepan and Linz, 2013; Brumberg, 2013). These conditions 
imply that those drafting the constitution in Tunisia perhaps tackled issues that were 
less contentious than in Egypt. I did not, however, find any support for this 
assumption. On the contrary, evidence from Egypt suggests that one of the main issues 
that created a rift between Ennahda and the secular opposition in Tunisia, relating to 
whether the political system would be presidential or parliamentary, did not ignite 
heated conflicts there (see Chapter 5).  
302 
 
Neither can a strong case be made for the argument that parties in the anti-
Mubarak coalition were more alienated and suspicious of each other when the 
transitions began than their counterparts in Tunisia. The prior experience of Tunisian 
Islamists and secularists with negotiations in what came to be known as the 18 October 
Collectif might have brought several individual members closer together. However, 
not all of the secular anti-Ben Ali coalition parties participated in these activities. As 
the talks took place mostly in exile (Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2011, p. 338), 
repression at home and the consequent lack of communication made it difficult for 
these agreements to reach the level of local activists. After the uprising, Ennahda 
embarked on its own internal process of renegotiating its position on issues that had 
been previously agreed at the negotiations between activists of the Collectif. For 
example, discussions in the NCA about the role of religion in the state revealed 
divisions within the party and the existence within Ennahda of a deeply conservative 
wing. Some of its leading deputies, as well as party activists, defended the inclusion 
of the reference to sharia in the constitution, as I explained in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 
concluded that suspicions prevailed among those drafting the document throughout 
the constitution-making process. Conflicts eventually developed to such an extent that 
most Tunisian secularists left the NCA and advocated the resignation of the Ennahda-
led government. That they returned to the drafting body and that agreement 
materialized in Tunisia and not in Egypt was, therefore, more than likely due to causes 
other than the variance in the quality of Islamist-secularist relationships. 
 This thesis cannot rule out the possibility that Tunisian parties also acted on 
normative values and that they considered the common good (Bellin, 2013). 
Nonetheless, it does not seem from the empirical analysis that it was their primary 
incentive during the constitution-making process and could, therefore, explain why 
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constitutional agreement was reached. Ennahda showed willingness to compromise 
on several key points during that period. One such example is when it agreed to 
increase the power of the president under the constitution, despite its preference for a 
parliamentary system. A second example is when it accepted the initiative to move 
constitutional negotiations to the Consensus Commission, although in that body it had 
less authority compared to other constitutional commissions. Despite these examples, 
I found that the party always had a number of reasons for its willingness to 
compromise, including the growing criticism of the policies of its government. 
Therefore, I maintain that we should seek to understand why parties of the anti-
authoritarian coalition found a way to compromise and so reach agreement, rather than 
relying on the “compromise mentality” (Marzouki, 2015) as an explanation.  
The explanation that I propose, based on the evidence presented in this thesis, 
is that a situation in which neither Islamists nor secularists could best their rivals 
pushed parties towards negotiations amid intensifying conflicts and incentivized 
Ennahda to make further concessions on the text of the constitution. This situation was 
generated, above all, by shifts in the distribution of power between Ennahda and its 
secularist opponents, who attracted more popular support from 2013 onwards. This 
swing, as I argued in Chapter 4, occurred as initially fragmented secularist parties in 
the NCA came to coalesce more tightly in their opposition to Ennahda. This 
development was accompanied by the rising popularity of Nidaa Tounes, a new 
political party which emerged as a leading voice of the secularist opposition and whose 
popularity challenged Ennahda, tipping the scales of power even more in favour of 
those who opposed a stronger role for religion in politics. However, because of the 
inclusion of figures linked to the outgoing regime in Nidaa’s top ranks, the party 
should not be seen as a member of the anti-authoritarian coalition. Citizens and civil 
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society activists, who mobilized in support of secularist demands during the crisis in 
the summer of 2013, gave secularists even more influence. In parallel, other Islamist 
parties in the NCA disintegrated, which undermined the influence they could 
otherwise have exerted on the text of the constitution.  
As a result, even though non-Islamist parties entered the NCA significantly 
weaker than Islamists in October 2011, they were able to gradually improve their 
position throughout the constitution-making process. By the time they came to 
negotiate with Ennahda about the resignation of its government through the platform 
of the Quartet-led National Dialogue in autumn 2013, they did so having become a 
political force comparable to that of the Islamists. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5 and 
6, the interlinkage between the Dialogue and constitutional negotiations changed the 
situation within the NCA, endowing non-Islamist parties with a new strength that they 
could use to bend the constitution into an even more acceptable shape, despite the fact 
that they were still in the minority in the NCA.  
This newly acquired balance between Islamist and secularist forces created a 
situation in which political parties across the religious divide understood there was no 
viable alternative to compromise given the political crisis of the summer of 2013. This 
involved, among other issues, settling on a constitutional text that was acceptable, at 
least to some extent, to everyone. According to a member of the opposition Nidaa 
Tounes, “everybody had to understand that they could not exclude the other party. 
You cannot exclude so significant part of the Tunisian people… It would be a civil 
war”.332 A similar rationale was put forward by Ennahda’s Prime Minister, Ali 
Larayedh. According to him: 
                                               
 




… the most important reason for the national dialogue was not the 
level of maturity, patriotism, and belief in peaceful solutions. This 
was certainly true, but the most important reason was the inability 
of antagonistic forces to find a solution to the crisis in another way. 
(…) What especially brought the [parties] to accept (these 
conditions of the national dialogue) was their inability to remove 
the government by force and our understanding that the situation 
had become untenable (M’Rad, 2015, pp. 59-60).   
 
Ennahda’s choice of pragmatism, which led the party to introduce other 
concessions in the period between the presentation of the penultimate draft of the 
constitution and the document finally adopted resulted, of course, from multiple 
motivating factors. One of these could well have been the party’s historical experience 
of repression and the fear that the return of authoritarianism could prevent its direct 
involvement in politics (Marks, 2015; Marzouki, 2015; 2017, pp. 343-52). The 
military coup that in Egypt removed Islamist President Morsi in July 2013, just before 
the second political assassination in Tunisia drove citizens on to the streets, clearly 
cemented this choice, as I explained in Chapter 7 (see also Marks, 2015). Nevertheless, 
the empirical evidence that I gathered points to the importance of a situation in which 
there was no alternative to settling on the constitution, a state of affairs that was 
facilitated by the new balance of power between Islamist and secularist parties, for 
arriving at a constitution that was acceptable across the religious divide and 
consequently agreed.  
This balance of power dynamic was missing in Egypt, as Chapter 4 revealed. 
This was not, however, because the Freedom and Justice Party was stronger than 
Ennahda. In fact, it won a similar share of the vote as Ennahda did in the first 
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democratic elections. The difference was that the overall Islamist voice was boosted 
by conservative Salafist forces, which emerged as the second strongest political actor 
after the revolution. It proved more difficult for non-Islamist parties to find common 
ground with them than was the case with the more pragmatic FJP. The last option of 
the secular-leaning parties in Egypt to counterbalance the Islamists was that of turning 
to the military. Nonetheless, more research is necessary to further confirm the 
relevance of the balance of power scenario in the Egyptian case.   
These conclusions resonate with those of early transition literature which 
reasoned that situations where no party could impose unilateral solutions were most 
conducive to pacted transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 44; Przeworski, 
1988). Brownlee et al. (2015, p. 197), in their comparison of Arab Spring countries, 
put most explanatory weight on the differences in power distribution between 
Islamists and secularists when accounting for the contrasting outcomes following 
transition in Egypt and Tunisia. This thesis adds nuance to their findings by showing 
how the shifts in the distribution of power developed throughout time. Secularists 
came to counterbalance Ennahda only in the last phase of the constitution-writing 
process. 
Finally, the thesis emphasizes that neither constitution-making processes nor 
constitutional agreements can be viewed as isolated islands. The experience of Tunisia 
showed that overall constitutional agreement was intertwined with other political 
deals. Ennahda’s opponents were as interested in the constitution as in Ennahda losing 
power, and some, especially Nidaa Tounes, more than others. For the constitution to 
be voted through, Ennahda’s text-related concessions had to be accompanied by its 
promise to withdraw from government and in its place install a technocrat cabinet. 
Disagreement in Egypt was clearly influenced by the complicated context of the 
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transition, which featured the dissolution of a popularly elected lower chamber of 
parliament, conflicts between the FJP, judges, and the military, and competition 
between Islamists and secularists over political influence. We are reminded that 
constitution-making is only one area of political contention during democratization, 
and that it plays out against a backdrop of wider struggles for political power.  
 
8.2 Contributions to Literature 
I argued in Chapter 2 that, despite their shared agenda, scholars of constitution change 
rarely probed the contexts in which democratization occurred, and vice versa, students 
of democratization largely ignored the processes through which constitutions emerge 
after the breakdown of authoritarian rule. The main theoretical contribution of this 
thesis lies in bringing these scholarly perspectives together. By drawing on both these 
two traditions, this thesis offers contributions to the literature on democratization and 
constitution-making design, while also enhancing our understanding of the 
constitutional and democratic change processes that evolved in Egypt and Tunisia 
post-2011.  
This thesis has made two distinctive contributions to the burgeoning body of 
research on constitution-making. First, it theoretically broke down the long and often 
abstract causal chains that have often been assumed in the large-N studies into the 
procedures that guide constitutional change. The qualitative analysis that this research 
employed enabled me to probe the individual building blocks of existing assumptions 
about the role of constitution-making designs in significant depth. In addition, I was 
able to identify those factors that are conducive to the implementation of inclusive 
designs. This analytical depth has been achieved by limiting the research scope by: (a) 
concentrating on the specific context of democratization; (b) taking into account only 
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one aspect of inclusion, that of political parties, as opposed to focusing on 
inclusiveness in more general terms; and, (c) by investigating constitutional 
agreement, which is a more proximate outcome compared to dependent variables more 
typically studied. These choices have their consequences for the generalizability of the 
proposed findings, which I note below. Nevertheless, I believe that this trade-off is a 
necessary one given our current state of knowledge about the role of constitution-
making design during democratization, which, as I have shown, has been constrained 
by methodological and conceptual challenges that prevented authors in this field to 
draw more systematic patterns from comparisons of a larger number of cases. 
Against the backdrop of scholarly and practitioner enthusiasm about the 
potentially positive effects of constitution-making processes, this research moderates 
the argument that constitution-making design matters. The empirical analysis proves 
that Elster (2012, p. 149) was right to view constitution-making design first of all as a 
tool to minimize potential problems, not more. There are, however, additional 
limitations to what even well-designed constitution-making processes can achieve. 
While being modest in his conclusions, Elster (2012, p. 149) expected rules and 
practices that guide how constitution-making unravels can function as “procedural 
safeguards”. Yet constitution-making designs are not neutral. They tend to reflect 
existing power relations, as I have proved in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. This 
condition of endogeneity might considerably reduce their potential to constrain 
stronger political actors, and, therefore, their independent effect on the outcomes 
explored.  
Second, the thesis has developed conceptual tools to study inclusiveness. They 
help to distinguish between two forms of horizontal, elite inclusion in constitution-
making: substantive and formal. I have put this conceptual framework into practice, 
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showing how participants themselves perceive inclusive processes, and tracing the 
mechanisms through which the two types of inclusiveness contribute to constitutional 
agreement. The research revealed that while there are, indeed, benefits to members of 
parties being involved formally in constitution-making bodies, what political 
adversaries seek during democratization, and what conflicts with their opponents are 
about, is, ultimately, their ability to modify the constitution. By laying down and 
testing this conceptual framework, the thesis prepares ground for further inquiry into 
constitution-making design in terms of the inclusion of political parties across deep 
political divides. This aspect of inclusion has been largely overlooked in the literature, 
as authors have given more attention to the inclusion of citizens.  
In addition, this thesis informs the debates about democratization by 
emphasizing that the configuration of macro-political institutions might not be the 
only, or even the most important, element of political negotiations in the aftermath of 
a breakdown of authoritarian rule. The experience of Egypt and Tunisia shows that 
disagreements about the role of religion in the state, and constitutional formulations 
specifying rights and freedoms, were essential parts of constitutional agreements 
reached and, as such, they deserve further attention.  
The final contribution is empirical. The analysis that this thesis puts forward 
relies heavily on primary empirical material from two recent cases of democratic and 
constitutional change. The bulk of this data comes from semi-structured interviews 
with the key participants in these political events, which I collected in Tunis, Cairo 
and Prague in several rounds between 2014 and 2017. In total, this project builds on 
close to 60 qualitative interviews, in addition to systematic analysis of newspaper 
reports that informed the exploration of constitution-making in Egypt. This rich 
material allowed me not only to shed light on the link between inclusive constitution-
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making design and constitutional agreement, but also to provide new insights into the 
question why constitutional agreement was secured in Tunisia but not in Egypt, after 
the 2010/11 uprisings.      
  
8.3 Limitations and Future Research Avenues  
There are, of course, limitations to this research. The political situation in Egypt after 
the military intervention in July 2013 prevented me from returning to Cairo for further 
fieldwork. The interview material at my disposal relating to the Egyptian case was 
consequently not as complete as that which I gathered in Tunisia. While I sought to 
make up for this shortcoming by supplementing interview data with newspaper 
analysis, I could not replicate the empirical depth achieved in the Tunisian case study. 
However, I have been as open as possible about this limitation from the outset, and 
been very clear to denote instances when I lacked sufficient data to draw conclusions.  
As already stated, there are limits to the generalizability of my findings. The 
conclusions drawn from this research are relevant, above all, for cases of constitutional 
change during democratization and where political forces face considerable divisions. 
Nonetheless, I believe that two elements of this research can inform the exploration of 
constitution-making design more broadly. These are, on the one hand, the conceptual 
tools that I developed to inquire into the inclusion of political parties in constitution-
making. Both the conceptualization and operationalization of formal and substantive 
inclusiveness may be useful to scholars who study the involvement of actors other 
than political parties or who analyse other contexts than democratization in which 
constitutional change unfolds. On the other hand, researchers interested in exploring 
constitution-making may build on the identification of the factors that I singled out for 
their potential to influence what type of a constitution-making process would emerge, 
311 
 
as well as on the assessment of implications that the endogenous nature of 
constitution-making designs can have for their explanatory value.  
This thesis has focused on constitutional agreement as the major outcome that 
is assessed rather than on democracy. Even though agreement on the new institutional 
framework might be a necessary step for achieving democracy, as maintained by 
scholars of democratic transition and consolidation, it does not guarantee democracy 
would, indeed, be attained. I found that constitution-making rules and practices that 
promote inclusiveness can encourage compromise, thus fostering agreement. Yet, 
compromises might not always yield the best constitutional texts and may result in 
ambiguous constitutions and flawed political institutions that undermine good 
governance and, ultimately, the consolidation and quality of democracy. The 
relationship between constitution-making design and democracy, thus, remains an 
open question.  
Finally, considering how political parties participate in constitutional 
negotiations and shape the constitutional text, this thesis has tackled only one aspect 
of inclusiveness. Even as other actors played an important role in constitution-making 
processes in Egypt and Tunisia, such as civil society activists and revolutionaries, they 
remained at the margins of this research project. Other scholars have, in the meantime, 
explored how citizens are involved in constitutional change. I have argued in Chapter 
2 that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but that the involvement of 
political elites and citizens can supplement each other in producing a constitution that 
is widely embraced and creates the basis for a flourishing democracy. A next logical 





8.4 Final Reflections 
Policy documents and studies on constitution-making have suggested that 
constitutions written after conflict and authoritarian breakdown should be produced 
through inclusive processes, where a temporary majority cannot impose its own vision 
on others. This thesis supports this contention, showing that this component is critical, 
especially where political forces whose approval of the constitution is required are 
divided along religious lines. The real challenge, however, is to facilitate the adoption 
of an inclusive processes in cases where the distribution of power between parties is 
not conducive to inclusion, and where the main players do not think about the general 
good to an extent that suggests to them that they should implement an inclusive 
constitution-making design. With these conclusions in mind, does it make sense to 
recommend the adoption of an inclusive constitution-making design to   countries 
embarking on the process of democratization? Or, is the fixation on constitution-
making process a waste of time and effort, given the constraints on the implementation 
of a suitable design, and the limited impact it may have on constitutional agreement?  
In March 2018, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
met in Prague to discuss issues of participation and inclusion, which had been 
previously recognized by its member states as indispensable requirements for the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The conference also 
brought together civil society representatives. Presentations by two of them, Professor 
of Urban and Regional planning at the Ryerson University in Toronto, Mitchel Kosny, 
and Tunisian women’s rights activist, Hedia Belhadj, were inspirational for my 
reflections on the “best practices” in constitution-making. An advocate of 
participatory and inclusive housing involved in a large social housing project in 
Toronto, Kosny did not think the SDGs discernibly influenced what he and his team 
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did within their housing project. Nevertheless, he saw the guidelines as an important 
framework that gave their efforts a “validation at a higher level”. To women’s rights 
activist, Belhadj, the goals provided an “opportunity to push for certain issues”.333 
Analogously, putting the agenda of inclusive constitution-making processes on the 
table creates a normative backdrop that weaker actors can rely on when pressurizing 
majority parties to introduce more inclusive constitution-making rules. Insisting on 
the constitution-making “best practices” might make sense, yet we should be wary of 
what constitution-making processes and their design can do. 
  
                                               
 
333 This is based on the author’s notes taken during the 2018 ECOSOC Special Meeting “Towards 
sustainable, resilient and inclusive societies through the participation of all” which took place on 26 – 
27 March 2018 in Prague. See ECOSOC, “2018 ECOSOC Special Meeting ‘Towards sustainable, 
resilient and inclusive societies through participation of all’”, available at: 
https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/node/3371101 [accessed 15 September 2018].  
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General labour strike. Large demonstrations erupt throughout Tunisia. 
Ben Ali flees to Saudi Arabia.  
Original date of the NCA elections.  
23 October  Elections to the NCA are held. 
22 November The NCA meets for the first time.  
10 December Deputies adopt the OPPP, a law that serves as an interim constitution.   
2012  
20 January The NCA adopts Rules and Procedures that elaborate on the 
provisions that will guide the work on the constitution.  
14 February  Work on the constitution begins in six constituent commissions.  
June  The formation of the Nidaa Tounes is announced by its founder, Beji 
Caid Essebsi. 
October A Nidaa activist is murdered in Tatouine by members of the LPR. 
2013  
6 February  Chokri Belaid, leader of WATAD and member of the PF, is 
assassinated by an unknown assailant.  
19 February Ennahda’s government led by Hamadi Jebali resigns and is replaced 
by a cabinet led by Ali Larayedh (Ennahda).  
15 April  The National Dialogue is launched by President Moncef Marzouki.  
1 June  Fourth and final draft of the constitution is released, stirring 
controversy.  
29 June Consensus Commission begins its work.  
25 July Another outspoken leftist figure and PF member, Mohamed Brahmi, 
is assassinated in front of his house in Tunis. The murder is followed 
by large protests.   
July Around 60 deputies withdraw from the NCA in protest, some of them 
demanding the dissolution of the NCA. Opponents of the Ennahda-led 
government, accompanied by protesters, gather in front of the NCA 
building in Bardo and begin a sit-in. 
6 August NCA President, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, suspends all NCA activities.  
12 September The NCA resumes its work but many opposition MPs continue their 
boycott. 
5 October Most of the parties of the anti-Ben Ali coalition sign the National 
Dialogue Roadmap proposed by the mediating Quartet.  
14 December A new prime minister is announced.  
2014  
3 – 26 January The process of voting on and amending each article of the 
constitution is completed by a vote on the entire draft, which is 
adopted by 200 of 216 NCA deputies.   
8 January The NCA elects members of the independent election commission, 
ISIE.   
28 January The NCA approves a technocratic cabinet led by Mehdi Jomaa.  
26 October Parliamentary elections take place. Nidaa Tounes obtains 37.56 % of 
the vote. Ennahda comes second with 27.79 %.  








11 February SCAF announces Hosni Mubarak has stepped down and suspends 
the 1971 Constitution.   
14 February  SCAF appoints a committee of experts to propose constitutional 
amendments. 
19 March  Voters approve amendments to the 1971 Constitution in a popular 
referendum.  
30 March  SCAF issues a Constitutional Declaration, which specifies important 
constitution-making deadlines and procedures.  
28 November 
– 11 January 
2012 
Three rounds of the parliamentary elections and additional run-offs 
take place.  
2012  
3 March First joint session of both parliamentary chambers begins with 
discussions on the selection criteria for the CA.  
28 March The first CA meets for the first time but is halted by walkouts.  
10 April  Supreme Administrative Court suspends the first CA. 
12 June  MPs elect members of the second CA at a joint parliamentary 
session.  
14 June  The People’s Assembly, the lower chamber of parliament, receives 
dissolution order from the SCAF after the Supreme Constitutional 
Court ruled it unconstitutional.  
24 June  Mohamed Morsi (FJP) is elected president. 
22 November President Morsi releases a controversial Constitutional Declaration. 
29 November  The Islamist-dominated CA is boycotted by non-Islamists but passes 
the new constitution.   
15 – 22 
December 
After a popular referendum consisting of two rounds, voters approve 
the new constitution.   
2013  
3 July General Abdel Fatah El-Sisi removes President Morsi and suspends 





Appendix III. List of Interviews 
Name  Affiliation Date  Location   
Samir Taïeb Al-Massar 2 October 2015 Tunis  
Salma Baccar Al-Massar 30 June 2014 Tunis 







Ikbel Msada CPR 10 July 2014 
9 November 2016 
Tunis 
 
Heythem Belgacem  CPR 9 October 2015 Tunis 





Mustafa Ben Jaafar Ettakatol 7 October 2015 Tunis 







Mehrezia Labidi  Ennahda 10 July 2014 Tunis 
Badredine Abdelkafi Ennahda 7 July 2014 Tunis 
Zied Ladhari  Ennahda 9 July 2014 Tunis 
Sabhi Atigue Ennahda 15 November 
2016 
Tunis 
Habib Khedher Ennahda 25 November 
2016 
Tunis 
Latifa Habachi  Ennahda 25 November 
2016 
Tunis 
Amer Laarayedh  Ennahda 3 December 2016 Tunis 
Mahmoud Baroudi Democratic Alliance 
(formerly PDP) 
24 June 2014 Tunis 
Mohamed Gahbich  Democratic Alliance 
(formerly PDP) 
25 June 2014 Tunis 
Mongi Rahoui  WATAD  2 July 2014 Tunis 
Hamma Hammami  PF 14 December 
2016 
Tunis 
Rim Mahjoub  Afek Tounes 3 July 2014 Tunis 
Mahmoud Ben Romdhane Machrou Tounes 
(formerly Nidaa 
Tounes) 
8 December 2016 Tunis 






Selim Ben Abdessalam Nidaa Tounes 
(formerly Ettakatol 
and Al-Massar) 







Asmaa Nouira Law Professor, HA 27 June 2014 Tunis 





Ghazi Gherairi Law Professor, HA 9 November 2016 Tunis 
Mohamed Fadhel 
Mahfoudh  





Abdessatar Ben Moussa LTDH 14 December 
2016 
Tunis 
Anuar Ben Kaddour UGGT 3 July 2014 Tunis 
Haykel Ben Mahfoudh Constitutional expert 26 June 2014 Tunis 
Achref Aoudi iWatch  8 July 2014 Tunis 










Thierry Bresillon Journalist  15 November 
2016 
Tunis 
Amr Hamzawy Egypt Freedom 
Party  
8 October 2017 Prague 
Farid Zahran  ESDP 14 August 2014 Cairo  
Ahmed Said FEP 12 August 2014 Cairo 
Amr El-Shobaki Al-Adl Party  11 August 2014 Cairo 
Anwar Sadat Reform and 
Development Party 
6 August 2014 Cairo  
Mohamed Abdel Alim 
Dawoud 
Wafd Party 17 August 2014 Cairo  
Mohamed Mohi El-Din Ghad Al-Thawra 
Party 
10 August 2014 Cairo  
Mustafa Kamel El-Sayyid Socialist Popular 
Alliance 
7 August 2014 Cairo  
Zaid Al-Ali  International IDEA 12 August 2014 Cairo  
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